A decentralized batch-based group key management potocol for mobile Internet of Thngs (DBGK).

It is anticipated that constrained devices in the Internet of Things (IoT) will often operate in groups to achieve collective monitoring or management tasks. For sensitive and mission-critical sensing tasks, securing multicast applications is therefore highly desirable. To secure group communications, several group key management protocols have been introduced. However, the majority of the proposed solutions are not adapted to the IoT and its strong processing, storage, and energy constraints. In this context, we introduce a novel decentralized and batch-based group key management protocol to secure multicast communications. Our protocol is simple and it reduces the rekeying overhead triggered by membership changes in dynamic and mobile groups and guarantees both backward and forward secrecy. To assess our protocol, we conduct a detailed analysis with respect to its communcation and storage costs. This analysis is validated through simulation to highlight energy gains. The obtained results show that our protocol outperforms its peers with respect to keying overhead and the mobility of members.

Mitigating sandwich attacks against a secure key management scheme in wireless sensor networks for PCS/SCADA

Alzaid et al. proposed a forward & backward secure key management scheme in wireless sensor networks for Process Control Systems (PCSs) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The scheme, however, is still vulnerable to an attack called the sandwich attack that can be launched when the adversary captures two sensor nodes at times t1 and t2, and then reveals all the group keys used between times t1 and t2. In this paper, a fix to the scheme is proposed in order to limit the vulnerable time duration to an arbitrarily chosen time span while keeping the forward and backward secrecy of the scheme untouched. Then, the performance analysis for our proposal, Alzaid et al.’s scheme, and Nilsson et al.’s scheme is given.

Efficient Key Management and Distribution for MANET

Ad hoc networks are being used in applications ranging from disaster recovery to distributed collaborative entertainment applications. Ad hoc networks have become one of the most attractive solution for rapid deployment of interconnecting large number of mobile personal devices. The user community of mobile personal devices are demanding a variety of value added multimedia entertainment services. The popularity of peer group is increasing and one or some members of the peer group need to send data to some or all members of the peer group. The increasing demand for group oriented value added services is driving for efficient multicast service over ad hoc networks. Access control mechanisms need to be deployed to provide guarantee that the unauthorized users cannot access the multicast content. In this paper, we present a topology aware key management and distribution scheme for secure overlay multicast over MANET to address node mobility related issues for multicast key management. We use overlay approach for key distribution and our objective is to keep communication overhead low for key management and distribution. We also incorporate reliability using explicit acknowledgments with the key distribution scheme. Through simulations we show that the proposed key management scheme has low communication overhead for rekeying and improves the reliability of key distribution.

SKMA - A Key Management Architecture for SCADA Systems

Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are widely used in the management of critical infrastructure such as electricity and water distrubution systems. Currently there is little understanding of how to best protect SCADA systems from malicious attacks. We review the constraints and requirements for SCADA security and propose a suitable architecture (SKMA) for secure SCADA communications. The architecture includes a proposed key management protocol (SKMP). We compare the architecture with a previous proposal from Sandia Labs.

Universally composable contributory group key exchange

We treat the security of group key exchange (GKE) in the universal composability (UC) framework. Analyzing GKE protocols in the UC framework naturally addresses attacks by malicious insiders. We define an ideal functionality for GKE that captures contributiveness in addition to other desired security goals. We show that an efficient two-round protocol securely realizes the proposed functionality in the random oracle model. As a result, we obtain the most efficient UC-secure contributory GKE protocol known.

Modeling key compromise impersonation attacks on group key exchange protocols

A key exchange protocol allows a set of parties to agree upon a secret session key over a public network. Two-party key exchange (2PKE) protocols have been rigorously analyzed under various models considering different adversarial actions. However, the analysis of group key exchange (GKE) protocols has not been as extensive as that of 2PKE protocols. Particularly, the security attribute of key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience has so far been ignored for the case of GKE protocols. We first model the security of GKE protocols addressing KCI attacks by both outsider and insider adversaries. We then show that a few existing protocols are not secure even against outsider KCI attacks. The attacks on these protocols demonstrate the necessity of considering KCI resilience for GKE protocols. Finally, we give a new proof of security for an existing GKE protocol under the revised model assuming random oracles.

