Reputation and honesty in a market for information

Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tendto focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to explore, in a game of finite but uncertain duration, whether reputation can be an effective constraint on deliberate misinformation. At the beginning of each period, an uninformed potential asset buyer can purchase information, at a fixed price and from a fully-informed source, about the value of the asset in that period. The informational insiders cannot purchase the asset and are given short-term incentives to provide false information when the asset value is low. Our model predicts that, in accordance with the Folk Theorem, Pareto-superior outcomes featuring truthful revelation should be sustainable. However, this depends critically on beliefs about rationality and behavior. We find that, overall, sellers are truthful 89% of the time. More significantly, the observed frequency of truthfulness is 81% when the asset value is low. Our result is consistent with both mixed-strategy and trigger strategy interpretations and provides evidence that most subjects correctly anticipate rational behavior. We discuss applications to financial markets, media regulation, and the stability of cartels.

Children's Lie-Telling and Self-Awareness as an Honesty Promoting Technique

The present study investigated how social-cognitive development relates to children’s lie-telling and the effectiveness of a novel honesty promoting technique (i.e., self-awareness). Sixty-four children were asked not to peek at a toy in the experimenter’s absence and were later asked about whether they had peeked as a measure of their honesty. Half of the children were questioned in the self-awareness condition and half in the control condition. Additionally, children completed a battery of cognitive and social-cognitive tests to assess executive functioning and theory-of-mind understanding. While first-order theory-of-mind understanding, inhibitory control, and visuospatial working memory did not significantly relate to children’s lie-telling, measures of inhibitory control in conjunction with working memory and complex working memory were significantly related to children’s lie-telling. Finally, the novel honesty promoting technique was effective: children in the self-aware condition lied significantly less often than children in the control condition.

Increasing scepticism toward potential liars: effects of existential threat on veracity judgments and the moderating role of honesty norm activation

With the present research, we investigated effects of existential threat on veracity judgments. According to several meta-analyses, people judge potentially deceptive messages of other people as true rather than as false (so-called truth bias). This judgmental bias has been shown to depend on how people weigh the error of judging a true message as a lie (error 1) and the error of judging a lie as a true message (error 2). The weight of these errors has been further shown to be affected by situational variables. Given that research on terror management theory has found evidence that mortality salience (MS) increases the sensitivity toward the compliance of cultural norms, especially when they are of focal attention, we assumed that when the honesty norm is activated, MS affects judgmental error weighing and, consequently, judgmental biases. Specifically, activating the norm of honesty should decrease the weight of error 1 (the error of judging a true message as a lie) and increase the weight of error 2 (the error of judging a lie as a true message) when mortality is salient. In a first study, we found initial evidence for this assumption. Furthermore, the change in error weighing should reduce the truth bias, automatically resulting in better detection accuracy of actual lies and worse accuracy of actual true statements. In two further studies, we manipulated MS and honesty norm activation before participants judged several videos containing actual truths or lies. Results revealed evidence for our prediction. Moreover, in Study 3, the truth bias was increased after MS when group solidarity was previously emphasized.

Honesty After a Labor Relationship

Al final de un experimento controlado, donde se contrataron asistentes de investigación para la codificación de noticias de los periódicos en línea durante un mes, el experimentador-empleador los invitó a lanzar un dado y reportar el resultado con el fin de pagar en efectivo una cantidad proporcional y lineal en el número reportado, de 1 a 6. Otro grupo (control) de estudiantes similares, fue invitado a realizar la misma tarea, pero sin tener relación laboral previa con el experimentador-empleador. Nuestro grupo de tratamiento mostró niveles promedio más altos de honestidad, ya que la distribución de los números reportados por estos fue menos sesgada a la derecha. Es decir, el grupo de relaciones de trabajo fue más propenso a reportar números que están más cerca de la distribución uniforme (honesta) que el grupo de control, y que otros estudios con este tipo de experimento. Se conjetura que la relación laboral del grupo de tratamiento indujo mayores niveles de honestidad entre los participantes. Una de las posibles razones es que la relación de trabajo creada para el grupo de estudiantes de tratamiento incluía una serie de choques que implicaba la posibilidad de desempleo involuntario, generando incentivos para que los estudiantes interpretaran la honestidad como un rasgo que podría ser valorado en el mercado de trabajo. Este artículo contribuye a la creciente literatura sobre la comprensión de los motivos de la honestidad y el engaño.

