Market power analysis in the Iberian electricity market using a conjectural variations model

In the last years the electricity industry has faced a restructuring process. Among the aims of this process was the increase in competition, especially in the generation activity where firms would have an incentive to become more efficient. However, the competitive behavior of generating firms might jeopardize the expected benefits of the electricity industry liberalization. The present paper proposes a conjectural variations model to study the competitive behavior of generating firms acting in liberalized electricity markets. The model computes a parameter that represents the degree of competition of each generating firm in each trading period. In this regard, the proposed model provides a powerful methodology for regulatory and competition authorities to monitor the competitive behavior of generating firms. As an application of the model, a study of the day-ahead Iberian electricity market (MIBEL) was conducted to analyze the impact of the integration of the Portuguese and Spanish electricity markets on the behavior of generating firms taking into account the hourly results of the months of June and July of 2007. The advantages of the proposed methodology over other methodologies used to address market power, namely Residual Supply index and Lerner index are highlighted. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Price forecasting in the day-ahead Iberian electricity market using a conjectural variations Arima model

Price forecast is a matter of concern for all participants in electricity markets, from suppliers to consumers through policy makers, which are interested in the accurate forecast of day-ahead electricity prices either for better decisions making or for an improved evaluation of the effectiveness of market rules and structure. This paper describes a methodology to forecast market prices in an electricity market using an ARIMA model applied to the conjectural variations of the firms acting in an electricity market. This methodology is applied to the Iberian electricity market to forecast market prices in the 24 hours of a working day. The methodology was then compared with two other methodologies, one called naive and the other a direct forecast of market prices using also an ARIMA model. Results show that the conjectural variations price forecast performs better than the naive and that it performs slightly better than the direct price forecast.

The first renewable forward market mechanisms in the Iberian Electricity Market

A description of the first renewable forward market mechanisms in the Iberian Electricity Market is provided. A contract for difference mechanism is available in Spain since March 2011between the last resort suppliers and the special regime (renewables and cogeneration) settling the price differences between the equilibrium price of the forward regulated auctions for the last resort supply and the spot price of the corresponding delivery period. Regulated auctions of baseload futures of the Portuguese zone in which the Portuguese last resort supplier sells the special regime production exist since December 2011. The experience gained from renewables auctions in Latin America could be used in the Iberian Electricity market, complementing these first market mechanisms. Introduction of renewable auctions at least for the most mature technologies (i.e. wind) in Spain and Portugal providing a fair price for the renewable generation will be of utmost importance in the short term to diminish the tariff deficit caused by the massive deployment of the feed-in-tariff scheme. Liquidity in the forward markets will also increase as a result of the entry of renewable generation companies intending to maximize their profits due to gradual suppression of feed in tariff schemes.

Analysis of the Iberian electricity forward market hedging efficiency

An assessment of the hedging performance in the Iberian Forward Electricity Market is performed. Aggregated data from the Portuguese and Spanish clearing houses for energy derivatives are considered. The hedging performance is measured through the ratio of the final open interest of a month derivatives contract divided by its accumulated cleared volume. The base load futures in the Iberian energy derivatives exchange show the lowest ratios due to good liquidity. The peak futures show bigger ratios as their reduced liquidity is produced by auctions fixed by Portuguese regulation. The base load swaps settled in the clearing house located in Spain show initially large values due to low registered volumes, as this clearing house is mainly used for short maturity (daily and weekly swaps). This hedging ratio can be a powerful oversight tool for energy regulators when accessing to all the derivatives transactions as envisaged by European regulation.

Particle Swarm Optimization of Electricity Market Negotiating Players Portfolio

Energy systems worldwide are complex and challenging environments. Multi-agent based simulation platforms are increasing at a high rate, as they show to be a good option to study many issues related to these systems, as well as the involved players at act in this domain. In this scope the authors’ research group has developed a multi-agent system: MASCEM (Multi- Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets), which performs realistic simulations of the electricity markets. MASCEM is integrated with ALBidS (Adaptive Learning Strategic Bidding System) that works as a decision support system for market players. The ALBidS system allows MASCEM market negotiating players to take the best possible advantages from each market context. However, it is still necessary to adequately optimize the players’ portfolio investment. For this purpose, this paper proposes a market portfolio optimization method, based on particle swarm optimization, which provides the best investment profile for a market player, considering different market opportunities (bilateral negotiation, market sessions, and operation in different markets) and the negotiation context such as the peak and off-peak periods of the day, the type of day (business day, weekend, holiday, etc.) and most important, the renewable based distributed generation forecast. The proposed approach is tested and validated using real electricity markets data from the Iberian operator – MIBEL.

