Comparative advantage, heterogeneous firms and variable mark-ups

We develop a model of comparative advantage with monopolistic competition, that incorporates heterogeneous firms and endogenous mark-ups. We analyse how these features vary across countries with different factor endowments, and across markets of different size. In this model we can obtain trade gains via two channels. First, when we open the economy, most productive firms start to export their product, then, they demand more producing factors and wages rises, thus, those firms that are less productive will be forced to stop to produce. Second channel is via endogenous mark-ups, when we open the economy, the competition gets ``tougher'', then, mark-ups falls, thus, those firms that are less productive will stop to produce. We also show that comparative advantage works as a ``third channel'' of trade gains, because, all trade gains results are magnified in comparative advantage industry of both countries. We also make a numerical exercise to see how endogenous variables of the model vary when trade costs fall.

Essays on household taxation and competition between heterogeneous firms

Essa tese é constituída por três artigos: "Tax Filing Choices for the Household", "Optimal Tax for the Household: Collective and Unitary Approaches" e "Vertical Differentiation and Heterogeneous Firms".

Heterogeneous firms and cost sharing in China's marketplaces

This study extends Melitz's model with heterogeneous firms by introducing shared fixed costs in a marketplace. It aims to explain heterogeneous firms' choice between traditional marketplaces and modern distribution channels on the basis of their productivities. The results reveal that the co-existence of a traditional marketplace and modern distribution channels improves social welfare. In addition, a deregulation policy for firm entry outside a marketplace and accumulation of human capital are factors that contribute to improve the social welfare.

Undermined climate policies : a study on the impact of regulatory and financial discrimination across heterogeneous firms in China

Firms in China within the same industry but with different ownership and size have very different production functions and can face very different emission regulations and financial conditions. This fact has largely been ignored in most of the existing literature on climate change. Using a newly augmented Chinese input–output table in which information about firm size and ownership are explicitly reported, this paper employs a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze the impact of alternative climate policy designs with respect to regulation and financial conditions on heterogeneous firms. The simulation results indicate that with a business-as-usual regulatory structure, the effectiveness and economic efficiency of climate policies is significantly undermined. Expanding regulation to cover additional firms has a first-order effect of improving efficiency. However, over-investment in energy technologies in certain firms may decrease the overall efficiency of investments and dampen long-term economic growth by competing with other fixed-capital investments for financial resources. Therefore, a market-oriented arrangement for sharing emission reduction burden and a mechanism for allocating green investment is crucial for China to achieve a more ambitious emission target in the long run.

Essays on internationalization in the context of heterogeneous firms

The significant increase in global trade flows in last decades has been one of the main features of the globalization process that started in the 1950s. In general, the main factors behind this increase were linked to (i) the significant reductions of trade costs and technical barriers; (ii) the improvements in transport infrastructure and telecommunications; (iii) the progress of the international financial system and the increasing legal certainty; and (iv) the development of a corporate culture that promotes the internationalization of firms as a strategic tool in order to survive and to grow. The remarkable increase of trade openness has also been observed in the Spanish economy. In this regard, it is clear that the entry into force of the Treaty of Accession of Spain to the European Economic Community (now the European Union) in 1986 played a main role in this dramatic increase. In addition, and because of the deep depression of domestic demand caused by the global financial and economic crisis that started in 2008, the external trade has become a key driver in the economic recovery of the Spanish economy...

Trade liberalization, exports and technology upgrading: Evidence on the impact of MERCOSUR on Argentinean firms

This paper studies the impact of a regional free trade agreement, MERCOSUR, on technologyupgrading by Argentinean firms. To guide empirical work, I introduce technology choice inMelitz s (2003) model of trade with heterogeneous firms. The joint treatment of the technologyadoption and exporting choices shows that the increase in revenues produced by trade integrationcan induce exporters to upgrade technology. An empirical test of the model reveals that firms inindustries facing higher reductions in Brazil s tariffs increase their investment in technologyfaster. The effect of tariffs on entry in the export market and technology adoption is highest inthe upper-middle range of the firm size distribution, as predicted by the model.

