Independent regulatory commissions. Report of the Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (pursuant to section 136 of the legislative reorganization act of 1946, Public Law 601, 79th congress, and house resolution 56, as amended, 86th congress)

January 3, 1961.

Independent regulatory commissions : report of the Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce [pursuant to section 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, P.L. 601, 79th Cong., and H. Res. 99, as amended, 85th Congress.

Mode of access: Internet.

Comparison of elected and appointed regulatory commissions.

"November 1982."

Cell-to-cell contact-independent regulatory T cells in human tuberculosis

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Investigation of regulatory commissions and agencies : interim report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight.

"February 9, 1960."

Regulatory agency budgets : hearings ... Ninety-second Congress, second session, on S. 448 ...

"S. 448, to provide that the appropriation requests of certain regulatory agencies be transmitted directly to Congress."

Regulatory reform--1974 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-third Congress, second session ...

Pt. 1 erroneously says S. 4155.

Organização administrativa brasileira: quadro atual e propostas acerca da estruturação de entidades vocacionais ao desenvolvimento de políticas de estado, não subordinadas ao poder público central

o objeto da presente pesquisa é evidenciar o padrão de Estado Regulador brasileiro, sua complexidade e o modelo adotado, em parte, na década de 90, para a sua implementação, notadamente com a criação de algumas autarquias especiais dotadas de autonomia funcional diferenciada em relação ao Poder Público central. Examinando os motivos e a forma adotada para a estruturação dessas entidades reguladoras, no bojo de uma tentativa de reformar a organização administrativa, sob a forma gerencial, pretende-se analisar se esse caminho deve ser trilhado, ainda que em parte, para outros setores. A análise envolve a possível redefinição da divisão de tarefas e competências entre "entidades de Governo" e entes públicos cuja missão requer continuidade ("órgãos de Estado"), especialmente, nos casos de alternância do poder. Pretende-se contribuir para a estruturação de entidades vocacionadas para o desenvolvimento de políticas de Estado.

Interim report of the Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight, pursuant to section 136 of the Legislative reorganization act of 1946, Public law 601, 79th Congress, and House resolution 99, as amended, 85th Congress [on] Federal Communications Commission.

Mode of access: Internet.

Having your cake and eating it too: Can regulatory agencies be both independent and accountable?

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) were created in various sectors and on different governmental levels to implement liberalization policies. This paper investigates the link between IRAs' independence, which is said to promote regulatory credibility and the use of technical expertise, and their accountability, which is related to the need for controlling and legitimizing independent regulators. The literature on the regulatory state anticipates a positive relation between the independence and accountability of IRAs, but systematic empirical evidence is still lacking. To tackle this question, this paper measures and compares the independence and the accountability of IRAs in three differentially liberalized sectors in Switzerland (telecommunications, electricity and railways). With the application of Social Network Analysis, this piece of research shows that IRAs can be de facto independent and accountable at the same time, but the two features do not necessarily co-evolve in the same direction.

“Giving Dracula the keys to the blood bank? Interrogating the Fifth Crown Casino Licensing Regulatory Review

Drawing on narrative analysis, this paper analyses the 2013 Fifth Regulatory Review of the license of an Australian casino as a case study focused on the framing and articulation of ‘responsible gambling’ (RG) in the Review. Part 1 sets out the policy and regulatory context for the licensing review of Melbourne’s Crown Casino. Part 2 overviews the structure/content of the Review; the key messages of the Reviewers’ narrative and its main recommendations. In reflecting on the Review in Part 3, analysis focuses on the investigation and recommendations regarding Responsible Gambling, which has gained recent policy priority. The analysis interrogates the Review’s findings, narratives, processes and evidentiary base in relation to how it presents and assesses casino performance on RG. In doing so, it focuses on the Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation’s Review’s framing of RG; sources of evidence drawn on by the Review; an assessment of the casino’s loyalty club feature ‘Play Safe’, as an RG measure; the Review’s assessment of casino performance on RG and its Code of Conduct in particular; and the Review’s framing of RG recommendations. It concludes with reflections on governance issues raised by the Review, the need for more focus on the neglected area of regulatory licensing and enforcement (OECD, 2011; 2012; OECD & European Commission, 2009) and the need for independent regulatory reviews that address conflicts of interest on the part of both Government and the Regulator.

