Incentive compatible mechanisms for group ticket allocation in software maintenance services

A customer reported problem (or Trouble Ticket) in software maintenance is typically solved by one or more maintenance engineers. The decision of allocating the ticket to one or more engineers is generally taken by the lead, based on customer delivery deadlines and a guided complexity assessment from each maintenance engineer. The key challenge in such a scenario is two folds, un-truthful (hiked up) elicitation of ticket complexity by each engineer to the lead and the decision of allocating the ticket to a group of engineers who will solve the ticket with in customer deadline. The decision of allocation should ensure Individual and Coalitional Rationality along with Coalitional Stability. In this paper we use game theory to examine the issue of truthful elicitation of ticket complexities by engineers for solving ticket as a group given a specific customer delivery deadline. We formulate this problem as strategic form game and propose two mechanisms, (1) Division of Labor (DOL) and (2) Extended Second Price (ESP). In the proposed mechanisms we show that truth telling by each engineer constitutes a Dominant Strategy Nash Equilibrium of the underlying game. Also we analyze the existence of Individual Rationality (IR) and Coalitional Rationality (CR) properties to motivate voluntary and group participation. We use Core, solution concept from co-operative game theory to analyze the stability of the proposed group based on the allocation and payments.

Incentive-based interventions for increasing physical activity and fitness

This is the protocol for a review and there is no abstract. The objectives are as follows: The main aim of the review is to determine the effectiveness of using incentive-based approaches (IBAs) (financial and non-financial) to increase physical activity in community-dwelling children and adults. A secondary objective will be to address the use of incentives to improve cardiovascular and metabolic fitness. A final objective will be to explore: - whether there are any adverse effects associated with the use of IBAs for increasing physical activity; - whether there are any differential effects of IBAs within and between study populations by age, gender, education, inequalities and health status; and - whether the use of disincentive/aversive approaches leads to a reduction in sedentary behaviour.

Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Resource Procurement in Computational Grids with Rational resource Providers

In a computational grid, the presence of grid resource providers who are rational and intelligent could lead to an overall degradation in the efficiency of the grid. In this paper, we design incentive compatible grid resource procurement mechanisms which ensure that the efficiency of the grid is not affected by the rational behavior of resource providers.In particular, we offer three elegant incentive compatible mechanisms for this purpose: (1) G-DSIC (Grid-Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible) mechanism (2) G-BIC (Grid-Bayesian Nash Incentive Compatible) mechanism (3) G-OPT(Grid-Optimal) mechanism which minimizes the cost to the grid user, satisfying at the same time, (a) Bayesian incentive compatibility and (b) individual rationality. We evaluate the relative merits and demerits of the above three mechanisms using game theoretical analysis and numerical experiments.

Evaluation of strength of component-laminates in strip-based mechanisms

This paper deals with the evaluation of the component-laminate load-carrying capacity, i.e., to calculate the loads that cause the failure of the individual layers and the component-laminate as a whole in four-bar mechanism. The component-laminate load-carrying capacity is evaluated using the Tsai-Wu-Hahn failure criterion for various lay-ups. The reserve factor of each ply in the component-laminate is calculated by using the maximum resultant force and the maximum resultant moment occurring at different time steps at the joints of the mechanism. Here, all component bars of the mechanism are made of fiber reinforced laminates and have thin rectangular cross-sections. They could, in general, be pre-twisted and/or possess initial curvature, either by design or by defect. They are linked to each other by means of revolute joints. We restrict ourselves to linear materials with small strains within each elastic body (strip-like beam). Each component of the mechanism is modeled as a beam based on geometrically non-linear 3-D elasticity theory. The component problems are thus split into 2-D analyses of reference beam cross-sections and non-linear 1-D analyses along the three beam reference curves. For the thin rectangular cross-sections considered here, the 2-D cross-sectional nonlinearity is also overwhelming. This can be perceived from the fact that such sections constitute a limiting case between thin-walled open and closed sections, thus inviting the non-linear phenomena observed in both. The strong elastic couplings of anisotropic composite laminates complicate the model further. However, a powerful mathematical tool called the Variational Asymptotic Method (VAM) not only enables such a dimensional reduction, but also provides asymptotically correct analytical solutions to the non-linear cross-sectional analysis. Such closed-form solutions are used here in conjunction with numerical techniques for the rest of the problem to predict more quickly and accurately than would otherwise be possible. Local 3-D stress, strain and displacement fields for representative sections in the component-bars are recovered, based on the stress resultants from the 1-D global beam analysis. A numerical example is presented which illustrates the failure of each component-laminate and the mechanism as a whole.

