The informational value of incumbency

This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage without recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters information about governing politicians not available from challengers. Because there are many reasons for high reelection rates different from incumbency status, we propose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection success. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage and ideological and selection biases. An important implication of our analysis is that the literature linking incumbency and legislature irresponsibility most likely provides an overestimation of the latter.

Incumbency (dis)advantage when citizens can propose

This paper analyses the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to citizen proposals such as the outcome of referenda or popular initiatives. We argue that these proposals constitute a potential source of electoral disadvantage when citizens factor in their evaluation of the incumbent his reaction to these proposals. This is because an incumbent politician may jeopardize his re-election by implementing policies close to his preferred ones but unpopular among the electorate. We characterize conditions under which this potential disadvantage becomes in fact an electoral advantage for the incumbent. We find that the choices of the incumbent during the legislature will be closest to citizens policy proposals when the intensity of electoral competition is neither too soft nor too tough. Finally, we use our results to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms such as referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition and on the incumbency advantage phenomenon.

Incumbency Reconsidered: Prospects, Strategic Entry, and Incumbent Quality in U.S. House Elections

Efforts to estimate the magnitude of the incumbency effect in U.S. House elections and assess its political meaning have been complicated by two omitted-variables problems. First, in the absence of an adequate measure of incumbent prospects, estimates of the magnitude of the incumbency effect fail to control for selection effects associated with the decision incumbents make about whether to run for reelection. Strategic incumbents enter races they think they can win and withdraw when they expect to lose. The consequence is an upward bias in estimates of incumbents’ electoral advantages. Second, the normative implications of high reelection rates cannot be assessed without measuring incumbent quality, since a possible explanation for their electoral success is that incumbents are of high quality and doing a good job. We propose a strategy for measuring incumbent prospects and quality, demonstrate the strategic nature of incumbent and challenger entry, re-estimate the incumbency effect, and show that incumbent quality has an impact on electoral outcomes. Our conclusion is that incumbents’ advantages in House elections have been over estimated while the positive basis of incumbent safety is typically under appreciated.

Economic Policy Voting and Incumbency: Unemployment in Western Europe

The economic voting literature has been dominated by the incumbency-oriented hypothesis, where voters reward or punish government at the ballot box according to economic performance. The alternative, policy-oriented hypothesis, where voters favor parties closest to their issue position, has been neglected in this literature. We explore policy voting with respect to an archetypal economic policy issue – unemployment. Voters who favor lower unemployment should tend to vote for left parties, since they “own” the issue. Examining a large time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) pool of Western European nations, we find some evidence for economic policy voting. However, it exists in a form conditioned by incumbency. According to varied tests, left incumbents actually experience a net electoral cost, if the unemployment rate climbs under their regime. Incumbency, then, serves to break any natural economic policy advantage that might accrue to the left due to the unemployment issue.

Economic Policy Voting and Incumbency: Unemployment in Western Europe

The economic voting literature has been dominated by the incumbency-oriented hypothesis, where voters reward or punish government at the ballot box according to economic performance. The alternative, policy-oriented hypothesis, where voters favor parties closest to their issue position, has been neglected in this literature. We explore policy voting with respect to an archetypal economic policy issue – unemployment. Voters who favor lower unemployment should tend to vote for left parties, since they “own” the issue. Examining a large time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) pool of Western European nations, we find some evidence for economic policy voting. However, it exists in a form conditioned by incumbency. According to varied tests, left incumbents actually experience a net electoral cost, if the unemployment rate climbs under their regime. Incumbency, then, serves to break any natural economic policy advantage that might accrue to the left due to the unemployment issue.

Analyzing the researcher's work in generating data: The case of complaints

This article investigates the researcher's work in the coproduction (or not) of complaint sequences in research interviews. Using a conversation analytic approach, we show how the interviewer's management of complaint sequences in a research setting is consequential for subsequent talk and thus directly affects the data generated. In the examples shown here, researchers sharing cocategorial incumbency with respondents may well provide spaces for research participants to formulate complaints. This article examines sequences of talk surrounding complaints to show how researchers generate complaints (or not) and handle unsafe complaints. Researchers are able to provoke specific types of accounts from respondents, whereas their respondents may actively resist the researchers' direction. For researchers using the interview as a method of data generation, examination of complaint sequences and how these appear in interview data provides insight into how interview talk is coproduced and managed within a socially situated setting.

Parties, governments and pollsters: A new form of patronage?

