Effet de la classe ou expériences scolaires? : étude sur l'élaboration et la variation des aspirations scolaires réalistes des étudiant(e)s canadien(ne)s au regard des études universitaires

Cette thèse a été réalisée, entre autres, grâce à une subvention reçue du Fonds de recherche du Québec – Société et culture et de son partenaire le ministère de l’Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport (MELS) Les analyses contenues dans cette thèse ont été réalisées au Centre interuniversitaire québécois de statistiques sociales (CIQSS), membre du Réseau canadien des centres de données de recherche (RCCDR). Les activités du CIQSS sont rendues possibles grâce à l’appui financier du CRSHC, des IRSC, de la FCI, de Statistique Canada, du FRQSC ainsi que de l’ensemble des universités québécoises qui participent à leur financement. Les idées exprimées dans ce texte sont celles des auteurs et non celles des partenaires financiers.

Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida: a construção social de um mercado

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Habitus e ethos: tempo e espaço em exames de Português

Dissertação de mestrado em Ciências da Educação - Análise e intervenção em Educação

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints

In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.

Complexity and Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Problemsing.

I develop a model of endogenous bounded rationality due to search costs, arising implicitly from the problems complexity. The decision maker is not required to know the entire structure of the problem when making choices but can think ahead, through costly search, to reveal more of it. However, the costs of search are not assumed exogenously; they are inferred from revealed preferences through her choices. Thus, bounded rationality and its extent emerge endogenously: as problems become simpler or as the benefits of deeper search become larger relative to its costs, the choices more closely resemble those of a rational agent. For a fixed decision problem, the costs of search will vary across agents. For a given decision maker, they will vary across problems. The model explains, therefore, why the disparity, between observed choices and those prescribed under rationality, varies across agents and problems. It also suggests, under reasonable assumptions, an identifying prediction: a relation between the benefits of deeper search and the depth of the search. As long as calibration of the search costs is possible, this can be tested on any agent-problem pair. My approach provides a common framework for depicting the underlying limitations that force departures from rationality in different and unrelated decision-making situations. Specifically, I show that it is consistent with violations of timing independence in temporal framing problems, dynamic inconsistency and diversification bias in sequential versus simultaneous choice problems, and with plausible but contrasting risk attitudes across small- and large-stakes gambles.

"Um arranjo produtivo em xeque": campo, habitus e capital simbólico em um Arranjo Produtivo Local moveleiro em Minas Gerais

O Arranjo Produtivo Local de Ubá e região (APL de Ubá) gera cerca de nove mil empregos e abriga a sede da maior empresa de móveis de aço da América Latina, além de três outras grandes empresas. Entretanto, é marcado por relações de disputa que preocupam os próprios empresários locais. O problema investigado é até que ponto essas disputas, especialmente entre fabricantes e fornecedores, colocam em risco esse APL moveleiro. O objetivo neste artigo é apresentar um entendimento de como se dão as relações de poder entre os empreendedores locais fabricantes de móveis e os fornecedores dessas empresas, discutindo suas implicações para o APL. Os resultados apontam para a existência de problemas nas relações entre fabricantes e fornecedores decorrentes, principalmente, da acumulação desigual de capital simbólico, do predomínio de interesses diferentes em jogo (illusio), bem como dos princípios diferentes e em oposição que orientam as práticas dos agentes (habitus). Os resultados apontam os riscos que essa natureza de relações acarreta para o APL de Ubá.