Corporate finance in general equilibrium models with incomplete markets: A survey

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Corporate capital structure revisited: incomplete markets and default

After Modigliani and Miller (1958) presented their capital structure irrelevance proposition, analysis of corporate Önancing choices involving debt and equity instruments have generally followed two trends in the literature, where models either incorporate informational asymmetries or introduce tax beneÖts in order to explain optimal capital structure determination (Myers, 2002). None of these features is present in this paper, which develops an asset pricing model with the purpose of providing a positive theory of corporate capital structure by replicating main aspects of standard contractual practice observed in real markets. Alternatively, the imperfect market structure of the economy is tailored to match what is most common in corporate reality. Allowance for default on corporate debt with an associated penalty of seizure of Örmís future cash áows by creditors is introduced, for instance. In this context, a qualitative assessment of Önancial managersídecisions is carried out through numerical procedures.

Collateral avoids Ponzi schemes in incomplete markets

Without introducing neither debt constraints nor transversality conditions to avoid the possibility of Ponzi schemes, we show existence of equilibrium in an incomplete markets economy with a collateral structure.

Fiscal multipliers in an incomplete markets economy

This paper studies the behavior of fiscal multipliers in two different economic environments: complete markets and incomplete markets. Based on steady state analysis, output multipliers are found within a range between 0.49 and 0.66, when the markets are complete. Under incomplete markets, output multiplier was found in an interval between 0.75 and 0.94. These results indicates that the market structure, which reflects the degree of risk sharing and the intensity of the precautionary motive faced by individuals, plays a key role in determining the fiscal multipliers. In the second part of the paper, was performed an exercise to analyze the dynamic response of macroeconomic aggregates to an exogenous and unexpected rise in government spending financed by lump-sum taxes. In this case, impact output multipliers varies in a range between 0.64 and 0.68, under complete markets, and within 1.05 and 1.20 when markets are incomplete. The results found under incomplete markets are very close to that found on related literature which usually uses an econometric approach or calibrated/estimated New Keynesian models. These results shows that taking into account the deficiencies in the insurance mechanisms can be an interesting way to reconcile theoretical models with the results found on related current literature, without the need of ad-hoc assumptions relative to price stickness.

Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Agents, Incomplete Markets and Trading Constraints

The consumption capital asset pricing model is the standard economic model used to capture stock market behavior. However, empirical tests have pointed out to its inability to account quantitatively for the high average rate of return and volatility of stocks over time for plausible parameter values. Recent research has suggested that the consumption of stockholders is more strongly correlated with the performance of the stock market than the consumption of non-stockholders. We model two types of agents, non-stockholders with standard preferences and stock holders with preferences that incorporate elements of the prospect theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In addition to consumption, stockholders consider fluctuations in their financial wealth explicitly when making decisions. Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics are used to calibrate the labor income processes of the two types of agents. Each agent faces idiosyncratic shocks to his labor income as well as aggregate shocks to the per-share dividend but markets are incomplete and agents cannot hedge consumption risks completely. In addition, consumers face both borrowing and short-sale constraints. Our results show that in equilibrium, agents hold different portfolios. Our model is able to generate a time-varying risk premium of about 5.5% while maintaining a low risk free rate, thus suggesting a plausible explanation for the equity premium puzzle reported by Mehra and Prescott (1985).

Endogenous borrowing constraints and default when markets are incomplete

Incomplete markets and non-default borrowing constraints increase the volatility of pricing kernels and are helpful when addressing assetpricing puzzles. However, ruling out default when markets are in complete is suboptimal. This paper endogenizes borrowing constraints as an intertemporal incentive structure to default. It modeIs an infinitehorizon economy, where agents are allowed not to pay their liabilities and face borrowing constraints that depend on the individual history of default. Those constraints trade off the economy's risk-sharing possibilities and incentives to prevent default. The equilibrium presents stationary properties, such as an invariant distribution for the assets' solvency rate.

