Direct and indirect subsidies in markets with system goods in the presence of externalities. Preliminary version

This paper derives a model of markets with system goods and two technological standards. An established standard incurs lower unit production costs but causes a negative externality. The paper derives the conditions for policy intervention and compares the effect of direct and indirect cost-reducing subsidies in two markets with system goods in the presence of externalities. If consumers are committed to the technology by purchasing one of the components, direct subsidies are preferable. For a medium-low cost difference between technological standards and a low externality cost it is optimal to provide a direct subsidy only to the first technology adopter. As the higher the externality cost raises, the more technology adopters should be provided with direct subsidies. This effect is robust in all extensions. In the absence of consumers commitment to a technological standard indirect and direct subsidies are both desirable. In this case, the subsidy to the first adopter is lower then the subsidy to the second adopter. Moreover, for the low cost difference between technological standards and low externality cost the fi rst fi rm chooses a superior standard without policy intervention. Finally, a perfect compatibility between components based on different technological standards enhances an advantage of indirect subsidies for medium-high externality cost and cost difference between technological standards. Journal of Economic Literature Classi fication Numbers: C72, D21, D40, H23, L13, L22, L51, O25, O33, O38. Keywords: Technological standards; complementary products; externalities; cost-reducing subsidies; compatibility.

Sharing a River among Satiable Countries

With diminishing global water reserves the problem of water allocation becomes increasingly important. We consider the problem of efficiently sharing a river among a group of satiable countries. Inducing countries to efficiently cooperate requires monetary compensations via international agreements. We show that cooperation of the other countries exerts a positive externality on the benefit of a coalition. Our problem is to distribute the benefit of efficiently sharing the river under these constraints. If the countries outside of a coalition do not cooperate at all, then the downstream incremental distribution is the unique compromise between the absolute territorial sovereignty (ATS) doctrine and the unlimited territorial integrity (UTI) doctrine. If all countries outside of a coalition cooperate, then there may not exist any distribution satisfying the UTI doctrine.

Spectroscopic and theoretical studies of some 2-ethylsulfinyl-(4 `-substituted)-phenylthioacetates

The analysis of the IR nu(co) bands of the 2-ethylsulfinyl-(4`-substituted)-phenylthioacetates 4`-Y-C(6)H(4)SC(O)CH(2)S(O)Et (Y = NO(2) 1, Cl 2, Br 3, H 4, Me 5, OMe 6) supported by B3LY/6-31G(d,p) calculations along with the NBO analysis for 1.4 and 6 and X-ray analysis for 3, indicated the existence of four gauche (q-g-syn, g(3)-syn. g(1)-atin and q-g(2)-syn) conformers for 1-6 The calculations reproduce quite well the experimental results, i e the computed q-g-syn and g3-syn conformers correspond in the IR spectrum (in solution), to the nu(co) doublet higher frequency component of larger intensity, while the computed grant, conformer correspond to the nu(co) doublet lower frequency component (in solution) NBO analysis showed that the n(s) -> pi(center dot)(c1=o2), no(co) -> sigma(c1-s3), no(co) -> sigma(c1-c4) orbital interactions are the main factors which stabilize the q-g-syn, g(3)-syn, g(1)-anti and q-g(2)-syn conformers for 1, 4 and 6 The no(co) -> sigma(c1-s3) interaction which stabilizes the q-g-syn, g(3)-syn and q-g(2)-syn conformers into a larger extent than the granti conformer, is responsible for the larger tto frequencies of the former conformers relative to the latter one. The q-g-syn, g(3)-syn and q-g(2)-syn conformers are further stabilized sigma(c4-s5) -> pi(co)center dot (strong). pi(co)/sigma(c1-c4,) no(co) -> sigma(c6-H17[Et]) (weak) and pi(co)/sigma(c4-c5) pi(co) (strong) orbital interactions. The q-g-syn conformer is also stabilized by sigma(c4-s5) -> pi(center dot)(co) (strong), pi(co)/sigma(c4-c5).no(co) -> sigma(c6-H17[Et]), pi(C9=C11[ph]) -> sigma(c4-H6x-CH2]) (weak). no((SO)) -> sigma(C11-H23[ph]) (medium) pi(co)/sigma(c4-c5)(strong) orbital interactions. The q-g-syn conformei is further stabilized by the n(S5) O((C))(8-) S((SO))(8+) attractive Coulornbic interaction while the q-g(2)-syn conformer is destabilized by the n55 0,8c-0) repulsive Coulombic interaction. This analysis indicates the following conformer stabilization order. q-g-syn, g(3)-syn > g(1)-anti >> q-g(2)-syn X-ray single crystal analysis of 3 indicates that it assumes in the solid a distorted q-g(2)-syn geometry which is stabilized through almost the same orbital and Coulombic interaction which takes place for the q-g(2)-syn conformer, in the gas, along with dipole moment coupling and a series intermolecular C-HO0 interactions. (C) 2010 Elsevier B V All rights reserved

How does firm heterogeneity information impact the estimation of embodied carbon emissions in Chinese exports?

Using an augmented Chinese input–output table in which information about firm ownership and type of traded goods are explicitly reported, we show that ignoring firm heterogeneity causes embodied CO2 emissions in Chinese exports to be overestimated by 20% at the national level, with huge differences at the sector level, for 2007. This is because different types of firm that are allocated to the same sector of the conventional Chinese input–output table vary greatly in terms of market share, production technology and carbon intensity. This overestimation of export-related carbon emissions would be even higher if it were not for the fact that 80% of CO2 emissions embodied in exports of foreign-owned firms are, in fact, emitted by Chinese-owned firms upstream of the supply chain. The main reason is that the largest CO2 emitter, the electricity sector located upstream in Chinese domestic supply chains, is strongly dominated by Chinese-owned firms with very high carbon intensity.

Consumption-based accounting of U.S. CO2 emissions from 1990 to 2010

To tackle global climate change, it is desirable to reduce CO2 emissions associated with household consumption in particular in developed countries, which tend to have much higher per capita household carbon footprints than less developed countries. Our results show that carbon intensity of different consumption categories in the U.S. varies significantly. The carbon footprint tends to increase with increasing income but at a decreasing rate due to additional income being spent on less carbon intensive consumption items. This general tendency is frequently compensated by higher frequency of international trips and higher housing related carbon emissions (larger houses and more space for consumption items). Our results also show that more than 30% of CO2 emissions associated with household consumption in the U.S. occur outside of the U.S. Given these facts, the design of carbon mitigation policies should take changing household consumption patterns and international trade into account.

Congestión vehicular en Medellín: una posible solución desde la Economía

Según la teoría económica el mecanismo de precios es una herramienta adecuada para solucionar el problema de congestión vehicular. El objetivo de este artículo es diagnosticar el grado de congestión vehicular de la ciudad de Medellín (Colombia) y proponer alternativas que den solución a dicho problema desde la óptica de la teoría económica. A diferencia de otros estudios, esta investigación analizó la relación entre el gasto de las familias en transporte y la elección de transporte (público o privado) a través la metodología de elasticidades. Se encontró evidencia a favor de la hipótesis de los precios como mecanismos para desincentivar el uso del automóvil privado, pues a medida que aumenta el nivel de gasto en transporte (asociado a un supuesto peaje urbano), la probabilidad de usar transporte privado disminuye, mientras que la probabilidad de utilizar transporte público aumenta.