L’AIR nella pratica di una Autorità indipendente: l’esperienza dell’Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas di applicazione dell’AIR alla regolazione della qualità del servizio

In the last ten years Regulatory Impact Analysis has become the instrument providing groundwork for evidence-based regulatory decisions in most developed countries. However, to an increase in quantity, it did not correspond an increase in quality. In Italy, Regulatory Impact Analysis has been in place for ten years on paper, but in practice it has not been performed consistently. Of particular interest is the case of independent regulatory authorities, which have been required to apply Regulatory Impact Analysis since 2003. This paper explores how Regulatory Impact Analysis is carried out, by examining in depth how an individual case –on the Regulation for Quality of Service- was executed by the Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas. The aim is to provide a picture of the process leading to the final Regulatory Impact Analysis report, rather than just a study of its content. The case illustrates how Regulatory Impact Analysis, when properly employed, can be an important aid to the regulatory decision, not only by assessing ex ante the economic impacts of regulatory proposals in terms of costs, benefits and risks, but also opening the spectrum of policy alternatives and systematically considering stakeholder opinions as part of the decision-making process. This case highlights also several difficulties, analytical and process-related, that emerge in practical applications. Finally, it shows that the experience and expertise built by the regulatory authority over the years had a significant impact on the quality of the analysis.

O lugar da imagem: ANCINE, ANCINAV e o desafio da regulação do audiovisual no Brasil

O objetivo desta pesquisa é analisar como políticas públicas de regulação, fiscalização e incentivo à indústria audiovisual no Brasil, a partir da criação da ANCINE ¿ Agência Nacional do Cinema estão inseridas na perspectiva das transformações recentes do aparato institucional do Estado brasileiro e qual o seu sentido para o entendimento das agências reguladoras independentes no país. Além disso, avaliamos o debate sobre a mudança no perfil e escopo da agência, para uma perspectiva mais estritamente regulatória,com a proposta de sua substituição pela ANCINAV ¿ Agência Nacional do Cinema e do Audiovisual e a forma polêmica pela qual esta proposta foi discutida, tanto no campo setorial como no âmbito político mais amplo. Interpretamos essa experiência brasileira como a difusão de um aparato institucional articulador de política pública setorial, concretização, ainda que potencial, dos anseios por legitimidade, credibilidade e estabilidade institucional no setor, ao mesmo tempo que limitada em seu escopo regulatório pela dificuldade em ampliar sua atividade em direção aos meios de comunicação de massa.

Modelos organizacionais e normatividade institucional: estudo de caso da SABESP S.A.

The present paper aspires to join two different debates: (i) what is the State’s best organizational model to promote distinctive public services; and (ii) what role Law should perform in the promotion of a nation’s economic and social development. More specifically, this study examines whether the institutions created by the Brazilian normative system are able to balance the antagonist interests of the State and minority shareholders in a Government-Controlled Corporation. In this pursuit, this paper analyzes the changes that occurred in SABESP S.A. during the period between the years of 2000 – 2010, of major transformations in the Brazilian Water and Sewage sector. At that time, the company was introduced to the Novo Mercado of BM&FBovespa, was forced to execute agreements with conceding authorities and started to be monitored by ARSESP, an independent regulatory agency. Initial findings suggest that these institutions were able to create incentives for the company to strive for a more efficient performance, often succeeding in aligning the contrasting interests of the State and minority shareholders. Final conclusions are that: (i) Government-Controlled Corporations can be powerful public policy promotion instruments in sectors that are complex and capital intensive; and (ii) Law can and should perform a much more active role in sponsoring economic and social development than merely acting to diminish transaction costs to allow for the adequate functioning of markets.

O Processo de agencificação no Brasil: divergência ou mimetismo?

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar o processo de difusão das agências reguladoras independentes no Brasil, ou agencificação, com o intuito de verificar se este processo foi convergente ou divergente, de acordo com duas perspectivas teóricas concorrentes que buscam compreender os processos de difusão. Para isso, foram verificados os mecanismos de difusão – natureza política, verticais e horizontais – e identificadas variáveis contextuais relevantes – como a aparente confusão feita entre flexibilidade de gestão e regulação, o federalismo regulatório, a presença de atores setoriais fortemente articulados, e a importância das moedas de troca no presidencialismo multipartidário brasileiro – que atuaram no processo brasileiro de agencificação. As peculiaridades do caso brasileiro, como a criação de uma agência independente para o cinema e as mudanças ocorridas em âmbito estadual, indicam tratar-se de uma “difusão sem convergência” ou “convergência divergente”, uma vez que, embora o Brasil tenha experimentado uma “explosão” de agências reguladoras, estas foram modeladas de acordo com as necessidades locais e especificidades do contexto nacional.