Cooperation under incomplete contracting

We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets. Market incompleteness implies that players cannot make all possible binding commitments regarding their actions at different date-events. We unify various treatments of dynamic core concepts existing in the literature. This results in definitions of the Classical Core, the Segregated Core, the Two-stage Core, the Strong Sequential Core, and the Weak Sequential Core. Except for the Classical Core, all these concepts can be defined by requiring absence of blocking in period 0 and at any date-event in period 1. The concepts only differ with respect to the notion of blocking in period 0. To evaluate these concepts, we study three market structures in detail: strongly complete markets, incomplete markets in finance economies, and incomplete markets in settings with multiple commodities.

Should Fiscal Policy be different in a Non-Competitive Framework?

Published as an article in: Journal of Monetary Economics, 2003, vol. 50, issue 6, pages 1311-1331.

Aversion Analysis

In this paper : a) the consumer’s problem is studied over two periods, the second one involving S states, and the consumer being endowed with S+1 incomes and having access to N financial assets; b) the consumer is then representable by a continuously differentiable system of demands, commodity demands, asset demands and desirabilities of incomes (the S+1 Lagrange multiplier of the S+1 constraints); c) the multipliers can be transformed into subjective Arrow prices; d) the effects of the various incomes on these Arrow prices decompose into a compensation effect (an Antonelli matrix) and a wealth effect; e) the Antonelli matrix has rank S-N, the dimension of incompleteness, if the consumer can financially adjust himself when facing income shocks; f) the matrix has rank S, if not; g) in the first case, the matrix represents a residual aversion; in the second case, a fundamental aversion; the difference between them is an aversion to illiquidity; this last relation corresponds to the Drèze-Modigliani decomposition (1972); h) the fundamental aversion decomposes also into an aversion to impatience and a risk aversion; i) the above decompositions span a third decomposition; if there exists a sure asset (to be defined, the usual definition being too specific), the fundamental aversion admits a three-component decomposition, an aversion to impatience, a residual aversion and an aversion to the illiquidity of risky assets; j) the formulas of the corresponding financial premiums are also presented.

Economic Development under Alternative Trade Regimes

How does openness affect economic development? This question is answered in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model of the world economy, where countries have technological differences that are both sector-neutral and specific to the investment goods sector. Relative to a benchmark case of trade in credit markets only, consider (i) a complete restriction of trade, and (ii) a full liberalization of trade. The first change decreases the cross-sectional dispersion of incomes only slightly, and produces a relatively small welfare loss. The second change, instead, decreases dispersion by a significant amount, and produces a very large welfare gain.

On the Individual Optimality of Economic Integration

Ce document est une version antérieure du document "On the Individual Optimality of Economic Integration", nov. 2015 : http://hdl.handle.net/1866/12794

