Organizational design and incentive provision

We model the trade-off between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix or- ganizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high. Moreover, the results show that there is always a level of bias for which matrix design can achieve the expected profit obtained by shareholders if they could directly control the firm. We also show that the main trade-off, i.e., hierarchical versus matrix structure is preserved under asymmetric levels of bias among managers and when low-level workers perceive activities with complementary efforts.

Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision

We model the tradeoff between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix organizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high.

Globalization and the provision of incentives inside the firm: The effect of foreign competition

This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structureof compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competitionas import penetration and use tariffs and exchange rates as instrumental variables toestimate its causal effect on pay. We find that higher foreign competition leads tomore incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of payto performance. Second, it increases whithin-firm pay differentials between executivelevels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly becausethey receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is alsoassociated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreigncompetition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.

A Theory of voter experimentation in repeated elections

Nesse artigo, eu desenvolvo e analiso um modelo de dois perí odos em que dois polí ticos competem pela preferência de um eleitor representativo, que sabe quão benevolente é um dos polí ticos mas é imperfeitamente informado sobre quão benevolente é o segundo polí tico. O polí tico conhecido é interpretado como um incumbente de longo prazo, ao passo que o polí tico desconhecido é interpretado como um desa fiante menos conhecido. É estabelecido que o mecanismo de provisão de incentivos inerente às elei cões - que surge através da possibilidade de não reeleger um incumbente - e considerações acerca de aquisi cão de informa cão por parte do eleitor se combinam de modo a determinar que em qualquer equilí brio desse jogo o eleitor escolhe o polí tico desconhecido no per íodo inicial do modelo - uma a cão à qual me refi ro como experimenta cão -, fornecendo assim uma racionaliza cão para a não reelei cão de incumbentes longevos. Especifi camente, eu mostro que a decisão do eleitor quanto a quem eleger no per odo inicial se reduz à compara cão entre os benefí cios informacionais de escolher o polí tico desconhecido e as perdas econômicas de fazê-lo. Os primeiros, que capturam as considera cões relacionadas à aquisi cão de informa cão, são mostrados serem sempre positivos, ao passo que as últimas, que capturam o incentivo à boa performance, são sempre não-negativas, implicando que é sempre ótimo para o eleitor escolher o polí tico desconhecido no per íodo inicial.

Incentive-Disincentive Clause, HR-521, 1985

There is an urgent need to complete projects in high traffic urban areas in the shortest possible time. These road user benefits resulting from faster construction will minimize public inconvenience, safety hazards and a total cost to the public. The incentive - disincentive clause in the contract will encourage the contractor to expedite all phases in the contract. A copy of this special provision is part of this work plan and other details of construction are included in the plan and specification of Project F-65-4(34)--20-77.

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach

We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged. Under suitable domain restrictions, there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule.

On the limits of cheap talk for public good provision

This article studies a model where, as a consequence of private information, agents do not have incentive to invest in a desired joint project, or a public good, when they are unable to have prior discussion with their partners. As a result, the joint project is never undertaken and inefficiency is observed. Agastya, Menezes and Sengupta (2007) prove that with a prior stage of communication, with a binary message space, it is possible to have some efficiency gain since "all ex-ante and interim efficient equilibria exhibit a simple structure". We show that any finite message space does not provide efficiency gain on the simple structure discussed in that article. We use laboratory experiments to test these results. We find that people do contribute, even without communication, and that any kind of communication increases the probability of project implementation. We also observed that communication reduces the unproductive contribution, and that a large message space cannot provide efficiency gain relative to the binary one.

Workplace diversity and incentive contracts : theory and evidence

This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

Business model with discount incentive in a P2P-cloud multimedia streaming system

Today P2P faces two important challenges: design of mechanisms to encourage users' collaboration in multimedia live streaming services; design of reliable algorithms with QoS provision, to encourage the multimedia providers employ the P2P topology in commercial live streaming systems. We believe that these two challenges are tightly-related and there is much to be done with respect. This paper analyzes the effect of user behavior in a multi-tree P2P overlay and describes a business model based on monetary discount as incentive in a P2P-Cloud multimedia streaming system. We believe a discount model can boost up users' cooperation and loyalty and enhance the overall system integrity and performance. Moreover the model bounds the constraints for a provider's revenue and cost if the P2P system is leveraged on a cloud infrastructure. Our case study shows that a streaming system provider can establish or adapt his business model by applying the described bounds to achieve a good discount-revenue trade-off and promote the system to the users.

A novel monetary incentive for commercial P2P streaming

Today P2P faces two important challenges: design of mechanisms to encourage users’ collaboration in multimedia live streaming services; design of reliable algorithms with QoS provision, to encourage multimedia providers employ the P2P topology in commercial streaming services. We believe that these two challenges are tightly-related and there is much to be done with respect. This paper proposes a novel monetary incentive for P2P multimedia streaming. The incentive model classifies the users in groups according to the perceived video quality. We apply the model to a streaming system’s billing model in order to evaluate its feasibility and visualize its quantitative effect on the users’ motivation and the provider’s profit. We conclude that monetary incentive can boost up users’ cooperation, loyalty and enhance the overall system integrity and performance. Moreover the model defines the constraints for the provider’s cost and profit when the system is leveraged on the cloud. Considering those constraints, a multimedia content provider can adapt the billing model of his streaming service and achieve desirable discount-profit trade-off. This will moreover contribute to better promotion of the service, across the users on the Internet.