Propuestas regulatorias para el diseño de un mercado ibérico a plazo eficiente de la energía = Regulatory proposals for the development of an efficient iberian energy forward market

El mercado ibérico de futuros de energía eléctrica gestionado por OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, con sede en Lisboa), también conocido como el mercado ibérico de derivados de energía, comenzó a funcionar el 3 de julio de 2006. Se analiza la eficiencia de este mercado organizado, por lo que se estudia la precisión con la que sus precios de futuros predicen el precio de contado. En dicho mercado coexisten dos modos de negociación: el mercado continuo (modo por defecto) y la contratación mediante subasta. En la negociación en continuo, las órdenes anónimas de compra y de venta interactúan de manera inmediata e individual con órdenes contrarias, dando lugar a operaciones con un número indeterminado de precios para cada contrato. En la negociación a través de subasta, un precio único de equilibrio maximiza el volumen negociado, liquidándose todas las operaciones a ese precio. Adicionalmente, los miembros negociadores de OMIP pueden liquidar operaciones “Over-The-Counter” (OTC) a través de la cámara de compensación de OMIP (OMIClear). Las cinco mayores empresas españolas de distribución de energía eléctrica tenían la obligación de comprar electricidad hasta julio de 2009 en subastas en OMIP, para cubrir parte de sus suministros regulados. De igual manera, el suministrador de último recurso portugués mantuvo tal obligación hasta julio de 2010. Los precios de equilibrio de esas subastas no han resultado óptimos a efectos retributivos de tales suministros regulados dado que dichos precios tienden a situarse ligeramente sesgados al alza. La prima de riesgo ex-post, definida como la diferencia entre los precios a plazo y de contado en el periodo de entrega, se emplea para medir su eficiencia de precio. El mercado de contado, gestionado por OMIE (“Operador de Mercado Ibérico de la Energía”, conocido tradicionalmente como “OMEL”), tiene su sede en Madrid. Durante los dos primeros años del mercado de futuros, la prima de riesgo media tiende a resultar positiva, al igual que en otros mercados europeos de energía eléctrica y gas natural. En ese periodo, la prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser negativa en los mercados de petróleo y carbón. Los mercados de energía tienden a mostrar niveles limitados de eficiencia de mercado. La eficiencia de precio del mercado de futuros aumenta con el desarrollo de otros mecanismos coexistentes dentro del mercado ibérico de electricidad (conocido como “MIBEL”) –es decir, el mercado dominante OTC, las subastas de centrales virtuales de generación conocidas en España como Emisiones Primarias de Energía, y las subastas para cubrir parte de los suministros de último recurso conocidas en España como subastas CESUR– y con una mayor integración de los mercados regionales europeos de energía eléctrica. Se construye un modelo de regresión para analizar la evolución de los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo durante sus cuatro primeros años como una función de doce indicadores potenciales de liquidez. Los únicos indicadores significativos son los volúmenes negociados en las subastas obligatorias gestionadas por OMIP, los volúmenes negociados en el mercado OTC y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear. El número de creadores de mercado, la incorporación de agentes financieros y compañías de generación pertenecientes a grupos integrados con suministradores de último recurso, y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear muestran una fuerte correlación con los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo. La liquidez de OMIP está aún lejos de los niveles alcanzados por los mercados europeos más maduros (localizados en los países nórdicos (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) y Alemania (EEX)). El operador de mercado y su cámara de compensación podrían desarrollar acciones eficientes de marketing para atraer nuevos agentes activos en el mercado de contado (p.ej. industrias consumidoras intensivas de energía, suministradores, pequeños productores, compañías energéticas internacionales y empresas de energías renovables) y agentes financieros, captar volúmenes del opaco OTC, y mejorar el funcionamiento de los productos existentes aún no líquidos. Resultaría de gran utilidad para tales acciones un diálogo activo con todos los agentes (participantes en el mercado, operador de mercado de contado, y autoridades supervisoras). Durante sus primeros cinco años y medio, el