A forward and backward secure key management in wireless sensor networks for PCS/SCADA

Process Control Systems (PCSs) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have recently been added to the already wide collection of wireless sensor networks applications. The PCS/SCADA environment is somewhat more amenable to the use of heavy cryptographic mechanisms such as public key cryptography than other sensor application environments. The sensor nodes in the environment, however, are still open to devastating attacks such as node capture, which makes designing a secure key management challenging. In this paper, a key management scheme is proposed to defeat node capture attack by offering both forward and backward secrecies. Our scheme overcomes the pitfalls which Nilsson et al.'s scheme suffers from, and is not more expensive than their scheme.

Generic one round group key exchange in the standard model

Minimizing complexity of group key exchange (GKE) protocols is an important milestone towards their practical deployment. An interesting approach to achieve this goal is to simplify the design of GKE protocols by using generic building blocks. In this paper we investigate the possibility of founding GKE protocols based on a primitive called multi key encapsulation mechanism (mKEM) and describe advantages and limitations of this approach. In particular, we show how to design a one-round GKE protocol which satisfies the classical requirement of authenticated key exchange (AKE) security, yet without forward secrecy. As a result, we obtain the first one-round GKE protocol secure in the standard model. We also conduct our analysis using recent formal models that take into account both outsider and insider attacks as well as the notion of key compromise impersonation resilience (KCIR). In contrast to previous models we show how to model both outsider and insider KCIR within the definition of mutual authentication. Our analysis additionally implies that the insider security compiler by Katz and Shin from ACM CCS 2005 can be used to achieve more than what is shown in the original work, namely both outsider and insider KCIR.

Design and analysis of group key exchange protocols

A group key exchange (GKE) protocol allows a set of parties to agree upon a common secret session key over a public network. In this thesis, we focus on designing efficient GKE protocols using public key techniques and appropriately revising security models for GKE protocols. For the purpose of modelling and analysing the security of GKE protocols we apply the widely accepted computational complexity approach. The contributions of the thesis to the area of GKE protocols are manifold. We propose the first GKE protocol that requires only one round of communication and is proven secure in the standard model. Our protocol is generically constructed from a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). We also suggest an efficient KEM from the literature, which satisfies the underlying security notion, to instantiate the generic protocol. We then concentrate on enhancing the security of one-round GKE protocols. A new model of security for forward secure GKE protocols is introduced and a generic one-round GKE protocol with forward security is then presented. The security of this protocol is also proven in the standard model. We also propose an efficient forward secure encryption scheme that can be used to instantiate the generic GKE protocol. Our next contributions are to the security models of GKE protocols. We observe that the analysis of GKE protocols has not been as extensive as that of two-party key exchange protocols. Particularly, the security attribute of key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience has so far been ignored for GKE protocols. We model the security of GKE protocols addressing KCI attacks by both outsider and insider adversaries. We then show that a few existing protocols are not secure against KCI attacks. A new proof of security for an existing GKE protocol is given under the revised model assuming random oracles. Subsequently, we treat the security of GKE protocols in the universal composability (UC) framework. We present a new UC ideal functionality for GKE protocols capturing the security attribute of contributiveness. An existing protocol with minor revisions is then shown to realize our functionality in the random oracle model. Finally, we explore the possibility of constructing GKE protocols in the attribute-based setting. We introduce the concept of attribute-based group key exchange (AB-GKE). A security model for AB-GKE and a one-round AB-GKE protocol satisfying our security notion are presented. The protocol is generically constructed from a new cryptographic primitive called encapsulation policy attribute-based KEM (EP-AB-KEM), which we introduce in this thesis. We also present a new EP-AB-KEM with a proof of security assuming generic groups and random oracles. The EP-AB-KEM can be used to instantiate our generic AB-GKE protocol.

An efficient public key management system : an application in vehicular ad hoc networks

The major purpose of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) is to provide safety-related message access for motorists to react or make a life-critical decision for road safety enhancement. Accessing safety-related information through the use of VANET communications, therefore, must be protected, as motorists may make critical decisions in response to emergency situations in VANETs. If introducing security services into VANETs causes considerable transmission latency or processing delays, this would defeat the purpose of using VANETs to improve road safety. Current research in secure messaging for VANETs appears to focus on employing certificate-based Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC) to support security. The security overhead of such a scheme, however, creates a transmission delay and introduces a time-consuming verification process to VANET communications. This paper proposes an efficient public key management system for VANETs: the Public Key Registry (PKR) system. Not only does this paper demonstrate that the proposed PKR system can maintain security, but it also asserts that it can improve overall performance and scalability at a lower cost, compared to the certificate-based PKC scheme. It is believed that the proposed PKR system will create a new dimension to the key management and verification services for VANETs.