Essays on the Role of Government Incentives in the Private Provision of Social Goods

The economic rationale for public intervention into private markets through price mechanisms is twofold: to correct market failures and to redistribute resources. Financial incentives are one such price mechanism. In this dissertation, I specifically address the role of financial incentives in providing social goods in two separate contexts: a redistributive policy that enables low income working families to access affordable childcare in the US and an experimental pay-for-performance intervention to improve population health outcomes in rural India. In the first two papers, I investigate the effects of government incentives for providing grandchild care on grandmothers’ short- and long-term outcomes. In the third paper, coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato, and Marcos Vera-Hernandez, we use an experimental framework to consider the the effects of financial incentives in improving maternal and child health outcomes in the Indian state of Karnataka.

Grandmothers provide a significant amount of childcare in the US, but little is known about how this informal, and often uncompensated, time transfer impacts their economic and health outcomes. The first two chapters of this dissertation address the impact of federally funded, state-level means-tested programs that compensate grandparent-provided childcare on the retirement security of older women, an economically vulnerable group of considerable policy interest. I use the variation in the availability and generosity of childcare subsidies to model the effect of government payments for grandchild care on grandmothers’ time use, income, earnings, interfamily transfers, and health outcomes. After establishing that more generous government payments induce grandmothers to provide more hours of childcare, I find that grandmothers adjust their behavior by reducing their formal labor supply and earnings. Grandmothers make up for lost earnings by claiming Social Security earlier, increasing their reliance on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and reducing financial transfers to their children. While the policy does not appear to negatively impact grandmothers’ immediate economic well-being, there are significant costs to the state, in terms of both up-front costs for care payments and long-term costs as a result of grandmothers’ increased reliance on social insurance.

The final paper, The Role of Non-Cognitive Traits in Response to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial of Obstetrics Care Providers in India, is coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato and Marcos Vera-Hernandez. We report the results from “Improving Maternal and Child Health in India: Evaluating Demand and Supply Side Strategies” (IMACHINE), a randomized controlled experiment designed to test the effectiveness of supply-side incentives for private obstetrics care providers in rural Karnataka, India. In particular, the experimental design compares two different types of incentives: (1) those based on the quality of inputs providers offer their patients (inputs contracts) and (2) those based on the reduction of incidence of four adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (outcomes contracts). Along with studying the relative effectiveness of the different financial incentives, we also investigate the role of provider characteristics, preferences, expectations and non-cognitive traits in mitigating the effects of incentive contracts.

We find that both contract types input incentive contracts reduce rates of post-partum hemorrhage, the leading cause of maternal mortality in India by about 20%. We also find some evidence of multitasking as output incentive contract providers reduce the level of postnatal newborn care received by their patients. We find that patient health improvements in response to both contract types are concentrated among higher trained providers. We find improvements in patient care to be concentrated among the lower trained providers. Contrary to our expectations, we also find improvements in patient health to be concentrated among the most risk averse providers, while more patient providers respond relatively little to the incentives, and these difference are most evident in the outputs contract arm. The results are opposite for patient care outcomes; risk averse providers have significantly lower rates of patient care and more patient providers provide higher quality care in response to the outputs contract. We find evidence that overconfidence among providers about their expectations about possible improvements reduces the effectiveness of both types of incentive contracts for improving both patient outcomes and patient care. Finally, we find no heterogeneous response based on non-cognitive traits.

Estimated Disability-adjusted Life Years Averted By Long-term Provision Of Long Acting Contraceptive Methods In A Brazilian Clinic.