mercado continuo presenta un crecimento de liquidez estable. Se mide el desempeño de sus funciones de cobertura mediante la ratio de posición neta obtenida al dividir la posición abierta final de un contrato de derivados mensual entre su volumen acumulado en la cámara de compensación. Los futuros carga base muestran la ratio más baja debido a su buena liquidez. Los futuros carga punta muestran una mayor ratio al producirse su menor liquidez a través de contadas subastas fijadas por regulación portuguesa. Las permutas carga base liquidadas en la cámara de compensación ubicada en Madrid –MEFF Power, activa desde el 21 de marzo de 2011– muestran inicialmente valores altos debido a bajos volúmenes registrados, dado que esta cámara se emplea principalmente para vencimientos pequeños (diario y semanal). Dicha ratio puede ser una poderosa herramienta de supervisión para los reguladores energéticos cuando accedan a todas las transacciones de derivados en virtud del Reglamento Europeo sobre Integridad y Transparencia de los Mercados de Energía (“REMIT”), en vigor desde el 28 de diciembre de 2011. La prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser positiva en todos los mecanismos (futuros en OMIP, mercado OTC y subastas CESUR) y disminuye debido a la curvas de aprendizaje y al efecto, desde el año 2011, del precio fijo para la retribución de la generación con carbón autóctono. Se realiza una comparativa con los costes a plazo de generación con gas natural (diferencial “clean spark spread”) obtenido como la diferencia entre el precio del futuro eléctrico y el coste a plazo de generación con ciclo combinado internalizando los costes de emisión de CO2. Los futuros eléctricos tienen una elevada correlación con los precios de gas europeos. Los diferenciales de contratos con vencimiento inmediato tienden a ser positivos. Los mayores diferenciales se dan para los contratos mensuales, seguidos de los trimestrales y anuales. Los generadores eléctricos con gas pueden maximizar beneficios con contratos de menor vencimiento. Los informes de monitorización por el operador de mercado que proporcionan transparencia post-operacional, el acceso a datos OTC por el regulador energético, y la valoración del riesgo regulatorio pueden contribuir a ganancias de eficiencia. Estas recomendaciones son también válidas para un potencial mercado ibérico de futuros de gas, una vez que el hub ibérico de gas –actualmente en fase de diseño, con reuniones mensuales de los agentes desde enero de 2013 en el grupo de trabajo liderado por el regulador energético español– esté operativo. El hub ibérico de gas proporcionará transparencia al atraer más agentes y mejorar la competencia, incrementando su eficiencia, dado que en el mercado OTC actual no se revela precio alguno de gas. ABSTRACT The Iberian Power Futures Market, managed by OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, located in Lisbon), also known as the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market, started operations on 3 July 2006. The market efficiency, regarding how well the future price predicts the spot price, is analysed for this energy derivatives exchange. There are two trading modes coexisting within OMIP: the continuous market (default mode) and the call auction. In the continuous trading, anonymous buy and sell orders interact immediately and individually with opposite side orders, generating trades with an undetermined number of prices for each contract. In the call auction trading, a single price auction maximizes the traded volume, being all trades settled at the same price (equilibrium price). Additionally, OMIP trading members may settle Over-the-Counter (OTC) trades through OMIP clearing house (OMIClear). The five largest Spanish distribution companies have been obliged to purchase in auctions managed by OMIP until July 2009, in order to partly cover their portfolios of end users’ regulated supplies. Likewise, the Portuguese last resort supplier kept that obligation until July 2010. The auction equilibrium prices are not optimal for remuneration purposes of regulated supplies as such prices seem to be slightly upward biased. The ex-post forward risk premium, defined as the difference between the forward and spot prices in the delivery period, is used to measure its price efficiency. The spot market, managed by OMIE (Market Operator of the Iberian Energy Market, Spanish Pool, known traditionally as “OMEL”), is located in Madrid. During the first two years of the futures market, the average forward risk premium tends to be positive, as it occurs with other European power and natural gas markets. In that