The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 : restrictions on the creation of “saviour siblings” and the relevance of the harm principle

This paper provides an overview of the regulatory developments in the UK which impact on the use of in vitro fertilization (IVF) and embryo screening techniques for the creation of “saviour siblings.” Prior to the changes implemented under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, this specific use of IVF was not addressed by the legislative framework and regulated only by way of policy issued by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). Following the implementation of the statutory reforms, a number of restrictive conditions are now imposed on the face of the legislation. This paper considers whether there is any justification for restricting access to IVF and pre-implantation tissue typing for the creation of “saviour siblings.” The analysis is undertaken by examining the normative factors that have guided the development of the UK regulatory approach prior to the 2008 legislative reforms. The approach adopted in relation to the “saviour sibling” issue is compared to more general HFEA policy, which has prioritized the notion of reproductive choice and determined that restrictions on access are only justified on the basis of harm considerations.

Climate Change, Neutrality and the Harm Principle

This paper aims at evaluating the compatibility of coercive climate policies with liberal neutrality. More precisely, it focuses on the doctrine of state neutrality as associated with the "harm principle". It argues that given the difficulty of attributing causal responsibilities for climate harms to individuals, the harm principle doesn't work in this case, at least if one endorses a liberal atomistic ontology. Furthermore, the definition of what constitutes climate harms implies making moral assumptions, which makes it impossible to justify climate policies in a neutral way. Finally, the paper shows another consequence of applying neutrality to the case of climate change, that is the risk of a shift from political forms of decision-making to technocracy. Focusing too much on liberty of choice may (paradoxically) be to the detriment of political freedom. The paper concludes that climate change is an intrinsically moral issue and that it should be the occasion of a political debate about our current values and lifestyles. It should not be reduced to a mere question of carbon metric.

Can Mixed Martial Arts be Ethically Defended?: Autonomy, Paternalism and the Harm Principle

Abstract Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) and the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) founded in 1993 have been under scrutiny for the past two decades. Unlike boxing, the ethical status of MMA and whether it is morally defensible have rarely been analyzed in the academic literature. I argue that MMA requires such an analysis because it is inherently violent. The purpose of this study was to examine elite-level MMA by referring to the ethical concepts of autonomy, paternalism and the Harm Principle. Findings from interviews with MMA athletes as well as my personal experience of MMA were presented to establish a deeper understanding of the sport and what it means to train and compete in a sport defined as violent. The conceptual analysis and findings of MMA athletes' experiences in this investigation resulted in the conclusion that MMA is ethically defensible. Additional findings, implications and recommendations for further research were also discussed.

Retributivists! The harm principle is not for you!

Retributivism is often explicitly or implicitly assumed to be compatible with the harm principle, since the harm principle (in some guises) concerns the content of the criminal law, whilst retributivism concerns the punishment of those that break the law. In this essay I show that retributivism should not be endorsed alongside any version of the harm principle. For some versions of the harm principle, this is because retributivism is logically incompatible with it, or its grounds. For others, retributivists can only endorse the harm principle at the cost of endorsing implausible positions about the content of the criminal law.

Regulating IVF and pre-implantation tissue-typing for the creation of "saviour siblings" : a harm analysis

Scientific discoveries, developments in medicine and health issues are the constant focus of media attention and the principles surrounding the creation of so called ‘saviour siblings’ are of no exception. The development in the field of reproductive techniques has provided the ability to genetically analyse embryos created in the laboratory to enable parents to implant selected embryos to create a tissue-matched child who may be able to cure an existing sick child. The research undertaken in this thesis examines the regulatory frameworks overseeing the delivery of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in Australia and the United Kingdom and considers how those frameworks impact on the accessibility of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) procedures for the creation of ‘saviour siblings’. In some jurisdictions, the accessibility of such techniques is limited by statutory requirements. The limitations and restrictions imposed by the state in relation to the technology are analysed in order to establish whether such restrictions are justified. The analysis is conducted on the basis of a harm framework. The framework seeks to establish whether those affected by the use of the technology (including the child who will be created) are harmed. In order to undertake such evaluation, the concept of harm is considered under the scope of John Stuart Mill’s liberal theory and the Harm Principle is used as a normative tool to judge whether the level of harm that may result, justifies state intervention or restriction with the reproductive decision-making of parents in this context. The harm analysis conducted in this thesis seeks to determine an appropriate regulatory response in relation to the use of pre-implantation tissue-typing for the creation of ‘saviour siblings’. The proposals outlined in the last part of this thesis seek to address the concern that harm may result from the practice of pre-implantation tissue-typing. The current regulatory frameworks in place are also analysed on the basis of the harm framework established in this thesis. The material referred to in this thesis reflects the law and policy in place in Australia and the UK at the time the thesis was submitted for examination (December 2009).

