Punishing the Innocent along with the Guilty: The Economics of Individual versus Group Punishment

Standard models of law enforcement involve the apprehension and punishment of a single suspect, but in many contexts, punishment is actually imposed on an entire group known to contain the offender. The advantages of .group punishment. are that the offender is punished with certainty and detection costs are saved. The disadvantage is that innocent individuals are punished. We compare individual and group punishment when social welfare depends on fairness, and when it depends on deterrence. We show that group punishment may dominate in the former case if the detection technology is ineffective but never in the latter case. We discuss our results in the context of several examples.

Roll the dice, rational agent : should extra-curial punishment mitigate an offender's sentence?

It was rugby league State of Origin night 2008 and a group of adults had descended upon a house in Eagleby, Brisbane to have some drinks and to celebrate the game. At 11pm that evening, Shane Thomas Davidson entered the bedroom of the homeowner’s 10-year-old son, TC. Davidson approached the bed and began to massage the boy’s penis under his clothing, which caused TC to wake. Davidson stated, ‘Show me how big your willy is and I’ll show you how big mine is’. TC refused the request and after a small period of time, left the bedroom and told his father what had happened...

Focus group discussions exploring major social influences on young driver safety in Oman. Report to the Research Council of Oman, Muscat.

This report documents the findings of in-depth focus groups conducted with 17 young drivers. The main aim of these focus groups was to explore key themes related to the risky behaviour of young drivers (17-25 years) in Oman. Specifically the interviews explored the influence of parents and peers, who may serve as a source of imitation, reward and punishment. Additionally, the interviews explored the influence of policing and licensing on young driver behaviour.

Punishment, blame and stigma after conflict: the experience of politically motivated former prisoners in Northern Ireland

This paper examines the relationship between the politics of blame in post-conflict Northern Ireland and the treatment of politically motivated former prisoners. Using the examples of direct and indirect discrimination in the areas of employment and access to mental health services, the paper considers how the discursive operation of blaming produces evasions and attributions of guilt. It argues that such blaming practices have very real material consequences for the allocation or withholding of goods and burdens in the community. The paper notes also that the ‘cause of victims’ is often appropriated by the press and other political actors for their own purposes, frequently to block the provision of public goods to one particular group of ex-combatants: ex-politically motivated prisoners. It concludes by posing a series of questions about blaming, justice and the moral authority of the victim in a transitional justice context. The claim of the paper is simply to offer some starting points for understanding the relationship between processes of blame, stigma and social exclusion.

Beyond Criminal Justice: An anthology of abolitionist papers presented to conferences of the European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control over the past decade

Beyond Criminal Justice presents a vision of a future without brutal, authoritarian and repressive penal regimes. Many of the papers brought together here have been unavailable for more than two decades. Their republication indicates not only their continuing theoretical importance to abolitionist studies but also how they provide important insights into the nature and legitimacy of criminal processes in the here and now. Contributors highlight the human consequences of the harms of imprisonment, evidencing the hurt, injury and damage of penal incarceration across a number of different countries in Europe. Focusing on penal power and prisoner contestation to such power, the moral and political crises of imprisonment are laid bare. The contributors to Beyond Criminal Justice explore the urgent need for a coherent, rational and morally and politically sophisticated theoretical basis for penal abolitionism. Advocating a utopian imagination and at the same time practical solutions already implemented in countries around Europe - alongside grappling with controversial debates such as abolitionist responses to rape and sexual violence - the book steps outside of common sense assumptions regarding 'crime', punishment and 'criminal justice'. Beyond Criminal Justice will be of interest to students of criminology, zemiology, sociology, penology and critical legal studies as well as anyone interested in rethinking the problem of 'crime' and challenging the logic of the penal rationale.

Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.

The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.

Neural processing of reward and punishment in young people at increased familial risk of depression

Background Abnormalities in the neural representation of rewarding and aversive stimuli have been well-described in patients with acute depression, and we previously found abnormal neural responses to rewarding and aversive sight and taste stimuli in recovered depressed patients. The aim of the present study was to determine whether similar abnormalities might be present in young people at increased familial risk of depression but with no personal history of mood disorder. Methods We therefore used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine the neural responses to pleasant and aversive sights and tastes in 25 young people (16–21 years of age) with a biological parent with depression and 25 age- and gender-matched control subjects. Results We found that, relative to the control subjects, participants with a parental history of depression showed diminished responses in the orbitofrontal cortex to rewarding stimuli, whereas activations to aversive stimuli were increased in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and insula. In anterior cingulate cortex the at-risk group showed blunted neural responses to both rewarding and aversive stimuli. Conclusions Our findings suggest that young people at increased familial risk of depression have altered neural representation of reward and punishment, particularly in cortical regions linked to the use of positive and negative feedback to guide adaptive behavior.

Intergroup bias in third-party punishment stems from both ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination

Social norms pervade almost every aspect of social interaction. If they are violated, not only legal institutions, but other members of society as well, punish, i.e., inflict costs on the wrongdoer. Sanctioning occurs even when the punishers themselves were not harmed directly and even when it is costly for them. There is evidence for intergroup bias in this third-party punishment: third-parties, who share group membership with victims, punish outgroup perpetrators more harshly than ingroup perpetrators. However, it is unknown whether a discriminatory treatment of outgroup perpetrators (outgroup discrimination) or a preferential treatment of ingroup perpetrators (ingroup favoritism) drives this bias. To answer this question, the punishment of outgroup and ingroup perpetrators must be compared to a baseline, i.e., unaffiliated perpetrators. By applying a costly punishment game, we found stronger punishment of outgroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators and weaker punishment of ingroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators. This demonstrates that both ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination drive intergroup bias in third-party punishment of perpetrators that belong to distinct social groups.

The self-reported impact of legal and non-legal sanctions on a group of recidivist drink drivers

Concern remains regarding the efficacy of legal sanctions to reduce drink driving behaviours among repeat offenders. The present study examined the impact of traditional legal sanctions (e.g., fines and licence disqualification periods), nonlegal sanctions, alcohol consumption and the frequency of recent offending behaviour(s) on intentions to re-offend for a group of recidivist drink drivers (N=166). The analysis indicated that participants perceived legal sanctions to be severe, but not entirely certain nor swift. In addition, self-reported recent drink driving behaviours and alcohol consumption levels were identified as predictors of future intentions to drink and drive. The findings of the study confirm the popular assumption that some repeat offenders are impervious to the threat and application of legal sanctions and suggests that additional interventions such as alcohol treatment programs are required if the drinking and driving sequence is to be broken for this population. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Psychic Punishment Costs and Deterrence

In this paper we analyze criminal deterrence in the presence of specific psychic costs of punishments. We consider a dynamic model with three players, analyzing the choices of a representative lawmaker, potential criminal and judge. In our setting the lawmaker decides whether to introduce a fixed punishment enhancement above a chosen threshold of crime level, depending on its popularity among the voters. In reaction, the judge, who is influenced by her own preferences as well as the opinion of her peer group, might change the probability of punishment, through affecting the standard of reasonable doubt. Our results suggest that large discontinuous and mandatory increases in punishment can have unintended effects that are contrary to the stated goal of such punishment enhancements. In equilibrium, when either the judge or her peer group is "anti-punishment" enough, the level of criminal activity might increase in response to the punishment enhancement. This perverse effect is less likely to occur if there is a higher number of peer groups within the "elite", so that a greater extent of self-selection by judges can occur. Our results have relevance for a number of areas outside the traditional criminal justice system as well, such as special courts (such as ecclesiastical or military courts), or the strictness and enforcement of regulations.