Incentive mechanisms in infrastructure projects : A case-based comparison between Australia and the Netherlands

Despite a general belief that incentive mechanisms can improve value for money during procurement and performance during project execution, empirical research on the actual effects is nascent. This research focuses on the design and implementation of incentive mechanisms in four different infrastructure projects: two road reconstructions in the Netherlands and two building constructions in Australia. Based on an analytical framework of key motivation drivers, a cross cases analysis is conducted in view of performance on the contract assumptions, selection phase, execution phase and project contract performance. It was identified that despite significant differences in the project characteristics, results indicate that they experience similar contextual drivers on the incentive effectiveness. High value was placed on risk allocation and relationship building in the selection and construction phase. The differences can be explained from both contextual and project related characteristics. Although there are limitations with this research in drawing generalizations across two sets of case projects, the results provide a strong base to explore the nature of incentive systems across different geographical and contextual boundaries in future research.

Incentive Mechanisms and Their Impact on Project Performance

Good performance characterizes project success and value for money. However, performance problems are not uncommon in project management. Incentivization is generally recognized as a strategy of addressing performance problems. This chapter aims to explore incentive mechanisms and their impact on project performance. It is mainly based on the use of incentives in construction and engineering projects. The same principles apply to project management in other industry sectors. Incentivization can be used in such performance areas as time, cost, quality, safety and environment. A client has different ways of incentivizing his contractor’s performance, e.g. (1) a single incentive or multiple incentives; and (2) incentives or disincentives or a combination of both. The establishment of incentive mechanisms proves to have a significant potential for relationship development, process enhancement and performance improvement. In order to ensure the success of incentive mechanisms, both contractors and clients need to make extra efforts. As a result, a link is developed among incentive mechanisms, project management system and project performance.

Client recommendations for financial incentives on construction projects

Purpose: To provide recommendations for construction clients who design and implement financial incentive mechanisms (FIMs) on projects. ---------- Methodology: Four large Australian building projects commissioned by government clients under managing contractor contracts and completed between 2001 and 2005 were examined to explore the ‘drivers’ that promoted motivation toward financial incentive goals. The results were triangulated across data sources, projects and stakeholder types. ---------- Findings: FIM design should incorporate: 1. flexibility to modify goals and measurement procedures over time, 2. multiple goals covering different project areas, 3. distribution of rewards across all the key organizations contributing to team performance (e.g. potentially not just the contractor, but the subcontractors and consultants) and a reward amount sufficient to be valued by potential recipients. FIM benefits are maximized through the following complementary procurement initiatives: 4. equitable contract risk allocation, 5. early contractor involvement in design, 6. value-driven tender selection, 7. relationship workshops, and 8. future work opportunities.---------- Research Limitations: This paper provides practical recommendations to industry and hence does not emphasize theoretical aspects.---------- Practical Implications: The uptake of these recommendations is likely to increase the impact of FIMs on motivation and improve project and industry outcomes. Although the study focuses on government clients of building projects, all the recommendations would seem to apply equally to private-sector clients and to non-building projects.---------- Originality: In order to improve motivation and reward high performance, clients are increasingly using FIM in their construction contracts. Despite the rising use of financial incentives, there is a lack of comprehensive construction-specific knowledge available to help clients maximize outcomes. The study addresses this gap in the literature.

Evaluation framework for green procurement in road construction

Purpose Most barriers and enablers of sustainable projects are related to procurement. This study proposes a framework for evaluating green procurement practices throughout the lifecycle of road construction projects and demonstrates its application through an Australian case study. Design/methodology/approach The study is based on linking the phases of road construction with incentive mechanisms for proactively motivating behavioural change. A holistic view on utilised and potential incentives is attempted with a literature review and a state-of-practice review. The latter is based on interviews and 90 policy and procurement documents across five Australian states. Findings An evaluation framework with seven procurement stages is suggested to describe current state green procurement incentives throughout the delivery lifecycle of road construction projects. The Australian case study was found to provide useful data to identify gaps and strong points of the different states regarding their level of integration of sustainability and greenhouse gas emissions GHG) reduction elements in their procurement practices. This understanding was used to draw recommendations on future advancement of green procurement. Originality/value: Government entities across the globe can impact considerably the achievement of sustainability and GHG targets, by using their procurement practices and requirements to create incentives for contractors and suppliers to engage in more GHG conscious practices. The present study provides a systematic account of how green procurement practices can be underpinned using the Australian road construction industry as a case study, and distinguish between strong and weak links in the green procurement chain to draw recommendations for future initiatives.

Duzentos anos de ensino médico no Brasil

Esta tese analisa o ensino médico brasileiro, nos 200 anos de existência, identificando os marcos e o contexto político, econômico, social e mundial. A metodologia escolhida foi a grounded teory (teoria fundamentada). A análise dos dados foi feita sob a luz do referencial teórico. Do levantamento quantitativo e qualitativo das escolas médicas brasileiras destacam-se distintos momentos de expansão das escolas médicas no Brasil. Registram-se, também, a evolução da criação das escolas médicas, a distribuição regional e os processos de avaliação governamental (Provão/SINAES) e da sociedade (CINAEM). Discute o papel indutor dos mecanismos de incentivos conduzidos pelo Estado, na interface da saúde e da educação. Foi detalhada a distribuição atual das 167 escolas médicas, que ofertaram 16.228 vagas no processo vestibular de 2007.