Saviour Siblings and the Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology: Harm, Ethics and Law

Advances in the field of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) have been revolutionary. This book focuses on the use of ARTs in the context of families who seek to conceive a matching sibling donor as a source of tissue to treat an existing sick child. Such children have been referred to as ‘saviour siblings’. Considering the legal and regulatory frameworks that impact on the accessibility of this technology in Australia and the UK, the work analyses the ethical and moral issues that arise from the use of the technology for this specific purpose. The author claims the only justification for limiting a family’s reproductive liberty in this context is where the exercise of reproductive decision-making results in harm to others. It is argued that the harm principle is the underlying feature of legislative action in Western democratic society, and as such, this principle provides the grounds upon which a strong and persuasive argument is made for a less-restrictive regulatory approach in the context of ‘saviour siblings’.

Crimes against morality

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the relationship between crime and morality, with a specific focus on crimes against morality. While we argue that all crimes have a general moral basis, condemned as wrong or bad and proscribed by society, there is a specific group of offences in modern democratic nations labelled crimes against morality. Included within this group are offences related to prostitution, pornography and homosexuality. What do these crimes have in common? Most clearly they tend to have a sexual basis and are often argued to do sexual harm, in both a moral and /or psychological sense, as well as physically. Conversely they are often argued to be victimless crimes, especially when the acts occur between consenting adults. Finally they are considered essentially private acts but they often occur, and are regulated, in the public domain. Most importantly, each of these crimes against morality has only relatively recently (ie in the past 150 years) become identified and regulated by the state as a criminal offence.

An interview with Dr. Richard Shapcott : the international ethics of 'Basic Democracy'

Dr. Richard Shapcott is the senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland. His areas of interest in research concern international ethics, cosmopolitan political theory and cultural diversity. He is the author of the recently published book titled International Ethics: A Critical Introduction; and several other pieces, such as, “Anti-Cosmopolitanism, the Cosmopolitan Harm Principle and Global Dialogue,” in Michalis’ and Petito’s book, Civilizational Dialogue and World Order. He’s also the author of “Dialogue and International Ethics: Religion, Cultural Diversity and Universalism, in Patrick Hayden’s, The Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and International Relations.

Creating 'saviour siblings' : the notion of harming by conceiving in the context of healthy children

Over the past decade there have been a number of families who have utilised assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) to create a tissue-matched child, with the purpose of using the child’s tissue to cure an existing sick child. This inevitably brings such families a sense of hope as the ultimate aim is to overcome a family health crisis. However, this specific use of reproductive technologies has been the subject of significant criticism, most of which is levelled against the potential harm to the ‘saviour’ child. In Australia, families seeking to access reproductive technologies in this context are therefore required to justify their motives to an ethics committee in order to establish, amongst other things, whether the child will suffer harm once born. This paper explores the concept of harm in the context of conception, focusing on whether it is possible to ‘harm’ a healthy child who has been conceived to save another. To achieve this, the paper will evaluate the impact of the ‘non-identity’ principle in the ‘saviour sibling’ context, and assess the existing body of literature which addresses ‘harm’ in the context of conception. As will be established, the majority of such literature has focused on ‘wrongful life’ cases which seek to address whether an existing child who has been born with a disability, has been harmed. Finally, this paper will distinguish the harm arguments in the ‘saviour sibling’ context based on the fact that the harm evaluation concerns the ‘future-life’ assessment of a healthy child.

