Motivations for the establishment of PNHRs and analysis of the incentives for their creation and management in Mato Grosso do Sul

The development of efficient programs of incentive to voluntary conservation in private lands require an extensive knowledge on the motivations of land owners for conservation and their degree of acceptance on the benefits offered. Thus, this paper intended to evaluate the motivations for the establishment of PNHRs, the difficulties faced by their recognition and the incentives received for their establishment and management in Mato Grosso do Sul, and also to discuss some possibilities of widening the benefits offered. To this end, people responsible for 34 PNHRs were interviewed between March/2008 and March/2009. The results show that conservation is among the main reasons for the creation of these areas, in spite of economical and personal factors also being mentioned. The slowness and the red tape during the process of recognition were also emphasized as problems; on the other hand, several PNHRs received or receive support for their creation or management. Finally, some considerations are made on the benefits offered to owners of PNHRs and their possibilities of widening throughout the state.

Economic incentives for farmers in the Philippine uplands to adopt hedgerow intercropping

Land degradation in the Philippine uplands is severe and widespread. Most upland areas are steep, and intense rainfall on soils disturbed by intensive agriculture can produce high rates of soil loss. This has serious implications for the economic welfare of a growing upland population with few feasible livelihood alternatives. Hedgerow intercropping can greatly reduce soil loss from annual cropping systems and has been considered an appropriate technology for soil conservation research and extension in the Philippine uplands. However; adoption of hedgerow intercropping has been sporadic and transient, rarely continuing once external support has been withdrawn. The objective of this paper is to investigate the economic incentives for farmers in the Philippine uplands to adopt hedgerow intercropping relative to traditional open-field maize farming. Cost-benefit analysis is used to compare the economic viability of hedgerow intercropping, as it has been promoted to upland farmers, with the viability of traditional methods of open-field farming. The APSIM and SCUAF models were used to predict the effect of soil erosion on maize yields from open-field farming and hedgerow intercropping. The results indicate that there have been strong economic incentives for farmers with limited planning horizons to reject hedgerow intercropping because the benefits of sustained yields are not realized rapidly enough to compensate for high establishment costs. Alternative forms of hedgerow intercropping such as natural vegetation and grass strips reduce establishment and maintenance costs and are therefore more economically attractive to farmers than hedgerow intercropping with shrub legumes. The long-term economic viability of hedgerow intercropping depends on the economic setting and the potential for hedgerow intercropping to sustain maize production relative to traditional open-field farming. (C) 1998 Academic Press.

Economic Incentives to Conserve Wildlife on Private Lands: Analysis and Policy

Some believe that provision of private property rights in wildlife on private land can provide a powerful economic incentive for nature conservation because it enables property owners to market such wildlife or its attributes. If such marketing is profitable, private landholders will conserve the wildlife concerned and its required habitat. But land is not always most profitably used for exploitation of wildlife, and many economic values of wildlife (such as non-use economic values) cannot be marketed. The mobility of some wildlife (their fugitive nature) adds to the limitations of the private property approach. While some species may be conserved by this approach, it is suboptimal as a single policy approach to nature conservation. Nevertheless, it is being experimented with in the Northern Territory of Australia where landholders have the possibility of harvesting on their properties a quota of eggs and chicks of red-tailed black cockatoos for commercial sale. This scheme is expected to provide an incentive to private landholders to retain hollow trees essential for the nesting of these birds. Aspects of this approach are analysed using this case, and related ones, from Northern Australia. It is noted that the private property rights approach adopted in southern Africa is unlikely to be equally successful everywhere. The long-term survival of some species depends on their ability to use private lands without severe harassment, either for their migration or to supplement their available resources, for example, the Asian elephant in Sri Lanka. Nature conservation on private land is often a useful, if not essential, supplement to conservation on public lands. Community and public incentives for such conservation are outlined.

Economic incentives for global conservation of wildlife: New international policy directions

Growing economic globalisation by extending the operation of markets is a two-edged sword as far as nature conservation is concerned. In some circumstances, it threatens the conservation of nature and in other cases, it provides economic incentives that foster the conservation of biodiversity. This article shows how global policy directions have altered in that regard. Initially the World Conservation Union (IUCN) favoured bans on trade in endangered species. This view was enshrined in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). Subsequently, with the upsurge of support for market-based economic liberalism, IUCN recognised that economic and market incentives, if linked to appropriate property rights, could foster biodiversity conservation. This is reflected in the International Convention on Biological Diversity. While there is conflict between this convention and CITES, its extent has been exaggerated. As explained, in certain cases, trade restrictions of the type adopted in CITES are appropriate for nature conservation whereas the market-oriented policy of the Convention on Biological Diversity can be effective in some different situations. Whether or not the extension of markets in wildlife and wildlife products and growing economic globalisation favours nature conservation varies according to the circumstances.

Reelection incentives and political budget cycle: evidence from Brazil

This article tests the presence of political budget cycle (PBC) in municipal elections in Brazil and checks whether mayors who adopt such policy have greater probability of reelection. Based on fiscal and electoral data of 5,406 Brazilian municipalities and applying the difference-in-differences econometric method as well as logistic regressions, the results provide some evidence of PBC in Brazil, although its magnitude and consistency varies depending on the years used as electoral and non-electoral years. On average, reelectable mayors spend close to 3% more in election years than nonreelectables. Moreover, reelectables who do run for reelection present a variation in spending which is close to 5% superior to that of non-reelectables and non-runners. Additionally, the results suggest that mayors who increase public spending during electoral periods have greater chances of being reelected, as long as such spending is done within deficit limits acceptable by voters.

Positive self-image and incentives in organizations

This paper investigates the implications of individuals’ mistaken beliefs of their abilities on incentives in organizations using the principal-agent model of moral hazard. The paper shows that if effort is observable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability are always favorable to the principal. However, if effort is unobservable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability can be either favorable or unfavorable to the principal. The paper provides conditions under which an agent’s over estimation about own ability is favorable to the principal when effort is unobservable. Finally, the paper shows that workers’ mistaken beliefs about their coworkers’ abilities make interdependent incentive schemes more attractive to firms than individualistic incentive schemes.

The private and fiscal returns to schooling and the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education: a general framework and some results for the EU

This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. For each of these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of education on wages and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions and unemployment and pension benefits on net incomes. We also construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public policies on the private returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling that capture the long-term effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public finances under c

Inequity version and team incentives

We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A "selfish" employer can profitably exploit such preferences among its employees by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium and thus, they would leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not meet the employer's demands. Such contracts resemble team and relative performance contracts, and thus we derive conditions under which it may be beneficial to form work teams of employees with distributional concerns who were previously working individually. Similar results are obtained for status-seeking and efficiency concerns preferences.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

Financial incentives in academia: research versus development

This paper investigates the effects of monetary rewards on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable to obtain innovative ideas. We analyse how the legal environment affects the allocation of researcher's time between research and development. Although technology transfer objectives reduce the time spent in research, they might also induce researchers to conduct research that is more basic in nature, contrary to what the skewing problem would presage. We also show that our results hold even if development delays publication.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Clean Development Mechanism and Sustainable Development: a discussion on the link between the CDM and Sustainable Development, an analysis of the current status of the CDM portfolio, and an multicriteria evaluation of the effects of additional incentives in order to foster broad local Sustainable Development dividends from the CDM projects

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