What is the contribution of the provision, at no cost for users, of long acting reversible contraceptive methods (LARC; copper intrauterine device [IUD], the levonorgestrel-releasing intrauterine system [LNG-IUS], contraceptive implants and depot-medroxyprogesterone [DMPA] injection) towards the disability-adjusted life years (DALY) averted through a Brazilian university-based clinic established over 30 years ago. Over the last 10 years of evaluation, provision of LARC methods and DMPA by the clinic are estimated to have contributed to DALY averted by between 37 and 60 maternal deaths, 315-424 child mortalities, 634-853 combined maternal morbidity and mortality and child mortality, and 1056-1412 unsafe abortions averted. LARC methods are associated with a high contraceptive effectiveness when compared with contraceptive methods which need frequent attention; perhaps because LARC methods are independent of individual or couple compliance. However, in general previous studies have evaluated contraceptive methods during clinical studies over a short period of time, or not more than 10 years. Furthermore, information regarding the estimation of the DALY averted is scarce. We reviewed 50 004 medical charts from women who consulted for the first time looking for a contraceptive method over the period from 2 January 1980 through 31 December 2012. Women who consulted at the Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, University of Campinas, Brazil were new users and users switching contraceptive, including the copper IUD (n = 13 826), the LNG-IUS (n = 1525), implants (n = 277) and DMPA (n = 9387). Estimation of the DALY averted included maternal morbidity and mortality, child mortality and unsafe abortions averted. We obtained 29 416 contraceptive segments of use including 25 009 contraceptive segments of use from 20 821 new users or switchers to any LARC method or DMPA with at least 1 year of follow-up. The mean (± SD) age of the women at first consultation ranged from 25.3 ± 5.7 (range 12-47) years in the 1980s, to 31.9 ± 7.4 (range 16-50) years in 2010-2011. The most common contraceptive chosen at the first consultation was copper IUD (48.3, 74.5 and 64.7% in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, respectively). For an evaluation over 20 years, the cumulative pregnancy rates (SEM) were 0.4 (0.2), 2.8 (2.1), 4.0 (0.4) and 1.3 (0.4) for the LNG-IUS, the implants, copper IUD and DMPA, respectively and cumulative continuation rates (SEM) were 15.1 (3.7), 3.9 (1.4), 14.1 (0.6) and 7.3 (1.7) for the LNG-IUS, implants, copper IUD and DMPA, respectively (P < 0.001). Over the last 10 years of evaluation, the estimation of the contribution of the clinic through the provision of LARC methods and DMPA to DALY averted was 37-60 maternal deaths; between 315 and 424 child mortalities; combined maternal morbidity and mortality and child mortality of between 634 and 853, and 1056-1412 unsafe abortions averted. The main limitations are the number of women who never returned to the clinic (overall 14% among the four methods under evaluation); consequently the pregnancy rate could be different. Other limitations include the analysis of two kinds of copper IUD and two kinds of contraceptive implants as the same IUD or implant, and the low number of users of implants. In addition, the DALY calculation relies on a number of estimates, which may vary in different parts of the world. LARC methods and DMPA are highly effective and women who were well-counselled used these methods for a long time. The benefit of averting maternal morbidity and mortality, child mortality, and unsafe abortions is an example to health policy makers to implement more family planning programmes and to offer contraceptive methods, mainly LARC and DMPA, at no cost or at affordable cost for the underprivileged population. This study received partial financial support from the Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP), grant # 2012/12810-4 and from the National Research Council (CNPq), grant #573747/2008-3. B.F.B., M.P.G., and V.M.C. were fellows from the scientific initiation programme from FAPESP. Since the year 2001, all the TCu380A IUD were donated by Injeflex, São Paulo, Brazil, and from the year 2006 all the LNG-IUS were donated by the International Contraceptive Access Foundation (ICA), Turku, Finland. Both donations are as unrestricted grants. The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest associated with this study.

Dental set-vice provision in private general practice for an insured population in New South Wales, Australia

Objective To determine patterns of dental set-vices provided to a cohort of the insured population 18 years and over, in private general practice in New South Wales, Australia. Basic research design A cohort study using the person-years method and Poisson regression for analysis. Setting Data were derived from claims records submitted by members of a health insurance fund (Government Employees Health Fund-GEHF) for rebates during the study period 1 January 1992-31 December 1995. Participants There were 133,467 members aged 18 years and over from New South Wales. Main outcome measures To determine, by age group, for those members who used private general practice and made a claim (referred to as 'patients') the annual number of visits, total number of services received per year and number of services received at a visit, Results The mean number of visits per patient was 2.4 per year with patients under 45 years making fewer visits than the 45-54 age group reference category. Mean number of services utilised per patient-year was 5.9, with services provided increasing from 3.5 for the 18-24-year-old group, reaching a plateau of approximately 6.2 for those aged 45 years or more. The number of services received per visit was 2.4 and there were no differences by age. Service mix was dominated by restorative (35%), diagnostic (27%), and preventive services (18%); with age specific variations observed. Conclusions Age was found to be an important determinant in the use of dental services, independent of membership duration and gender.

Impact of the Subprime Crisis in the Provision of Credit Risk of Major National Banks

Financial institutions are directly exposed to the credit risk, that is, the risk of the borrower not fulfill with their obligations, paying their debts in its stated periods established previously. The bank predict this type of risk, including them in their balance-sheets. In 2006/2007 there was the impact of a new financial crisis that spread around the world, known as the crisis of subprime. The objective of this study is to analyze if the provisions for credit risk or liquidation increased the sprouting of the crisis of subprime in ten major national banks, chosen accordant to their total assets. To answer this question, the balance-sheets of each one of these banks in the period of 2005 to 2007 were analyzed. This research is characterized, as for its objectives, as descriptive and as for the procedures as documentary research. It is also characterized as having a qualitative approach. The results show that the crisis of subprime has caused little impact in the credit risk provision of the analyzed institutions. It was noticed a slight increase in the provision indicators at the peak of the crisis in 2006. These percentages were reduced in, 2007, probably reflecting the economic stability of Brazil and the stagnation of the crisis Of subprime in that year, at least in relation to in our country.