Desvalor da ação e desvalor do resultado como fundamentos do injusto penal: uma revisão a partir do modelo habermasiano de sociedade

A presente tese propõe um modelo de injusto penal rigorosamente dualista, assimentendido aquele que, ao lado do desvalor da ação, exija sempre e necessariamente a efetivaocorrência de um desvalor do resultado, consistente na afetação, danosa ou perigosa, da esferade existência de terceiros. A hipótese que conduz a investigação é a de que, mesmo diante dosmovimentos expansionistas do poder punitivo hoje verificados, é possível defender a viabilidade de tal concepção de injusto penal. Para a demonstração dessa hipótese, parte-se domodelo dual de sociedade proposto por Jürgen Habermas, que tem na teoria do agircomunicativo a chave para a proteção do mundo da vida frente aos influxos colonizatóriosprovenientes dos sistemas econômico e político administrativo. A partir desse marco teórico,propõe-se uma releitura de alguns dos conceitos fundamentais da teoria do delito, de modo aconferir-lhes interpretação compatível com a concepção dualista rigorosa de injusto adotada.Por fim, para verificar a plausibilidade da hipótese colocada, tais conceitos fundamentais sãopostos à prova diante de situações teóricas tradicionalmente classificadas como de difícilconciliação com uma concepção de injusto baseada na necessária ocorrência de desvalor doresultado, como é o caso dos crimes de perigo abstrato e dos crimes tentados.

Um limite absoluto para o Direito? O princípio do dano e o problema da coação legítima

O princípio do dano, assim como elaborado por John Stuart Mill em On Liberty, é tido como elemento fundamental à afirmação do liberalismo a partir do século XIX e seu desenvolvimento rumo ao século XX. Diante das nascentes democracias européias foi afirmado como um princípio absoluto de proteção à liberdade individual contra a imposição da moralidade pela opinião pública e pelo Estado. Mill partilhava o apreço de Tocqueville pela democracia sem deixar de temer a tirania das maiorias. Inicialmente, investiga-se o lugar do princípio do dano na filosofia política milliana e as fragilidades apontadas por seus críticos. Em um segundo momento, analisa-se sua influência na defesa das liberdades civis na Inglaterra da década de 1950, especificamente com a edição do Relatório Wolfenden que defendeu a descriminalização de práticas homossexuais, bem como o debate que se lhe seguiu sobre os limites do Direito protagonizado por H.L.A. Hart. Na última parte, o objeto do estudo é o princípio do dano agora inserido em uma doutrina liberal-perfeccionista, assim como formulada por Joseph Raz em A Moralidade da Liberdade. O objetivo final é revelar a existência de incoerências internas no princípio do dano, tanto em sua versão original como nas que lhe sucederam, de modo a impedir a fixação de uma espaço imune ao Direito e à imposição da moralidade. No entanto, visto da perspectiva adequada, o fracasso na elaboração de tal princípio deve ser relativizado, eis que no seu devir o princípio do dano serviu à reflexão acerca dos limites da coerção legítima, bem como ao aprimoramento de conceitos relevantes à filosofia política como moralismo legal, paternalismo e perfeccionismo jurídicos.

Legislating about Unhealthy Food: A Millian Approach

Tackling food-related health conditions is becoming one of the most pressing issues in the policy agendas of western liberal democratic governments. In this article, I intend to illustrate what the liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill would have said about legislation on unhealthy food and I focus especially on the arguments advanced by Mill in his classic essay On Liberty ([1859] 2006). Mill is normally considered as the archetype of liberal anti-paternalism and his ideas are often invoked by those who oppose state paternalism, including those who reject legislation that restricts the consumption of unhealthy food. Furthermore, his views have been applied to related policy areas such as alcohol minimum pricing (Saunders 2013) and genetically modified food (Holtug 2001). My analysis proceeds as follows. First, I show that Mill’s account warrants some restrictions on food advertising and justifies various forms of food labelling. Second, I assess whether and to what extent Mill’s ‘harm principle’ justifies social and legal non-paternalistic penalties against unhealthy eaters who are guilty of other-regarding harm. Finally, I show that Mill’s account warrants taxing unhealthy foods, thus restricting the freedom of both responsible and irresponsible eaters and de facto justifying what I call ‘secondary paternalism’.