period, the ex-post forward risk premium tends to be negative in oil and coal markets. Energy markets tend to show limited levels of market efficiency. The price efficiency of the Iberian Power Futures Market improves with the market development of all the coexistent forward contracting mechanisms within the Iberian Electricity Market (known as “MIBEL”) – namely, the dominant OTC market, the Virtual Power Plant Auctions known in Spain as Energy Primary Emissions, and the auctions catering for part of the last resort supplies known in Spain as CESUR auctions – and with further integration of European Regional Electricity Markets. A regression model tracking the evolution of the traded volumes in the continuous market during its first four years is built as a function of twelve potential liquidity drivers. The only significant drivers are the traded volumes in OMIP compulsory auctions, the traded volumes in the OTC market, and the OTC cleared volumes by OMIClear. The amount of market makers, the enrolment of financial members and generation companies belonging to the integrated group of last resort suppliers, and the OTC cleared volume by OMIClear show strong correlation with the traded volumes in the continuous market. OMIP liquidity is still far from the levels reached by the most mature European markets (located in the Nordic countries (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) and Germany (EEX)). The market operator and its clearing house could develop efficient marketing actions to attract new entrants active in the spot market (e.g. energy intensive industries, suppliers, small producers, international energy companies and renewable generation companies) and financial agents as well as volumes from the opaque OTC market, and to improve the performance of existing illiquid products. An active dialogue with all the stakeholders (market participants, spot market operator, and supervisory authorities) will help to implement such actions. During its firs five and a half years, the continuous market shows steady liquidity growth. The hedging performance is measured through a net position ratio obtained from the final open interest of a month derivatives contract divided by its accumulated cleared volume. The base load futures in the Iberian energy derivatives exchange show the lowest ratios due to good liquidity. The peak futures show bigger ratios as their reduced liquidity is produced by auctions fixed by Portuguese regulation. The base load swaps settled in the clearing house located in Spain – MEFF Power, operating since 21 March 2011, with a new denomination (BME Clearing) since 9 September 2013 – show initially large values due to low registered volumes, as this clearing house is mainly used for short maturity (daily and weekly swaps). The net position ratio can be a powerful oversight tool for energy regulators when accessing to all the derivatives transactions as envisaged by European regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (“REMIT”), in force since 28 December 2011. The ex-post forward risk premium tends to be positive in all existing mechanisms (OMIP futures, OTC market and CESUR auctions) and diminishes due to the learning curve and the effect – since year 2011 – of the fixed price retributing the indigenous coal fired generation. Comparison with the forward generation costs from natural gas (“clean spark spread”) – obtained as the difference between the power futures price and the forward generation cost with a gas fired combined cycle plant taking into account the CO2 emission rates – is also performed. The power futures are strongly correlated with European gas prices. The clean spark spreads built with prompt contracts tend to be positive. The biggest clean spark spreads are for the month contract, followed by the quarter contract and then by the year contract. Therefore, gas fired generation companies can maximize profits trading with contracts of shorter maturity. Market monitoring reports by the market operator providing post-trade transparency, OTC data access by the energy regulator, and assessment of the regulatory risk can contribute to efficiency gains. The same recommendations are also valid for a potential Iberian gas futures market, once an Iberian gas hub – currently in a design phase, with monthly meetings amongst the stakeholders in a Working Group led by the Spanish energy regulatory authority since January 2013 – is operating. The Iberian gas hub would bring transparency attracting more shippers and improving competition and thus its efficiency, as no gas price is currently disclosed in the existing OTC market.

