The advantages of theft over toil: The design inference and arguing from ignorance

Intelligent design theorist William Dembski has proposed an explanatory filter for distinguishing between events due to chance, lawful regularity or design. We show that if Dembski's filter were adopted as a scientific heuristic, some classical developments in science would not be rational, and that Dembski's assertion that the filter reliably identifies rarefied design requires ignoring the state of background knowledge. If background information changes even slightly, the filter's conclusion will vary wildly. Dembski fails to overcome Hume's objections to arguments from design.

Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations

We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. Theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject, and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information.

Ignorance and Indifference: Epistemic Indefinites in Slovak

This thesis investigates epistemic indefinites (EIs), elements noteworthy for their grammaticalized ignorance implicature, i.e. inability to provide further information about the identity of the expression's referent. This work contributes to the effort of finding a unified account of the cross-linguistic repertoire of EIs. It comprises a corpus survey and a semantic analysis of Slovak voľa- and -si, EI items not studied until now. First, the following hypothesis was tested: the semantic/syntactic functions expressed by an indefinite will fall into contiguous areas on an implicational map (Haspelmath 1997). The results of the corpus analysis revealed that the map does not entirely capture the Slovak EIs' functional distribution and interpretations. Secondly, the semantic analysis was developed within the alternatives-and-exhaustification framework (Chierchia 2013). I show that some of the EIs' behavior can be explained as a consequence of an assumed sensitivity to parameters proposed by Chierchia. I situate voľa- and -si with respect to the framework’s typology and offer a critical assessment of this theoretical perspective.

Le fanatisme de l'ignorance confondu ou réponse à l'"Apologie des décrets" par le R. P. Lalande,... ([Reprod.]) / [par l'abbé Jabineau]

Collection : Les archives de la Révolution française ; 8.562

Interpersonal comparison of welfare in Harsanyi’s veil-of-ignorance model

Selon le voile d’ignorance proposé par John Harsanyi (1953, 1955), l’observateur rationnel derrière le voile d’ignorance cherche à maximiser la somme des utilités individuelles. Cependant, le modèle d’Harsanyi est fondé sur une hypothèse erronée que la fonction d’utilité à la von Neumann-Morgenstern de l’observateur permet la comparaison interpersonnelle de bien-être. Ce papier suggère une modification du modèle d’Harsanyi qui permet la comparaison interpersonnelle de bien-être, en utilisant les années de vie en parfaite utilité ou les années de vie heureuse comme mesure du bien-être.

A little learning is a dangerous thing: an experimental demonstration of ignorance-driven inference

Studies of ignorance-driven decision making have been employed to analyse when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds or else they have been employed to examine whether human behaviour is consistent with an ignorance-driven inference strategy (e. g., the recognition heuristic). In the current study we examine whether-under conditions where such inferences might be expected-the advantages that theoretical analyses predict are evident in human performance data. A single experiment shows that, when asked to make relative wealth judgements, participants reliably use recognition as a basis for their judgements. Their wealth judgements under these conditions are reliably more accurate when some of the target names are unknown than when participants recognize all of the names (a "less-is-more effect"). These results are consistent across a number of variations: the number of options given to participants and the nature of the wealth judgement. A basic model of recognition-based inference predicts these effects.

When does ignorance make us smart? Additional factors guiding heuristic inference

“Fast & frugal” heuristics represent an appealing way of implementing bounded rationality and decision-making under pressure. The recognition heuristic is the simplest and most fundamental of these heuristics. Simulation and experimental studies have shown that this ignorance-driven heuristic inference can prove superior to knowledge based inference (Borges, Goldstein, Ortman & Gigerenzer, 1999; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) and have shown how the heuristic could develop from ACT-R’s forgetting function (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). Mathematical analyses also demonstrate that, under certain conditions, a “less-is-more effect” will always occur (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). The further analyses presented in this paper show, however, that these conditions may constitute a special case and that the less-is-more effect in decision-making is subject to the moderating influence of the number of options to be considered and the framing of the question.