Essays in open economy macroeconomics with borrowing frictions

Cette thèse comporte trois essais en macroéconomie en économie ouverte et commerce international. Je considère tour à tour les questions suivantes: sous quelles conditions est-il optimal pour un pays de former une union économique? (essai 1); l'augmentation de la dispersion transversale des avoirs extérieurs nets des pays est-elle compatible avec une dispersion relativement stable des taux d'investissement? (essai 2); le risque de perte de marché à l'exportation du fait de l'existence des zones de commerce préférentiel joue t-il un rôle dans la décision des pays exclus de négocier des accords commerciaux à leur tour? (essai 3). Le premier essai examine les conditions d'optimalité d'une union économique. Il s'intéresse à une motivation particulière: le partage du risque lié aux fluctuations du revenu. Dans la situation initiale, les pays ont très peu d'opportunités pour partager le risque à cause des frictions: les marchés financiers internationaux sont incomplets et il n'y pas de mécanisme pour faire respecter les contrats de crédit entre pays. Dans ce contexte, une union économique apparait comme un arrangement qui pallie à ces frictions entre les pays membres seulement. Cependant, l'union dans son ensemble continue de faire face à ces frictions lorsqu'elle échange avec le reste du monde. L'arbitrage clé dans le modèle est le suivant. D'un coté, l'intégration économique permet un meilleur partage du risque entre pays membres et la possibilité pour le partenaire pauvre d'utiliser la ligne de crédit du partenaire riche en cas de besoin. De l'autre coté, l'union peut faire face à une limite de crédit plus restrictive parce que résilier la dette extérieure est moins coûteux pour les membres l'union. De plus, le fait que le partenaire pauvre peut utiliser la limite de crédit du partenaire riche génère une externalité négative pour ce dernier qui se retrouve plus fréquemment contraint au niveau des marchés internationaux des capitaux. En conformité avec les faits observés sur l'intégration économique, le modèle prédit que les unions économiques sont relativement peu fréquentes, sont plus susceptibles d'être créées parmi des pays homogènes, et généralement riches. Le deuxième essai porte sur la dispersion des avoirs extérieurs nets et la relation avec la dispersion des taux d'investissement. Au cours des récentes décennies, la dispersion croissante des déséquilibres extérieurs et les niveaux record atteints par certaines grandes économies ont reçu une attention considérable. On pourrait attribuer ce phénomène à une réduction des barrières aux mouvements internationaux des capitaux. Mais dans ce cas, il est légitime de s'attendre à une augmentation de la dispersion au niveau des taux d'investissement; ceci, parce que le financement des besoins en investissements constitue une raison fondamentale pour laquelle les pays échangent les capitaux. Les données indiquent cependant que la dispersion des taux d'investissement est restée relativement stable au cours des récentes décennies. Pour réconcilier ces faits, je construis un modèle d'équilibre général dynamique et stochastique où les pays sont hétérogènes en raison des chocs idiosyncratiques à leurs niveaux de productivité totale des facteurs. Au niveau des marchés internationaux des capitaux, le menu des actifs disponibles est restreint à une obligation sans risque et il n'y a pas de mécanisme pour faire respecter les contrats de crédit entre pays. A tout moment, un pays peut choisir de résilier sa dette extérieure sous peine d'exclusion financière et d'un coût direct. Ce coût direct reflète les canaux autres que l'exclusion financière à travers lesquels les pays en défaut sont pénalisés. Lorsque le modèle est calibré pour reproduire l'évolution de la dispersion transversale des avoirs extérieurs nets, il produit une dispersion relativement stable des taux d'investissement. La raison principale est que les incitations que les pays ont à investir sont liées à la productivité. Avec l'intégration financière, même si les opportunités d'emprunt se sont multipliées, les incitations à investir n'ont pas beaucoup changé. Ce qui permet de générer une dispersion accrue de la position des avoirs extérieurs nets des pays avec une dispersion relativement stable des taux d'investissement. Le troisième essai analyse un aspect de l'interdépendance dans la formation des accords commerciaux préférentiels: j'examine empiriquement si le risque de diversion des exportations en faveur des pays membres des zones de commerce préférentiel est un facteur déterminant dans la décision des pays exclus de ces accords de négocier un accord à leur tour. Je construis un indicateur qui mesure le potentiel de diversion des exportations auquel font face les pays et estime un modèle probit de formation des zones de commerce préférentiel créées entre 1961 et 2005. Les résultats confirment que les pays confrontés à un plus grand potentiel de détournement des échanges sont plus susceptibles de former une zone de commerce préférentiel à leur tour.

On the optimality of progressive income redistribution

We compute the optimal non-linear tax policy for a dynastic economy with uninsurable risk, where generations are linked by dynastic wealth accumulation and correlated incomes. Unlike earlier studies, we find that the optimal long-run tax policy is moderately regressive. Regressive taxes lead to higher output and consumption, at the expense of larger after-tax income inequality. Nevertheless, equilibrium effects and the availability of self-insurance via bequests mitigate the impact of regressive taxes on consumption inequality, resulting in improved average welfare overall. We also consider the optimal once-and-for-all change in the tax system, taking into account the transition dynamics. Starting at the U.S. status quo, the optimal tax reform is slightly more progressive than the current system.