Informal finance and rural finance policy in India: historical and contemporary perspectives

From the 1950s up to the early 1990s the All-India data show an ever-declining share of informal credit in the total outstanding debt of rural households. Contemporaneous micro-level studies, using more qualitative research methodologies, provide evidence that questions the strength of this trend, and more recent All-India credit surveys show, first, a levelling, and then a rise, in the share of rural informal credit in 1990/91 and 2000/01, respectively. By reference to findings of a study of village moneylenders in Rajasthan, the paper notes lessons to be drawn. First, informal financial agents have not disappeared from the rural financial landscape in India. Second, formal-sector financial institutions can learn much about rural financial service needs from the financial products and processes of their informal counterparts. Third, a national survey of informal agents, similar to that of the 1921 Census survey of indigenous bankers and moneylenders, would provide valuable pointers towards policy options for the sector. A recent Reserve Bank of India Report on Moneylender Legislation not only explores incentive mechanisms to better ensure fair practice, but also proposes provision for a new category of loan providers that would explicitly link the rural informal and formal financial sectors.

Economic models and algorithms for distributed systems

Distributed computing paradigms for sharing resources such as Clouds, Grids, Peer-to-Peer systems, or voluntary computing are becoming increasingly popular. While there are some success stories such as PlanetLab, OneLab, BOINC, BitTorrent, and SETI@home, a widespread use of these technologies for business applications has not yet been achieved. In a business environment, mechanisms are needed to provide incentives to potential users for participating in such networks. These mechanisms may range from simple non-monetary access rights, monetary payments to specific policies for sharing. Although a few models for a framework have been discussed (in the general area of a "Grid Economy"), none of these models has yet been realised in practice. This book attempts to fill this gap by discussing the reasons for such limited take-up and exploring incentive mechanisms for resource sharing in distributed systems. The purpose of this book is to identify research challenges in successfully using and deploying resource sharing strategies in open-source and commercial distributed systems.

Making the least active pay: a simulation of rewards and penalties under Demand Side Participation programs

The orthodox approach for incentivising Demand Side Participation (DSP) programs is that utility losses from capital, installation and planning costs should be recovered under financial incentive mechanisms which aim to ensure that utilities have the right incentives to implement DSP activities. The recent national smart metering roll-out in the UK implies that this approach needs to be reassessed since utilities will recover the capital costs associated with DSP technology through bills. This paper introduces a reward and penalty mechanism focusing on residential users. DSP planning costs are recovered through payments from those consumers who do not react to peak signals. Those consumers who do react are rewarded by paying lower bills. Because real-time incentives to residential consumers tend to fail due to the negligible amounts associated with net gains (and losses) or individual users, in the proposed mechanism the regulator determines benchmarks which are matched against responses to signals and caps the level of rewards/penalties to avoid market distortions. The paper presents an overview of existing financial incentive mechanisms for DSP; introduces the reward/penalty mechanism aimed at fostering DSP under the hypothesis of smart metering roll-out; considers the costs faced by utilities for DSP programs; assesses linear rate effects and value changes; introduces compensatory weights for those consumers who have physical or financial impediments; and shows findings based on simulation runs on three discrete levels of elasticity.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Atração de investimentos como instrumento de política industrial: o caso do ceará no período 1985-2002

This paper aims to assess the performance of credit and fiscal mechanisms in attracting industrial investment to the state of Ceará during 1985-2002, a period characterized by the political and administrative continuity which begun with the implementation of the so-called "Plan of Changes", during the term in office of former state governor Tasso Jereissati. In order to accomplish that, a survey was conducted of the state's credit, fiscal and infrastructure incentive mechanisms, industrial policy and the period's political context, as well as data from the Department of Industry and Commerce and on the economic performance of the state of Ceará. Over 700 industrial businesses were found to have been attracted into the state by means of the Industrial Investment Attraction Program, which amounted to a process of industry expansion while the country as a whole was going through a period of deindustrialization. The analysis points out that, if on one hand, the industrialization model then adopted was able to generate economic growth, on the other hand, it increased income concentration and could not drive industry into the less developed areas across the state's interior, as expected by Ceará's state government officials.

The brazilian education quality index (Ideb): measurement and incentives upgrades

The increasing availability of social statistics in Latin America opens new possibilities in terms of accountability and incentive mechanisms for policy makers. This paper addresses these issues within the institutional context of the Brazilian educational system. We build a theoretical model based on the theory of incentives to analyze the role of the recently launched Basic Education Development Index (Ideb) in the provision of incentives at the sub-national level. The first result is to demonstrate that an education target system has the potential to improve the allocation of resources to education through conditional transfers to municipalities and schools. Second, we analyze the local government’s decision about how to allocate its education budget when seeking to accomplish the different objectives contemplated by the index, which involves the interaction between its two components, average proficiency and the passing rate. We discuss as well policy issues concerning the implementation of the synthetic education index in the light of this model arguing that there is room for improving the Ideb’s methodology itself. In addition, we analyze the desirable properties of an ideal education index and we argue in favor of an ex-post relative learning evaluation system for different municipalities (schools) based on the value added across different grades

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Contrato típico de concessão comercial : sugestão de inserção de cláusula escalonada de mediação e arbitragem nas convenções de marca para solução de conflitos entre concessionários : um passo adiante nas disputas dos distribuidores

A partir de uma visão contemporânea do contrato o trabalho procurou, (i) reconstruir o marco teórico sobre qual se funda o contrato de concessão comercial no Brasil, registrando uma nota histórica sobre a criação da Lei nº 6.729/1979; (ii) avaliar a validade da lei estudada sob o enfoque do regime constitucional vigente; (iii) analisar o regime jurídico das convenções de marca previstas na lei e a utilização dessas convenções como mecanismos de incentivo de atuação dos concessionários dentro de suas respectivas áreas operacionais, conceituando-as; (iv) sugerir mecanismos de solução de conflitos decorrentes da atuação, pelos concessionários, fora de sua respectiva área operacional, especialmente a cláusula de mediação e arbitragem