Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the familywith the evidence on intervivos transfers in the US? This paper expandsthe altruism model by introducing e ?ort of the child and by relaxingthe assumption of perfect information of the parent about the labormarket opportunities of the child. First, I solve and simulate a modelof altruism under imperfect information. Second, I use cross-sectionaldata to test a prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especiallyresponsive to the income variations of children who are very attached tothe labor market? The results suggest that imperfect information accountsfor several patterns of intergenerational transfers in the US.

Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the family withthe evidence on parental monetary transfers in the US? This paper providesa new assessment of this question. I expand the altruism model by introducingeffort of the child and by relaxing the assumption of perfect informationof the parent about the labor market opportunities of the child. First,I solve and simulate a model of altruism and labor supply under imperfectinformation. Second, I use cross-sectional data to test the following prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especially responsive tothe income variations of children who are very attached to the labor market? The results of the analysis suggest that imperfect informationaccounts for many of the patterns of intergenerational transfers in theUS.

The location of manufacturing firms and imperfect information in transport market

It is well know that transport charges are not symmetric: fronthaul and backhaul costs on a route may differ, because they are affected by the distribution of economic acitivities. This paper develops a two-regional general equilibrium model in which transport costs are determined endogenously as a result of a search and matching process. It is shown that economies or diseconomies of transport density emerge, depending on the search costs of transport firms and the relative importance of the possibility of backhaul transportation. It is found that the symmetry of the distribution of economic activity may break owing to economies of transport density when the additional search costs are small enough.

Essays on Uncertainty, Imperfect Information, and Investment Dynamics

Understanding how imperfect information affects firms' investment decision helps answer important questions in economics, such as how we may better measure economic uncertainty; how firms' forecasts would affect their decision-making when their beliefs are not backed by economic fundamentals; and how important are the business cycle impacts of changes in firms' productivity uncertainty in an environment of incomplete information. This dissertation provides a synthetic answer to all these questions, both empirically and theoretically. The first chapter, provides empirical evidence to demonstrate that survey-based forecast dispersion identifies a distinctive type of second moment shocks different from the canonical volatility shocks to productivity, i.e. uncertainty shocks. Such forecast disagreement disturbances can affect the distribution of firm-level beliefs regardless of whether or not belief changes are backed by changes in economic fundamentals. At the aggregate level, innovations that increase the dispersion of firms' forecasts lead to persistent declines in aggregate investment and output, which are followed by a slow recovery. On the contrary, the larger dispersion of future firm-specific productivity innovations, the standard way to measure economic uncertainty, delivers the ``wait and see" effect, such that aggregate investment experiences a sharp decline, followed by a quick rebound, and then overshoots. At the firm level, data uncovers that more productive firms increase investments given rises in productivity dispersion for the future, whereas investments drop when firms disagree more about the well-being of their future business conditions. These findings challenge the view that the dispersion of the firms' heterogeneous beliefs captures the concept of economic uncertainty, defined by a model of uncertainty shocks. The second chapter presents a general equilibrium model of heterogeneous firms subject to the real productivity uncertainty shocks and informational disagreement shocks. As firms cannot perfectly disentangle aggregate from idiosyncratic productivity because of imperfect information, information quality thus drives the wedge of difference between the unobserved productivity fundamentals, and the firms' beliefs about how productive they are. Distribution of the firms' beliefs is no longer perfectly aligned with the distribution of firm-level productivity across firms. This model not only explains why, at the macro and micro level, disagreement shocks are different from uncertainty shocks, as documented in Chapter 1, but helps reconcile a key challenge faced by the standard framework to study economic uncertainty: a trade-off between sizable business cycle effects due to changes in uncertainty, and the right amount of pro-cyclicality of firm-level investment rate dispersion, as measured by its correlation with the output cycles.

The Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition, February 2007

This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety over investment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.

Heterogeneous information and trade policy

Protectionism enjoys surprising popular support, in spite of deadweight losses. At thesame time, trade barriers appear to decline with public information about protection.This paper develops an electoral model with heterogeneously informed voters whichexplains both facts and predicts the pattern of trade policy across industries. In themodel, each agent endogenously acquires more information about his sector of employment. As a result, voters support protectionism, because they learn more about thetrade barriers that help them as producers than those that hurt them as consumers.In equilibrium, asymmetric information induces a universal protectionist bias. Thestructure of protection is Pareto inefficient, in contrast to existing models. The modelpredicts a Dracula effect: trade policy for a sector is less protectionist when there ismore public information about it. Using a measure of newspaper coverage across industries, I find that cross-sector evidence from the United States bears out my theoreticalpredictions.