Firms, destinations, and aggregate fluctuations

This paper uses a database covering the universe of French firms for the period 1990-2007 to provide a forensic account of the role of individual firms in generating aggregatefluctuations. We set up a simple multi-sector model of heterogeneous firms selling tomultiple markets to motivate a theoretically-founded decomposition of firms' annualsales growth rate into different components. We find that the firm-specific componentcontributes substantially to aggregate sales volatility, mattering about as much as thecomponents capturing shocks that are common across firms within a sector or country.We then decompose the firm-specific component to provide evidence on two mechanismsthat generate aggregate fluctuations from microeconomic shocks highlighted in the recentliterature: (i) when the firm size distribution is fat-tailed, idiosyncratic shocks tolarge firms directly contribute to aggregate fluctuations; and (ii) aggregate fluctuationscan arise from idiosyncratic shocks due to input-output linkages across the economy.Firm linkages are approximately three times as important as the direct effect of firmshocks in driving aggregate fluctuations.

Neutrality in the choice of number of firms or level of fixed costs in calibrating an Armington-Krugman-Melitz encompassing module for applied general equilibrium models

This paper shows how an Armington-Krugman-Melitz encompassing module based on Dixon and Rimmer (2012) can be calibrated, and clarifies the choice of initial levels for two kinds of number of firms, or parameter values for two kinds of fixed costs, that enter a Melitz-type specification can be set freely to any preferred value, just as the cases we derive quantities from given value data assuming some of the initial prices to be unity. In consequence, only one kind of additional information, which is on the shape parameter related to productivity, just is required in order to incorporate Melitz-type monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms into a standard applied general equilibrium model. To be a Krugman-type, nothing is needed. This enables model builders in applied economics to fully enjoy the featured properties of the theoretical models invented by Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003) in practical policy simulations at low cost.

Labour Market Imperfections, International Integration and Selection

Although a large body of literature has focused on the effects of intra-firm differences on export performance, relatively little attention has been devoted to the interaction between firms' selection and international performance and labour market institutions - in contrast with the centrality of the latter to current policy and public debates on the implications of economic globalisation for national policies and institutions. In this paper, we study the effects of labour market unionisation on the process of competitive selection between heterogeneous firms and analyse how the interaction between the two is affected by trade liberalisation between countries with different unionisation patterns.

Unionisation, International Integration and Selection

We study how unionisation affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the rm or at the profit-centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection-softening; (ii) a counter-competitive; (iii) a wage-inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two-country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit-centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalisation can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).

Trade Costs, International Competition and Selection: The Effects of Unionisation on Market Size

Within a two-country model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms face firm-specific unions, we study the effects of different forms of trade liberalisation on market structure and competitive selection in the presence of inter-country asymmetries in size and labour market institutions. For given levels of trade openness, an increase in a country’s relative unions’ strength reduces the average productivity of its domestic producers but increases that of its exporters. Whilst an unfavourable union power differential, by increasing wages, weakens a country’s firms’ competitive position, the higher wages reinforce standard market access mechanisms to give rise to aggregate income effects. When the initial levels of trade openness are sufficiently low, this ‘expansionary’ aggregate effect can attract industry in the country with stronger unions and also result in an increase in the extensive margin of exports. For sufficiently large inter-country differences in the bargaining power of unions, trade liberalization can then result in a pro-variety effect, with an increase in the total availability of varieties to consumers in both countries, regardless of there being inter-country differences in size.

Unionisation, International Integration and Selection

We study how unionisation affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit-centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection-softening; (ii) a counter-competitive; (iii) a wage-inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two-country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit-centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalisation can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).

Financing Constraints, Irreversibility, and Investment Dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financing constraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firms cannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint that they can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examine the cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and output in the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields three main results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investment is reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint on variable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interaction between the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and material deliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they are highly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

Financing constraints, irreversibility and investment dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financingconstraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firmscannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint thatthey can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examinethe cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and outputin the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields threemain results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investmentis reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint onvariable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interactionbetween the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and materialdeliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they arehighly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

Employee referrals and the inter-industry wage structure

This paper investigates the role of employee referrals in the labor market.Using an original data set, I find that industries that pay wage premia andhave characteristics associated with high-wage sectors rely mainly on employeereferrals to fill jobs. Moreover, unemployment rates are higher in industries which use employee referrals more extensively. This paper develops an equilibrium matching model which can explain these empirical regularities. Inthis model, the matching process sorts heterogeneous firms and workers into two distinct groups: referrals match "good" jobs to "good" workers, while formalmethods (e.g., newspaper ads and employment agencies) match less-attractive jobs to disadvantaged workers. Thus, well-connected workers who learn quickly aboutjob opportunities use referrals to jump job queues, while those who are less well placed in the labor market search for jobs through formal methods. The split of firms and workers between referrals and formal search is, however, not necessarily efficient. Congestion externalities in referral search imply that unemployment would be closer to the optimal rate if firms and workers 'at themargin' searched formally.