The Economics of Incentive-Based Health Care Plans

Medical savings accounts (MSAs) belong to a larger class of incentive-based health care plans. Using a model that allows the consumer to invest in healthy activities, we examine the efficiency properties of incentive plans and compare them to traditional full- coverage and deductible plans, under both experience rating and community rating. The model also is extended to include utilization of preventive health care. Properly constructed incentive plans have the capacity to induce socially efficient levels of healthy activities and preventive care, raising the expected wealth of consumers without reducing insurers' profits.

Application of the agency theory for the analysis of performance-based mechanisms in road management

El WCTR es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte, y aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper develops a model based on agency theory to analyze road management systems (under the different contract forms available today) that employ a mechanism of performance indicators to establish the payment of the agent. The base assumption is that of asymmetric information between the principal (Public Authorities) and the agent (contractor) and the risk aversion of this latter. It is assumed that the principal may only measure the agent?s performance indirectly and by means of certain performance indicators that may be verified by the authorities. In this model there is presumed to be a relation between the efforts made by the agent and the performance level measured by the corresponding indicators, though it is also considered that there may be dispersion between both variables that gives rise to a certain degree of randomness in the contract. An analysis of the optimal contract has been made on the basis of this model and in accordance with a series of parameters that characterize the economic environment and the particular conditions of road infrastructure. As a result of the analysis made, it is considered that an optimal contract should generally combine a fixed component and a payment in accordance with the performance level obtained. The higher the risk aversion of the agent and the greater the marginal cost of public funds, the lower the impact of this performance-based payment. By way of conclusion, the system of performance indicators should be as broad as possible but should not overweight those indicators that encompass greater randomness in their results.

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries

The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery-ecosystem interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to address two important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries: inappropriate incentives bearing on fishers and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, developed fisheries managed primarily by total-harvest limits and input controls. We contend that much greater emphasis must be placed on fisher motivation when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen natural experiments in commercial fisheries, we argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community and individual harvest or territorial rights and price ecosystem services and that are coupled with public research, monitoring, and effective oversight promote sustainable fisheries.

Incentive based policies on climate change: taxes and tradable emssions permits

The reduction of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) plays a central role in the environmental policies considered by countries for implementation not only at its own level but also at supranational levels. This thesis is dedicated to investigate some aspects of two of the most relevant climate change policies. The first part is dedicated to emission permit markets and the second part to optimal carbon taxes. On emission permit markets we explore the strategic behavior of oligopolistic firms operating in polluting industrial sectors that are regulated by cap and trade systems. Our aim is to identify how market power influences the main results obtained under perfect competition assumptions and to understand how actions taken in one market affects the outcome of the other related market. A partial equilibrium model is developed for this purpose with specific abatement cost functions. In Chapter 2 we use the model to explain some of the most relevant literature results. In Chapter 3 the model is used to analyze different oligopolistic structures in the product market under the assumption of competitive permits market. There are two significant findings. Firstly, under the assumption of a Stackelberg oligopoly, firms have no incentives for lobbying in order to manipulate permit prices up, as they have under Cournot competition...

The role of offsets in compensating for damage in the coastal and marine environments

This thesis examines the extent of which economic instruments can be used to minimise environmental damage in the coastal and marine environments, and the role of offsets to compensate for residual damage. Economic principles are used to review current command and control systems, potential incentive based mechanisms, and the development of appropriate offsets. Implementing offsets in the marine environment has a number of challenges, so alternative approaches may be necessary. The study finds that offsets in areas remote from the initial impact, or even to protect different species, may be acceptable provided they result in greater conservation benefits than the standard like-for-like offset. This study is particularly relevant for the design of offsets in the coastal and marine environments where there is limited scope for like-for-like offsets.

