Performance benchmarking and incentive regulation – considerations of directing signals for electricity distribution companies

After the restructuring process of the power supply industry, which for instance in Finland took place in the mid-1990s, free competition was introduced for the production and sale of electricity. Nevertheless, natural monopolies are found to be the most efficient form of production in the transmission and distribution of electricity, and therefore such companies remained franchised monopolies. To prevent the misuse of the monopoly position and to guarantee the rights of the customers, regulation of these monopoly companies is required. One of the main objectives of the restructuring process has been to increase the cost efficiency of the industry. Simultaneously, demands for the service quality are increasing. Therefore, many regulatory frameworks are being, or have been, reshaped so that companies are provided with stronger incentives for efficiency and quality improvements. Performance benchmarking has in many cases a central role in the practical implementation of such incentive schemes. Economic regulation with performance benchmarking attached to it provides companies with directing signals that tend to affect their investment and maintenance strategies. Since the asset lifetimes in the electricity distribution are typically many decades, investment decisions have far-reaching technical and economic effects. This doctoral thesis addresses the directing signals of incentive regulation and performance benchmarking in the field of electricity distribution. The theory of efficiency measurement and the most common regulation models are presented. The chief contributions of this work are (1) a new kind of analysis of the regulatory framework, so that the actual directing signals of the regulation and benchmarking for the electricity distribution companies are evaluated, (2) developing the methodology and a software tool for analysing the directing signals of the regulation and benchmarking in the electricity distribution sector, and (3) analysing the real-life regulatory frameworks by the developed methodology and further develop regulation model from the viewpoint of the directing signals. The results of this study have played a key role in the development of the Finnish regulatory model.

Incentive regulation : strategies for Illinois : a staff report /

Mode of access: Internet.

Essays on regulation and risk

In this thesis, we investigate some aspects of the interplay between economic regulation and the risk of the regulated firm. In the first chapter, the main goal is to understand the implications a mainstream regulatory model (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) have on the systematic risk of the firm. We generalize the model in order to incorporate aggregate risk, and find that the optimal regulatory contract must be severely constrained in order to reproduce real-world systematic risk levels. We also consider the optimal profit-sharing mechanism, with an endogenous sharing rate, to explore the relationship between contract power and beta. We find results compatible with the available evidence that high-powered regimes impose more risk to the firm. In the second chapter, a joint work with Daniel Lima from the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), we start from the observation that regulated firms are subject to some regulatory practices that potentially affect the symmetry of the distribution of their future profits. If these practices are anticipated by investors in the stock market, the pattern of asymmetry in the empirical distribution of stock returns may differ among regulated and non-regulated companies. We review some recently proposed asymmetry measures that are robust to the empirical regularities of return data and use them to investigate whether there are meaningful differences in the distribution of asymmetry between these two groups of companies. In the third and last chapter, three different approaches to the capital asset pricing model of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) are tested with recent Brazilian data and estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) as a unifying procedure. We find that ex-post stock returns generally exhibit statistically significant coskewness with the market portfolio, and hence are sensitive to squared market returns. However, while the theoretical ground for the preference for skewness is well established and fairly intuitive, we did not find supporting evidence that investors require a premium for supporting this risk factor in Brazil.

The Impact of Regulation on a Firm's Incentives to Invest in Emergent Smart Grid Technologies

This paper analyzes the implementation of new technologies in network industries through the development of a suitable regulatory scheme. The analysis focuses on Smart Grid (SG) technologies which, among others benefits, could save operational costs and reduce the need for further conventional investments in the grid. In spite of the benefits that may result from their implementation, the adoption of SGs by network operators can be hampered by the uncertainties surrounding actual performances. A decision model has been developed to assess the firms' incentives to invest in "smart" technologies under different regulatory schemes. The model also enables testing the impact of uncertainties on the reduction of operational costs, and of conventional investments. Under certain circumstances, it may be justified to support the development and early deployment of emerging innovations that have a high potential to ameliorate the efficiency of the electricity system, but whose adoption faces many uncertainties.

