National security and pandemics

Pandemics are for the most part disease outbreaks that become widespread as a result of the spread of human-to-human infection. Beyond the debilitating, sometimes fatal, consequences for those directly affected, pandemics have a range of negative social, economic and political consequences. These tend to be greater where the pandemic is a novel pathogen, has a high mortality and/or hospitalization rate and is easily spread. According to Lee Jong-wook, former Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), pandemics do not respect international borders. Therefore, they have the potential to weaken many societies, political systems and economies simultaneously.

National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation and before the Courts: Exploring the Challenges. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 78/January 2015

This study provides a comparative analysis of the national legal regimes and practices governing the use of intelligence information as evidence in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. It explores notably how national security can be invoked to determine the classification of information and evidence as 'state secrets' in court proceedings and whether such laws and practices are fundamental rights- and rule of law-compliant. The study finds that, in the majority of Member States under investigation, the judiciary is significantly hindered in effectively adjudicating justice and guaranteeing the rights of the defence in ‘national security’ cases. The research also illustrates that the very term ‘national security’ is nebulously defined across the Member States analysed, with no national definition meeting legal certainty and “in accordance with the law” standards and a clear risk that the executive and secret services may act arbitrarily. The study argues that national and transnational intelligence community practices and cooperation need to be subject to more independent and effective judicial accountability and be brought into line with EU 'rule of law' standards.

Refugees and U.S. asylum seekers from Central America : statement of Nancy R. Kingsbury, Director, Foreign Economic Assistance Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division; before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives.

"For release ... March 9, 1989."

An examination of the report of the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China : hearing before the International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, first session, May 26, 1999.

Shipping list no.: 2000-0165-P.

Health Security in the White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland - A Review of Provisions

The paper reviews the provisions of the White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland. It states that the issue of health security is not given adequate significance there. The accessibility of health services is considered, in general, solely in terms of their availability. The assumptions concerning the concept of providing the number of beds required in a state of threat to national security and in time of war do not take into account the current socio-economic conditions and need to be reviewed. The conclusions emphasize the dilemmas that emerge as a result of the unilateral promotion of a single category of national security, that is military security, in the context of ensuring health security.

Investigation of Offences against National Security

The study is a close scrutiny of the process of investigation of offences in India along with an analysis of powers and functions of the investigating agency. The offences, which are prejudicial to sovereignty, integrity and security of the nation or to its friendly relations with foreign states, are generally called the offences against national security. Offences against national security being prejudicial to the very existence of the nation and its legal system, is a heinous and terrible one. As early as 1971 the Law Commission of India had pointed out the need of treating the offences relating to national security and their perpetrators on a totally different procedural footing. The recommendation that, all the offences coming under the said category ought to be brought under the purview of a single enactment so as to confront such offences effectively. The discrepancies in and inadequacies of the criminal justice system in India as much as they are related to the investigations of the offences against national security are examined and the reforms are also suggested. The quality of criminal justice is closely linked with the caliber of the prosecution system and many of the acquittals in courts can be ascribed not only to poor investigations but also to poor quality of prosecution.

Bottom-up review : analysis of DOD war game to test key assumptions : report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives /

"B-272119"--P. 1.

France and the Problems of Security and Disarmament after the First World War

Jackson, Peter, 'France and the Problems of Security and Disarmament after the First World War', Journal of Strategic Studies (2006) 29(2) pp.247-280 Special Issue: Enforcing arms limits: Germany post 1919; Iraq post 1991 RAE2008

A national security strategy for England: Matthew Sutcliffe, the Earl of Essex, and the Cadiz Expedition of 1596

The English cleric Matthew Sutcliffe arguably produced the first comprehensive security concept in history. It had at its centre the war between England and Spain (1585-1604), and Sutcliffe advocated taking the war to the Iberian Peninsula to seize Philip II's main Atlantic ports, rather than remaining satisfied with the indirect combat of Spain in Flanders, defensive action against naval attacks on England and the guerre de course on Spanish shipping at sea. This approach seems to be at the heart of Essex's 1596 naval campaing against Spanish ports, which foundered on the bureaucratic politics of the Elizabethan government.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service