Broadcast in Ad hoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach

We consider the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB) problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. We design a Bayesian incentive compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) protocol to address this problem. VCG mechanism based schemes have been popularly used in the literature to design dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) protocols for ad hoe wireless networks. VCG based mechanisms have two critical limitations: (i) the network is required to he bi-connected, (ii) the resulting protocol is not budget balanced. Our proposed BIC-B protocol overcomes these difficulties. We also prove the optimality of the proposed scheme.

Broadcast in Adhoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach

We consider the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB) problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. We design a Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast (BIC-B) protocol to address this problem. VCG mechanism based schemes have been popularly used in the literature to design dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) protocols for ad hoc wireless networks. VCG based mechanisms have two critical limitations: (i) the network is required to be bi-connected, (ii) the resulting protocol is not budget balanced. Our proposed BIC-B protocol overcomes these difficulties. We also prove the optimality of the proposed scheme.

Payone : incentive for epidemic protocol-based anonymity system

Anonymity systems maintain the anonymity of communicating nodes by camouflaging them, either with peer nodes generating dummy traffic or with peer nodes participating in the actual communication process. The probability of any adversary breaking down the anonymity of the communicating nodes is inversely proportional to the number of peer nodes participating in the network. Hence to maintain the anonymity of the communicating nodes, a large number of peer nodes are needed. Lack of peer availability weakens the anonymity of any large scale anonymity system. This work proposes PayOne, an incentive based scheme for promoting peer availability. PayOne aims to increase the peer availability by encouraging nodes to participate in the anonymity system by awarding them with incentives and thereby promoting the anonymity strength. Existing incentive schemes are designed for single path based approaches. There is no incentive scheme for multipath based or epidemic based anonymity systems. This work has been specifically designed for epidemic protocols and has been implemented over MuON, one of the latest entries to the area of multicasting based anonymity systems. MuON is a peer-to-peer based anonymity system which uses epidemic protocol for data dissemination. Existing incentive schemes involve paying every intermediate node that is involved in the communication between the initiator and the receiver. These schemes are not appropriate for epidemic based anonymity systems due to the incurred overhead. PayOne differs from the existing schemes because it involves paying a single intermediate node that participates in the network. The intermediate node can be any random node that participates in the communication and does not necessarily need to lie in the communication path between the initiator and the receiver. The light-weight characteristics of PayOne make it viable for large-scale epidemic based anonymity systems.

Conceptual designs of multi-degree of freedom compliant parallel manipulators composed of wire-beam based compliant mechanisms

This paper proposes conceptual designs of multi-degree(s) of freedom (DOF) compliant parallel manipulators (CPMs) including 3-DOF translational CPMs and 6-DOF CPMs using a building block based pseudo-rigid-body-model (PRBM) approach. The proposed multi-DOF CPMs are composed of wire-beam based compliant mechanisms (WBBCMs) as distributed-compliance compliant building blocks (CBBs). Firstly, a comprehensive literature review for the design approaches of compliant mechanisms is conducted, and a building block based PRBM is then presented, which replaces the traditional kinematic sub-chain with an appropriate multi-DOF CBB. In order to obtain the decoupled 3-DOF translational CPMs (XYZ CPMs), two classes of kinematically decoupled 3-PPPR (P: prismatic joint, R: revolute joint) translational parallel mechanisms (TPMs) and 3-PPPRR TPMs are identified based on the type synthesis of rigid-body parallel mechanisms, and WBBCMs as the associated CBBs are further designed. Via replacing the traditional actuated P joint and the traditional passive PPR/PPRR sub-chain in each leg of the 3-DOF TPM with the counterpart CBBs (i.e. WBBCMs), a number of decoupled XYZ CPMs are obtained by appropriate arrangements. In order to obtain the decoupled 6-DOF CPMs, an orthogonally-arranged decoupled 6-PSS (S: spherical joint) parallel mechanism is first identified, and then two example 6-DOF CPMs are proposed by the building block based PRBM method. It is shown that, among these designs, two types of monolithic XYZ CPM designs with extended life have been presented.