Self-other asymmetry

In this paper, I present a non standard objection to moral impartialism. My idea is that moral impartialism is questionable when it is committed to a principle we have reasons to reject: the principle of self-other symmetry. According to the utilitarian version of the principle, the benefits and harms to the agent are exactly as relevant to the global evaluation of the goodness of his action as the benefits and harms to any other agent. But this view sits badly with the “Harm principle” which stresses the difference between harm to others and harm to the self. According to the deontological version, we have moral duties to ourselves which are exactly symmetrical to our duties to others. But there are reasons to believe that the idea of a duty to the self is not coherent.

Les valeurs de la communauté et la justification des restrictions aux droits et libertés de la personne

Il y a 150 ans, John Stuart Mill dénonçait l'emprise tyrannique de la morale publique sur la vie des individus et affirmait que le principe du préjudice à autrui constitue l'unique critère en vertu duquel l'État peut légitimement interférer avec la liberté individuelle. Près d'un siècle plus tard, en réaction au rapport Wolfenden, Lord Devlin articulait une version de la thèse du moralisme juridique en faveur du maintien de l'interdiction criminelle des pratiques homosexuelles en privé entre adultes consentants. Cette thèse du moralisme juridique a fait l'objet de nombreuses critiques. Selon deux des plus influents philosophes et théoriciens du droit du XXe siècle, Herbert L.A. Hart et Ronald Dworkin, le rôle légitime des valeurs de la communauté, dans la justification de l'intervention coerctive de l'État dans la vie des individus, doit être déterminé du point de vue de la morale critique. Ces débats philosophiques ont profondément influencé le discours judiciaire au Canada. La jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada depuis l'avènement de la Charte témoigne de deux tendances dans l'interprétation et l'application du principe du préjudice lors de l'examen de la légitimité des objectifs législatifs à la première étape du test Oakes. Selon une première approche, qui légitimise souvent un activisme judiciaire, la justification des mesures attentatoires doit reposer sur la démonstration d'un préjudice aux valeurs officiellement reconnues. Selon une deuxième approche, qui préconise plutôt une attitude de déférence envers les choix moraux du législateur, la démonstration d'un préjudice n'est pas un prérequis : l'existence de considérations morales objectives suffit.

Contre le libertarianisme de droite : l’accès aux ressources pour une justice minimale

Dans ce mémoire, nous aborderons des questions portant sur la légitimité de la propriété privée, à quels moments est-ce que la propriété privée cesse d’être légitime ? Nous défendrons que chaque individu détient le droit inaliénable d’accéder aux ressources, et que cet accès aux ressources doit lui fournir tous les moyens nécessaires pour qu’il puisse se développer jusqu’à ce qu’il soit pleinement autonome. Ainsi, lorsque la propriété privée de certains individus bloque l’accès aux ressources, il doit y avoir des mécanismes de redistribution permettant de compenser la nuisance produite par la propriété privée. Par ailleurs, l’accès aux ressources peut être remplacé par une gamme d’opportunités de base : les opportunités de développement nécessaires à l’atteinte de l’autonomie en société. La redistribution n’a donc pas besoin de viser l’accès aux ressources, elle doit garantir que tous aient accès aux opportunités de base. Nous circonscrirons notre réflexion à un cadre de justice minimale dans le but d’attribuer une nécessité morale à chacune des conclusions de ce mémoire. Autrement dit, si les paramètres de redistribution développés au terme de ce mémoire représentent le strict minimum pour qu’une société se soucie de la justice, alors il est nécessaire que toutes les sociétés instituent au moins ces paramètres de redistribution. Pour démontrer le minimalisme de ces paramètres de justice, nous les déduirons à partir de la position des libertariens de droite. Considérant que leur position se veut la plus minimale possible, si nos paramètres de redistribution sont pleinement consistants avec leur position, alors ces paramètres relèvent de la justice minimale.