In its first term, the Howard government hired Australasian Research Strategies (ARS), headed by pollster Mark Textor, to conduct market research for several Commonwealth departments and agencies. This was, the Labor Opposition claimed, a case of the Liberals handing jobs to their 'mates'. Textor played a key role in the Liberals' 1996 and 1998 federal election campaigns. However, Labor's attack rings hollow since in the 1980s the Hawke government similarly contracted Rod Cameron's ANOP to conduct opinion research for Commonwealth departments and agencies. At the time Cameron was Labor's strategic pollster and centrally involved in planning Labor election campaigns. On both sides of Australian politics, governments have begun to channel patronage towards their party's pollsters. In this research note, we suggest that this development cannot be explained as 'jobs for the boys'. Instead, this new form of patronage has its roots in the vital role that pollsters now play in guiding election campaigns, and in the commercial reality that Australian politics provides too little work to sustain specialist political pollsters. Parties in government now appear to utilise incumbency to sustain an ongoing relationship with the commercial polling organisations like ANOP and ARS to whom they will entrust much of the planning of their campaign for re-election.

Fixed-mobile integration

Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more efficient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards, amplifying any incumbency advantage. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform off-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation and even allows to maintain some of the efficiency gains.

Entry and market selection of firms: a laboratory study

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases. When all firms' costs are the same entry always leads consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer surplus to equilibrium. However, total profits remain below equilibrium, due to the fact that the inefficient incumbents produce too much and efficient entrants produce too little. Market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers' standpoint, but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. These results are not affected by whether entry is simultaneous or sequential. The length of the incumbency phase does have some subtle effects.

The disadvantage of winning an election

This paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or policy proposals coming from different sources. We argue that this potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advantages that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages. Finally, we use the results of this analysis to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition.

Leadership at the upper echelons : three essays

"IT'S THE ECONOMY STUPID", BUT CHARISMA MATTERS TOO: A DUAL PROCESS MODEL OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OUTCOMES. ABSTRACT Because charisma is assumed to be an important determinant of effective leadership, the extent to which a presidential nominee is more charismatic than his opponent should be an important determinant of voter choices. We computed a composite measure of the rhetorical richness of acceptances speeches given by U.S. presidential candidates at their national party convention. We added this marker of charisma to Ray C. Fair's presidential vote-share equation (1978; 2009). We theorized that voters decide using psychological attribution (i.e., due to macroeconomics and incumbency) as well as inferential processes (i.e., due to leader charismatic behavior) when voting. Controlling for the macro-level variables and incumbency in the Fair model, our results indicated that difference between nominees' charisma is a significant determinant of electoral success, particularly in close elections. This extended model significantly improves the precision of the Fair model and correctly predicts 23 out of the last 24 U.S. presidential elections. Paper 2: IT CEO LEADERSHIP, CORPORATE SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE. ABSTRACT We investigated whether CEO leadership predicted corporate financial performance (CFP) and corporate social performance (CSP). Using longitudinal data on 258 CEOs from 117 firms across 19 countries and 10 industry sectors, we found that determinants of CEO leadership (i.e., implicit motives) significantly predicted both CFP and CSP. As expected, the most consistent positive predictor was Responsibility Disposition when interacting with n (need for) Power. n Achievement and n Affiliation were generally negatively related or unrelated to outcomes. CSP was positively related to accounting measures of CFP. Our findings suggest that executive leader characteristics have important consequences for corporate level outcomes. Paper 3. PUNISHING THE POWERFUL: ATTRIBUTIONS OF BLAME AND LEADERSHIP ABSTRACT We propose that individuals are more lenient in attributing blame to leaders than to nonleaders. We advance a motivational explanation building on the perspective of punishment and on system justification theory. We conducted two scenario experiments which supported our proposition. In study 1, wrongdoer leader status was negatively related to blame and the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing. In study 2, controlling for the Big-Five personality factor and individual differences in moral evaluation (i.e., moral foundations), wrongdoer leader status was negatively related with desired severity of punishment, and fair punishments were perceived as more just for non-leaders than for leaders.

Good genes and good luck: Ammonoid diversity and the end-Permian mass extinction

The end-Permian mass extinction removed more than 80% of marine genera. Ammonoid cephalopods were among the organisms most affected by this crisis. The analysis of a global diversity data set of ammonoid genera covering about 106 million years centered on the Permian-Triassic boundary (PTB) shows that Triassic ammonoids actually reached levels of diversity higher than in the Permian less than 2 million years after the PTB. The data favor a hierarchical rather than logistic model of diversification coupled with a niche incumbency hypothesis. This explosive and nondelayed diversification contrasts with the slow and delayed character of the Triassic biotic recovery as currently illustrated for other, mainly benthic groups such as bivalves and gastropods.

