910 resultados para Incentive awards


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Mode of access: Internet.

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Shipping list no.: 91-41-P.

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"WPS-IA-7"--P. [4] of cover.

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Shipping list no.: 90-073-P.

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During the 2005 Legislative Session the Iowa Department of Revenue received an appropriation to establish the Tax Credits Tracking and Analysis Program (TCTAP) to track tax credit awards and claims. In addition, the Department was directed to perform periodic evaluations of tax credit programs. The purpose of these studies is three-fold: (1) To provide a comparison of the Iowa tax credit program to similar federal and other states’ programs (2) To summarize information related to the usage of the Iowa tax credit (3) To evaluate the economic impact of the tax credit program.

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In this study we use region-level panel data on rice production in Vietnam to investigate total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the period since reunification in 1975. Two significant reforms were introduced during this period, one in 1981 allowing farmers to keep part of their produce, and another in 1987 providing improved land tenure. We measure TFP growth using two modified forms of the standard Malmquist data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, which we have named the Three-year-window (TYW) and the Full Cumulative (FC) methods. We have developed these methods to deal with degrees of freedom limitations. Our empirical results indicate strong average TFP growth of between 3.3 and 3.5 per cent per annum, with the fastest growth observed in the period following the first reform. Our results support the assertion that incentive related issues have played a large role in the decline and subsequent resurgence of Vietnamese agriculture.

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In competitive electricity markets it is necessary for a profit-seeking load-serving entity (LSE) to optimally adjust the financial incentives offering the end users that buy electricity at regulated rates to reduce the consumption during high market prices. The LSE in this model manages the demand response (DR) by offering financial incentives to retail customers, in order to maximize its expected profit and reduce the risk of market power experience. The stochastic formulation is implemented into a test system where a number of loads are supplied through LSEs.

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Following the deregulation experience of retail electricity markets in most countries, the majority of the new entrants of the liberalized retail market were pure REP (retail electricity providers). These entities were subject to financial risks because of the unexpected price variations, price spikes, volatile loads and the potential for market power exertion by GENCO (generation companies). A REP can manage the market risks by employing the DR (demand response) programs and using its' generation and storage assets at the distribution network to serve the customers. The proposed model suggests how a REP with light physical assets, such as DG (distributed generation) units and ESS (energy storage systems), can survive in a competitive retail market. The paper discusses the effective risk management strategies for the REPs to deal with the uncertainties of the DAM (day-ahead market) and how to hedge the financial losses in the market. A two-stage stochastic programming problem is formulated. It aims to establish the financial incentive-based DR programs and the optimal dispatch of the DG units and ESSs. The uncertainty of the forecasted day-ahead load demand and electricity price is also taken into account with a scenario-based approach. The principal advantage of this model for REPs is reducing the risk of financial losses in DAMs, and the main benefit for the whole system is market power mitigation by virtually increasing the price elasticity of demand and reducing the peak demand.

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In this paper, we formulate the electricity retailers’ short-term decision-making problem in a liberalized retail market as a multi-objective optimization model. Retailers with light physical assets, such as generation and storage units in the distribution network, are considered. Following advances in smart grid technologies, electricity retailers are becoming able to employ incentive-based demand response (DR) programs in addition to their physical assets to effectively manage the risks of market price and load variations. In this model, the DR scheduling is performed simultaneously with the dispatch of generation and storage units. The ultimate goal is to find the optimal values of the hourly financial incentives offered to the end-users. The proposed model considers the capacity obligations imposed on retailers by the grid operator. The profit seeking retailer also has the objective to minimize the peak demand to avoid the high capacity charges in form of grid tariffs or penalties. The non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm II (NSGA-II) is used to solve the multi-objective problem. It is a fast and elitist multi-objective evolutionary algorithm. A case study is solved to illustrate the efficient performance of the proposed methodology. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the model for designing the incentive-based DR programs and indicate the efficiency of NSGA-II in solving the retailers’ multi-objective problem.

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This Work Project seeks to analyze the viability, utility and best way of implementing mechanisms of double accounting and of insertion of low (or null) sales objectives in an incentives program. The main findings are that both processes are possible and to a certain extent advisable, although in very specific ways and with some limitations. Double accounting processes are especially effective between different segments and networks and should have a greater impact in the first evaluation periods of each case and the null objectives, albeit usable, are recommended to be always substituted by positive objectives, even if quite small. Moreover, it is concluded that the formal structure of the incentives program influences significantly these concepts, namely concerning the duration of the evaluation periods and the interaction of the objectives of different entities for both the vertical (hierarchic) and horizontal (individual and collective) levels.