Short-Term Trading for a Wind-PV Power Producer in an Electricity Market

This paper deals with the problem of coordinated trading of wind and photovoltaic systems in order to find the optimal bid to submit in a pool-based electricity market. The coordination of wind and photovoltaic systems presents uncertainties not only due to electricity market prices, but also with wind and photovoltaic power forecast. Electricity markets are characterized by financial penalties in case of deficit or excess of generation. So, the aim o this work is to reduce these financial penalties and maximize the expected profit of the power producer. The problem is formulated as a stochastic linear programming problem. The proposed approach is validated with real data of pool-based electricity market of Iberian Peninsula.

Assessing the competitiveness of loss allocation methods in a deregulated electricity market

This paper critically assesses several loss allocation methods based on the type of competition each method promotes. This understanding assists in determining which method will promote more efficient network operations when implemented in deregulated electricity industries. The methods addressed in this paper include the pro rata [1], proportional sharing [2], loss formula [3], incremental [4], and a new method proposed by the authors of this paper, which is loop-based [5]. These methods are tested on a modified Nordic 32-bus network, where different case studies of different operating points are investigated. The varying results obtained for each allocation method at different operating points make it possible to distinguish methods that promote unhealthy competition from those that encourage better system operation.

Balancing market integration in MASCEM electricity market simulator

With the restructuring of the energy sector in industrialized countries there is an increased complexity in market players’ interactions along with emerging problems and new issues to be addressed. Decision support tools that facilitate the study and understanding of these markets are extremely useful to provide players with competitive advantage. In this context arises MASCEM, a multi-agent simulator for competitive electricity markets. It is essential to reinforce MASCEM with the ability to recreate electricity markets reality in the fullest possible extent, making it able to simulate as many types of markets models and players as possible. This paper presents the development of the Balancing Market in MASCEM. A key module to the study of competitive electricity markets, as it has well defined and distinct characteristics previously implemented.

Dynamic artificial neural network for electricity market prices forecast

This paper presents an artificial neural network applied to the forecasting of electricity market prices, with the special feature of being dynamic. The dynamism is verified at two different levels. The first level is characterized as a re-training of the network in every iteration, so that the artificial neural network can able to consider the most recent data at all times, and constantly adapt itself to the most recent happenings. The second level considers the adaptation of the neural network’s execution time depending on the circumstances of its use. The execution time adaptation is performed through the automatic adjustment of the amount of data considered for training the network. This is an advantageous and indispensable feature for this neural network’s integration in ALBidS (Adaptive Learning strategic Bidding System), a multi-agent system that has the purpose of providing decision support to the market negotiating players of MASCEM (Multi-Agent Simulator of Competitive Electricity Markets).

A short-term risk management tool applied to OMEL electricity market using particle swarm optimization

Short-term risk management is highly dependent on long-term contractual decisions previously established; risk aversion factor of the agent and short-term price forecast accuracy. Trying to give answers to that problem, this paper provides a different approach for short-term risk management on electricity markets. Based on long-term contractual decisions and making use of a price range forecast method developed by the authors, the short-term risk management tool presented here has as main concern to find the optimal spot market strategies that a producer should have for a specific day in function of his risk aversion factor, with the objective to maximize the profits and simultaneously to practice the hedge against price market volatility. Due to the complexity of the optimization problem, the authors make use of Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) to find the optimal solution. Results from realistic data, namely from OMEL electricity market, are presented and discussed in detail.

Transmission price simulator in a liberalized electricity market

This paper presents a software tool (SIM_CMTP) that solves congestion situations and evaluates the taxes to be paid to the transmission system by market agents. SIM_CMTP provides users with a set of alternative methods for cost allocation and enables the definition of specific rules, according to each market and/or situation needs. With these characteristics, SIM_CMTP can be used as an operation aid for Transmission System Operator (TSO) or Independent System Operator (ISO). Due to its openness, it can also be used as a decision-making support tool for evaluating different options of market rules in competitive market environment, guarantying the economic sustainability of the transmission system.

Multi-agent electricity market simulation with dynamic strategies & virtual power producers

Distributed energy resources will provide a significant amount of the electricity generation and will be a normal profitable business. In the new decentralized grid, customers will be among the many decentralized players and may even help to co-produce the required energy services such as demand-side management and load shedding. So, they will gain the opportunity to be more active market players. The aggregation of DG plants gives place to a new concept: the Virtual Power Producer (VPP). VPPs can reinforce the importance of these generation technologies making them valuable in electricity markets. In this paper we propose the improvement of MASCEM, a multi-agent simulation tool to study negotiations in electricity spot markets based on different market mechanisms and behavior strategies, in order to take account of decentralized players such as VPP.