An efficient public key management regime for vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETS)

The primary goal of the Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) is to provide real-time safety-related messages to motorists to enhance road safety. Accessing and disseminating safety-related information through the use of wireless communications technology in VANETs should be secured, as motorists may make critical decisions in dealing with an emergency situation based on the received information. If security concerns are not addressed in developing VANET systems, an adversary can tamper with, or suppress, the unprotected message to mislead motorists to cause traffic accidents and hazards. Current research on secure messaging in VANETs focuses on employing the certificate-based Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) scheme to support message encryption and digital signing. The security overhead of such a scheme, however, creates a transmission delay and introduces a time-consuming verification process to VANET communications. This thesis has proposed a novel public key verification and management approach for VANETs; namely, the Public Key Registry (PKR) regime. Compared to the VANET PKI scheme, this new approach can satisfy necessary security requirements with improved performance and scalability, and at a lower cost by reducing the security overheads of message transmission and eliminating digital certificate deployment and maintenance issues. The proposed PKR regime consists of the required infrastructure components, rules for public key management and verification, and a set of interactions and associated behaviours to meet these rule requirements. This is achieved through a system design as a logic process model with functional specifications. The PKR regime can be used as development guidelines for conforming implementations. An analysis and evaluation of the proposed PKR regime includes security features assessment, analysis of the security overhead of message transmission, transmission latency, processing latency, and scalability of the proposed PKR regime. Compared to certificate-based PKI approaches, the proposed PKR regime can maintain the necessary security requirements, significantly reduce the security overhead by approximately 70%, and improve the performance by 98%. Meanwhile, the result of the scalability evaluation shows that the latency of employing the proposed PKR regime stays much lower at approximately 15 milliseconds, whether operating in a huge or small environment. It is therefore believed that this research will create a new dimension to the provision of secure messaging services in VANETs.

Modeling key compromise impersonation attacks on group key exchange protocols

Two-party key exchange (2PKE) protocols have been rigorously analyzed under various models considering different adversarial actions. However, the analysis of group key exchange (GKE) protocols has not been as extensive as that of 2PKE protocols. Particularly, an important security attribute called key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience has been completely ignored for the case of GKE protocols. Informally, a protocol is said to provide KCI resilience if the compromise of the long-term secret key of a protocol participant A does not allow the adversary to impersonate an honest participant B to A. In this paper, we argue that KCI resilience for GKE protocols is at least as important as it is for 2PKE protocols. Our first contribution is revised definitions of security for GKE protocols considering KCI attacks by both outsider and insider adversaries. We also give a new proof of security for an existing two-round GKE protocol under the revised security definitions assuming random oracles. We then show how to achieve insider KCIR in a generic way using a known compiler in the literature. As one may expect, this additional security assurance comes at the cost of an extra round of communication. Finally, we show that a few existing protocols are not secure against outsider KCI attacks. The attacks on these protocols illustrate the necessity of considering KCI resilience for GKE protocols.

Performance and scalability assessment for non-certificate-based public key management in VANETS

Current research in secure messaging for Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) appears to focus on employing a digital certificate-based Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC) to support security. The security overhead of such a scheme, however, creates a transmission delay and introduces a time-consuming verification process to VANET communications. This paper proposes a non-certificate-based public key management for VANETs. A comprehensive evaluation of performance and scalability of the proposed public key management regime is presented, which is compared to a certificate-based PKC by employing a number of quantified analyses and simulations. Not only does this paper demonstrate that the proposal can maintain security, but it also asserts that it can improve overall performance and scalability at a lower cost, compared to the certificate-based PKC. It is believed that the proposed scheme will add a new dimension to the key management and verification services for VANETs.

Key Management in Wireless Sensor Networks

This chapter presents a comparative survey of recent key management (key distribution, discovery, establishment and update) solutions for wireless sensor networks. We consider both distributed and hierarchical sensor network architectures where unicast, multicast and broadcast types of communication take place. Probabilistic, deterministic and hybrid key management solutions are presented, and we determine a set of metrics to quantify their security properties and resource usage such as processing, storage and communication overheads. We provide a taxonomy of solutions, and identify trade-offs in these schemes to conclude that there is no one-size-fits-all solution.