Asymmetric information, credit market condition, and entrepreneurial finance

The issue of imperfect information plays a much more important role in financing “informationally opaque” small businesses than in financing large companies.1 This chapter examines the asymmetric information issue in entrepreneurial finance from two perspectives: the effects of relationship lending and the impacts of credit market concentration on entrepreneurial financial behavior. These two perspectives are strongly linked to each other via the asymmetric information issue in entrepreneurial finance. Existing literature has recognized the important role played by relationship lending in alleviating the problem of asymmetric information. However, mixed empirical results have been reported. For example, it has been found that the development of relationship lending can improve the availability of finance for small businesses borrowers (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and reduce the costs of finance (Berger and Udell, 1995). Meanwhile, with monopoly power, banks may extract rents, in terms of charging higher-than-market interest rates, from small businesscustomers who have very concentrated banking relationships (Ongena and Smith, 2001). In addition, both favorable and unfavorable effects of credit market concentration on financing small businesses have been acknowledged. Small business borrowers may have to pay a higher-than-market price on loans (Degryse and Ongena, 2005) and are more likely to be financially constrained (Cetorelli, 2004) than in competitive markets. On the other hand, empirical studies have shown that market concentration create a strong motive for lenders to invest in private information from small business customers, and therefore a concentrated market is more efficient in terms of private information acquisition (Han et al., 2009b). The objective of this chapter is to investigate, by reviewing existing literature, the role played by relationship lending and the effects of market concentration on financing entrepreneurial businesses that are supposed to be informationally opaque. In the first section we review literature on the important role played by asymmetric information in entrepreneurial finance from two perspectives: asymmetric information and relationship lending, and the theoretical modeling of asymmetric information. Then we examine the relationship between capital market conditions and entrepreneurial finance and attempt to answer two questions: Why is the capital market condition important for entrepreneurial finance? and What are the effects of capital market conditions on entrepreneurial financial behavior in terms of discouraged borrowers, cash holding, and the availability and costs of finance?

The Value of Waiting: Foreign Direct Investment with Uncertainty and Imperfect Local Knowledge

This paper examines the role of uncertainty and imperfect local knowledge in foreign direct investment. The main idea comes from the literature on investment under uncertainty, such as Pindyck (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). We empirically test .the value of waiting. with a dataset on foreign direct investment (FDI). Many factors (e.g., political and economic regulations) as well as uncertainty and the risks due to imperfect local knowledge, determine the attractiveness of FDI. The uncertainty and irreversibility of FDI links the time interval between permission and actual execution of such FDI with explanatory variables, including information on foreign (home) countries and domestic industries. Common factors, such as regulatory change and external shocks, may affect the uncertainty when foreign investors make irreversible FDI decisions. We derive testable hypotheses from models of investment under uncertainty to determine those possible factors that induce delays in FDI, using Korean data over 1962 to 2001.

Modelling context information with ORM

Context-aware applications rely on implicit forms of input, such as sensor-derived data, in order to reduce the need for explicit input from users. They are especially relevant for mobile and pervasive computing environments, in which user attention is at a premium. To support the development of context-aware applications, techniques for modelling context information are required. These must address a unique combination of requirements, including the ability to model information supplied by both sensors and people, to represent imperfect information, and to capture context histories. As the field of context-aware computing is relatively new, mature solutions for context modelling do not exist, and researchers rely on information modelling solutions developed for other purposes. In our research, we have been using a variant of Object-Role Modeling (ORM) to model context. In this paper, we reflect on our experiences and outline some research challenges in this area.

Poker learner: modelação de jogadores através de data mining

Dissertação de mestrado integrado em Engenharia e Gestão de Sistemas de Informação

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Media exposure and internal migration-evidence from Indonesia

This paper investigates the impact of television on internal migration in Indonesia. We exploit the differential introduction of private television throughout the country and the variation in signal reception due to topography to estimate the causal effect of media exposure. Our estimates reveal important long and short run effects. An increase of one standard deviation in the number of private TV channels received in the area of residence reduces future inter-provincial migration by 1.7-2.7 percentage points, and all migration (inter and intra-provincial) by 4-7.4 percentage points. Short run effects are slightly smaller, but still sizeable and statistically significant. We also show that respondents less exposed to private TV are more likely to consider themselves among the poorest groups of the society. As we discuss in a stylized model of migration choice under imperfect information, these findings are consistent with Indonesia citizens over-estimating the net gains from internal migration.

Monetary policy with signal extraction from the bond market

Monetary policy is conducted in an environment of uncertainty. This paper sets upa model where the central bank uses real-time data from the bond market togetherwith standard macroeconomic indicators to estimate the current state of theeconomy more efficiently, while taking into account that its own actions influencewhat it observes. The timeliness of bond market data allows for quicker responsesof monetary policy to disturbances compared to the case when the central bankhas to rely solely on collected aggregate data. The information content of theterm structure creates a link between the bond market and the macroeconomythat is novel to the literature. To quantify the importance of the bond market asa source of information, the model is estimated on data for the United Statesand Australia using Bayesian methods. The empirical exercise suggests that thereis some information in the US term structure that helps the Federal Reserve toidentify shocks to the economy on a timely basis. Australian bond prices seemto be less informative than their US counterparts, perhaps because Australia is arelatively small and open economy.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.