Signaling of need, sibling competition, and the cost of honesty

Young birds and mammals frequently solicit food by means of extravagant and apparently costly begging displays. Much attention has been devoted to the idea that these displays are honest signals of need, and that their apparent cost serves to maintain their honesty. Recent analyses, however, have shown that the cost needed to maintain a fully informative, honest signal may often be so great that both offspring (signaler) and parent (receiver) would do better to refrain from communication. This apparently calls into question the relevance of the costly signaling hypothesis. Here, I show that this argument overlooks the impact of sibling competition. When multiple signalers must compete for the attention of a receiver (as is commonly the case in parent–offspring interactions), I show that (all other things being equal) individual equilibrium signal costs will typically be lower. The greater the number of competitors, the smaller the mean cost, though the maximum level of signal intensity employed by very needy signalers may actually increase with the number of competitors. At the same time, costs become increasingly sensitive to relatedness among signalers as opposed to relatedness between signalers and receivers. As a result of these trends, signaling proves profitable for signalers under a much wider range of conditions when there is competition (though it is still likely to be unprofitable for receivers).

Be Careful Where You Smile : Culture Shapes Judgments of Intelligence and Honesty of Smiling Individuals

We thank all the supporting team-members involved in the translation procedures and data collections. Research was supported by the Polish NCN Grant 2011/03/N/HS6/05112 (K.K.) and Chinese NNSF Grant 31200788 (C.X).

An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Re-writing the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht. IHS Political Science Series No. 136, February 2014

At a time of crisis – a true state of emergency – both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Federal Constitutional Court have failed the rule of law in Europe. Worse still, in their evaluation of the ersatz crisis law, which has been developed in response to financial and sovereign debt crises, both courts have undermined constitutionality throughout Europe. Each jurisdiction has been implicated within the techocratisation of democratic process. Each Court has contributed to an incremental process of the undermining of the political subjectivity of European Citizens. The results are depressing for lawyers who are still attached to notions of constitutionality. Yet, we must also ask whether the Courts could have acted otherwise. Given the original flaws in the construction of Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the politically pre-emptive constraints imposed by global financial markets, each Court might thus be argued to have been forced to suspend immediate legality in a longer term effort to secure the character of the legal jurisdiction as a whole. Crisis can and does defeat the law. Nevertheless, what continues to disturb is the failure of law in Europe to open up any perspective for a return to normal constitutionality post crisis, as well as its apparent inability to give proper and honest consideration to the hardship now being experienced by millions of Europeans within crisis. This contribution accordingly seeks to reimagine each Judgment in a language of legal honesty. Above all, this contribution seeks to suggest a new form of post-national constitutional language; a language which takes as its primary function, proper protection of democratic process against the ever encroaching powers of a post-national executive power. This contribution forms a part of an on-going effort to identify a new basis for the legitimacy of European Law, conducted jointly and severally with Christian Joerges, University of Bremen and Hertie School of Government, Berlin. Differences do remain in our theoretical positions; hence this individual essay. Nevertheless, the congruence between pluralist and conflict of law approaches to the topic are also readily apparent. See, for example, Everson & Joerges (2013).

The way of the world: or, Honesty the best policy. A tale of New England and New York.

Wright II, 2261.

The edge of honesty.

Mode of access: Internet.

An Ethics Core Curriculum for Australasian Medical Schools

Teaching ethics incorporates teaching of knowledge as well as skills and attitudes. Each of these requires different teaching and assessment methods. A core curriculum of ethics knowledge must address both the foundations of ethics and specific ethical topics. Ethical skills teaching focuses on the development of ethical awareness, moral reasoning, communication and collaborative action skills. Attitudes that are important for medical students to develop include honesty, integrity and trustworthiness, empathy and compassion, respect, and responsibility, as well as critical self-appraisal and commitment to lifelong education.

Aggregated personality, climate and demographic factors as predictors of departmental shrinkage

The present study investigated how demographic, personality, and climate variables act to predict departmental theft. Participants in the current field survey were 153 employees from 17 departments across two stores. The results of confirmatory factor analyses supported the construct validity of the Big Five Inventory (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) and the Occupational Climate Questionnaire (Furnham & Gunter, 1997) in UK work settings. The results of regression analysis indicate that the variability in departmental theft is accountable in terms of a linear combination of demographic, personality, and climate factors. We concluded that an expanded theoretical perspective (utilizing demographic, personality, and climate variables) explained more variance than might otherwise be expected from any single perspective. Indeed, climate, personality, and demographic variables operated legitimately at the departmental level. Finally, we explained aggregated personality as a form of social interaction which is the by-product of individual differences.

Determinantes económicos da corrupção na União Europeia dos 15

Projecto «Economics of Corruption in Contemporary Portugal» no Centro de Estudos da População, Economia e Sociedade (CEPESE)