752 resultados para Government spending
Resumo:
The Financial Crisis has hit particularly hard countries like Ireland or Spain. Procyclical fiscal policy has contributed to a boom-bust cycle that undermined fiscal positions and deepened current account deficits during the boom. We set up an RBC model of a small open economy, following Mendoza (1991), and introduce the effect of fiscal policy decisions that change over the cycle. We calibrate the model on data for Ireland, and simulate the effect of different spending policies in response to supply shocks. Procyclical fiscal policy distorts intertemporal allocation decisions. Temporary spending boosts in booms spur investment, and hence the need for external finance, and so generates very volatile cycles in investment and the current account. This economic instability is also harmful for the steady state level of output. Our model is able to replicate the relation between the degree of cyclicality of fiscal policy, and the volatility of consumption, investment and the current account observed in OECD countries.
Resumo:
Die erste Ausgabe des Magazins Monu hat das Thema Paid Urbanism und untersucht urbane Veränderungen, verursacht durch Staatssubventionen. Es werden Projekte und Artikel von amerikanischen und europäischen Autoren präsentiert, die den Einfluss von Paid Urbanism auf die Form unterschiedlichster Orte wie Chicago, Coney Island (New York City) und Thüringen untersuchen und reflektieren.
Resumo:
The aim of the study was to see if any relationship between government spending andunemployment could be empirically found. To test if government spending affectsunemployment, a statistical model was applied on data from Sweden. The data was quarterlydata from the year 1994 until 2012, unit-root test were conducted and the variables wheretransformed to its first-difference so ensure stationarity. This transformation changed thevariables to growth rates. This meant that the interpretation deviated a little from the originalgoal. Other studies reviewed indicate that when government spending increases and/or taxesdecreases output increases. Studies show that unemployment decreases when governmentspending/GDP ratio increases. Some studies also indicated that with an already largegovernment sector increasing the spending it could have negative effect on output. The modelwas a VAR-model with unemployment, output, interest rate, taxes and government spending.Also included in the model were a linear and three quarterly dummies. The model used 7lags. The result was not statistically significant for most lags but indicated that as governmentspending growth rate increases holding everything else constant unemployment growth rateincreases. The result for taxes was even less statistically significant and indicates norelationship with unemployment. Post-estimation test indicates that there were problems withnon-normality in the model. So the results should be interpreted with some scepticism.
Resumo:
Cover title.
Resumo:
Running title: Economic growth and job creation.
Resumo:
Over the past decade, scholarly interest concerning the use of limitations to constrain government spending and taxing has noticeably increased. The call for constitutional restrictions can be credited, in part, to Washington's apparent inability to legislate any significant reductions in government expenditures or in the size of the national debt. At the present time, the federal government is far from instituting any constitutional limitations on spending or borrowing; however, the states have incorporated many controls on revenues and expenditures, the oldest being strictures on full faith and credit borrowing. This dissertations examines the efficacy of these restrictions on borrowing across the states (excluding Alaska) for the period dating from 1961 to 1990 and also studies the limitations on taxing and spending synonymous with the Tax Revolt.
We include socio-economic information in our calculations to control for factors other than the institutional variables that affect state borrowing levels. Our results show that certain constitutional restrictions (in particular, the referendum requirement and the dollar debt limit) are more effective than others. The apparent ineffectiveness of other limitations, such as the flexible debt limit, seem related to the bindingness of the limitations in at least half of the cases. Other variables, such as crime rates, number of schoolage children, and state personal income do affect the levels of full faith and credit debt, but not as strongly as the limitations. While some degree of circumvention can be detected (the amount of full faith and credit debt does inversely affect the levels of nonguaranteed debt), it is so small when compared to the effectiveness of the constitutional restrictions that it is almost negligible. The examination of the tax revolt era limitations yielded quite similar conclusions, with the additional fact that constitutional restrictions appear more binding than statutory ones. Our research demonstrates that constitutional limitations on borrowing can be applied effectively to constrain excessive borrowing, but caution must be used. The efficacy of these restrictions decrease dramatically as the number of loopholes increase.
Resumo:
We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the efficiency of public expenditures. Using a rich dataset of expenditures and public good provision for 1,836 municipalities in Peru for period 2001-2010, we estimate a non-monotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom of mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls whereas those benefited with modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts about the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.
Resumo:
This paper uses a survey experiment to examine differences in public attitudes toward 'direct' and 'indirect' government spending. Federal social welfare spending in the USA has two components: the federal government spends money to directly provide social benefits to citizens, and also indirectly subsidizes the private provision of social benefits through tax expenditures. Though benefits provided through tax expenditures are considered spending for budgetary purposes, they differ from direct spending in several ways: in the mechanisms through which benefits are delivered to citizens, in how they distribute wealth across the income spectrum, and in the visibility of their policy consequences to the mass public. We develop and test a model explaining how these differences will affect public attitudes toward spending conducted through direct and indirect means. We find that support for otherwise identical social programs is generally higher when such programs are portrayed as being delivered through tax expenditures than when they are portrayed as being delivered by direct spending. In addition, support for tax expenditure programs which redistribute wealth upward drops when citizens are provided information about the redistributive effects. Both of these results are conditioned by partisanship, with the opinions of Republicans more sensitive to the mechanism through which benefits are delivered, and the opinions of Democrats more sensitive to information about their redistributive effects.
Resumo:
Shipping list no.: 96-0230-P.
Resumo:
CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 89 H401-7
Resumo:
Shipping list no.: 95-0021-P.
Resumo:
Shipping list no.: 93-0637-P.
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.
Resumo:
Mode of access: Internet.