Productive efficiency and regulatory reform: The case of vehicle inspection services

Measuring productive efficiency provides information on the likely effects of regulatory reform. We present a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) of a sample of 38 vehicle inspection units under a concession regime, between the years 2000 and 2004. The differences in efficiency scores show the potential technical efficiency benefit of introducing some form of incentive regulation or of progressing towards liberalization. We also compute scale efficiency scores, showing that only units in territories with very low population density operate at a sub-optimal scale. Among those that operate at an optimal scale, there are significant differences in size; the largest ones operate in territories with the highest population density. This suggests that the introduction of new units in the most densely populated territories (a likely effect of some form of liberalization) would not be detrimental in terms of scale efficiency. We also find that inspection units belonging to a large, diversified firm show higher technical efficiency, reflecting economies of scale or scope at the firm level. Finally, we show that between 2002 and 2004, a period of high regulatory uncertainty in the sample’s region, technical change was almost zero. Regulatory reform should take due account of scale and diversification effects, while at the same time avoiding regulatory uncertainty.

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.

Lógica en la toma de decisiones de inversión en el sector de extracción de petróleo y gas natural

Este documento se centra en la presentación de información y análisis de la misma a la hora de establecer la manera en que empresas del sector de extracción de gas natural y generación de energía a base de dicho recurso, toman decisiones en cuanto a inversión, centrándose en la lógica que usan a la hora de emprender este proceso. Esto debido a la constante necesidad de establecer procesos que permitan tomar decisiones más acertadas, incluyendo todas las herramientas posibles para tal fin. La lógica es una de estas herramientas, pues permite encadenar factores con el fin de obtener resultados positivos. Por tal razón, se hace importante conocer el uso de esta herramienta, teniendo en cuentas de qué manera y en que contextos es usada. Con el fin de tener una mayor orientación, este estudio estará centrado en un sector específico, el cual es el de la extracción de petróleo y gas natural. Lo anterior entendiendo la necesidad existente de fundamentación teórica que permita establecer de manera clara la forma apropiada de tomar decisiones en un sector tan diverso y complejo como lo es el mencionado. El contexto empresarial actual exige una visión global, no basada en la lógica lineal causal que hoy se tiene como referencia. El sector de extracción de petróleo y gas natural es un ejemplo particular en cuanto a la manera en cuanto se toman decisiones en inversión, puesto que en su mayoría son empresas de capital intensivo, las cuales mantienen un flujo elevado de recursos monetarios.

Regulatory governance in the latinamerican telecommunications sector

Empezando con Chile a comienzos de 1980, los países de América Latina han profundizado la reforma a las telecomunicaciones para crear un entorno regulatorio que incentive la inversión privada, en particular la inversión extranjera. En este artículo, trabajo las tendencias regulatorias en el sector telecomunicaciones de 24 países latinoamericanos y del caribe durante el período 1980-1997 y construyo un índice basado en : autonomía, rendición de cuentas, claridad de las funciones y objetivos, transparencia y participación, y el tipo de mandato legal que crea el ente regulador. El índice muestra que, en promedio, la mayoría de los países llevaron a cabo fuertes reformas regulatorias en la dirección sugerida por expertos e investigadores. El índice también se correlación bien con varias variables políticas, de riesgo, económicas y de telecomunicaciones.

The Smart Paradox : Stimulate the deployment of Smart grids with effective regulatory instruments

The concept of SG (Smart Grids) encompasses a set of technologies that raise the intelligence of the electrical networks, such as smart meters or instruments of communication, sensing and auto-correction of networks. Nevertheless, the cost is still an important obstacle for the transformation of the current electricity system into a smarter one. Regulation can have an important role in setting up a favorable framework that fosters investments. However, the novelty with SG is the disembodied character of the technology, which may change the incentives of the regulated network companies to invest, affecting the effectiveness of the regulatory instruments (“cost plus” or “price cap”). This paper demonstrates that the solution to this “Smart” paradox requires strong incentive regulation mechanisms able to stimulate the adoption of SG technologies. Moreover, the regulation should not jeopardize conventional investments that are unable to be substituted by SG. Thus, a combination of performance regulation and efficiency obligations may be necessary.