Essays in political economy

Cette thése relie trois articles sur l'économie politique. Ces articles analysent à la fois théoriquement et empiriquement si, et dans quelle mesure, trois phénomènes politiques différents (les partis politiques, les guerres civiles et les menaces externes), et leur interaction, influent sur les résultats économiques. Le premier chapitre étudie l'impact de la présence au pouvoir des politiciens de nouveaux partis politiques sur la taille du gouvernement. Le chapitre se concentre sur les municipalités colombiennes, où les nouveaux partis politiques ont été nombreux et fructueux au cours des dernières années. Les estimations par régressions sur discontinuité montrent que les dépenses publiques et les recettes fiscales sont significativement plus élevées dans les municipalités gouvernées par un maire d'un nouveau parti politique. En utilisant des informations sur la politique locale et des caractéristiques des nouveaux partis, je soutiens que ce résultat peut être expliqué par le fait qu'il y a moins d'information sur les politiciens de nouveaux partis que les politiciens des partis traditionnels. Le deuxième chapitre développe une nouvelle explication de l'impact des guerres civiles et des conflits interétatiques sur le state-building qui repose sur l'idée que les protagonistes de ces deux types de conflits peuvent avoir un lien (ethnique ou idéologique). Un premier résultat montre que la force de ce lien détermine si les conflits contre des adversaires internes (i.e. guerres civiles) ou des ennemis externes (i.e. conflits interétatiques) sont complémentaires ou se substituent, conduisant à plus ou moins d'investissement en capacité fiscale. La théorie prédit également un rôle non trivial de la stabilité politique dans la relation entre les deux types de conflits et la capacité fiscale: un deuxième résultat montre que, bien que la stabilité politique se traduit par moins de capacité fiscale, plus de stabilité n'implique pas plus de state-building. Leur équivalence dépend du niveau de cohésion des institutions. Un nouveau mécanisme par lequel plus de stabilité politique peut impliquer moins de state-building est proposé. En outre, il est démontré que des corrélations dans les données cross-country sont compatibles avec la théorie. Le troisième chapitre examine la relation entre la probabilité d'occurrence d'un conflit intérieur violent et le risque qu'un tel conflit "s'externalise" (c'est à dire se propage dans un autre pays en devenant un conflit interétatique). Je considère une situation dans laquelle un conflit interne entre un gouvernement et un groupe rebelle peut s'externaliser. Je montre que le risque d'externalisation augmente la probabilité d'un accord de paix, mais seulement si le gouvernement est suffisamment puissant par rapport aux rebelles, et si le risque d'externalisation est suffisamment élevé. Je montre comment ce modèle aide à comprendre les récents pourparlers de paix entre le gouvernement colombien et le groupe le plus puissant des rebelles dans le pays, les FARC.

Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia

What are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds that these events might be beneficial for leaders. Disasters are linked to leader survival through clientelism: they generate an in-flow of resources in the form of aid, which increase money for buying votes. Analyzing the rainy season of 2010-2011 in Colombia, considered its worst disaster in history, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that in the local election incumbent parties benefited from the disaster. The result is robust to different specifications and alternative explanations. Moreover, places receiving more aid and those with judicial evidence of vote-buying irregularities, are more likely to reelect the incumbent, supporting the mechanism proposed by this paper.

Congress composition and electoral advantage

In 2003, an electoral reform changed the mechanism to assign seats in the Colombian Congress. I simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the previous assignment mechanism to determine which senators benefited from the reform, i.e. would have not been elected had the reform not been made. With the results of the simulation, I use a regression discontinuity design to compare the senators that would have been barely elected anyways with those who would have lost, but were near to be elected. I check the differences in the amount of law drafts presented, the attendance to voting sessions, and a discipline index for each senator as proxy of their legislative behavior. I find that the senators benefiting from the reform present a different legislative behavior during the 4-year term with respect to the senators that would have been elected anyways. Since the differential legislative behavior cannot be interpreted as being better (worse) politician, I examine if the behavioral difference gives them an electoral advantage. I find no difference in the electoral result of 2010 Senate election in terms of the probability of being (re)elected in 2010, the share of votes, the share of votes within their party list, and the concentration of their votes. Additionally, I check the probability of being investigated for links with paramilitary groups and I find no differences. The results suggest that political reforms can change the composition of governing or legislative bodies in terms of performance, but it does not necessarily translate into an electoral advantage.