Government competition : a threat to small business : report of the SBA Advocacy Task Group on Government Competition with Small Business /

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Report to Government Oversight Committee Regrading Soil and Water Conservation Districts Competition with Small Business, 2006

At the request of the Government Oversight Committee, the Ombudsman gathered information regarding competition by county Soil and Water Conservation Districts (SWCD) with small business through the sale of products and services. The goal of the Ombudsman’s review was to assist the Government Oversight Committee (Committee) in gaining an objective understanding of the issues so the Committee can ascertain whether there is a problem that requires legislation this legislative session. The Ombudsman focused on gathering specific information from four SWCD offices in central Iowa; Dallas, Greene, Guthrie and Jasper. These offices were specifically identified in documentation presented to the Government Oversight Committee by affected small business owners (contractors), Jon Judson of Diversity Farms and Dan Brouse of Iowa Restorations. However, with 100 SWCDs in Iowa,1 each with their own elected commissioners and each with different practices, priorities and fundraising activities, what the Ombudsman learned about these four counties may not be applicable to all the SWCDs in Iowa. The Ombudsman assigned the case to the Assistant Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman for Small Business, Kristie Hirschman. For reference purposes in this report, actions taken by Ms. Hirschman will be ascribed to the Ombudsman.

Enhancing governmental productivity through competition : a new way of doing business within the government, to provide quality government at least cost : a progress report on OMB circular no. A-76, "performance of commercial activities."

Mode of access: Internet.

Competition for the expert administrative positions in city government.

Mode of access: Internet.

The Main Determinants of the Use of the Cost Accounting System in Portuguese Local Government

This paper explores the main determinants of the use of the cost accounting system (CAS) in Portuguese local government (PLG). Regression analysis is used to study the fit of a model of accounting changes in PLG, focused on cost accounting systems oriented to activities and outputs. Based on survey data gathered from PLG, we have found that the use of information in decision-making and external reporting is still a mirage. We obtain evidence about the influence of the internal organizational context (especially the lack of support and difficulties in the CAS implementation) in the use for internal purposes, while the institutional environment (like external pressures to implement the CAS) appears to be more deterministic of the external use. Results strengthen the function of external reporting to legitimate the organization’s activities to external stakeholders. On the other hand, some control variables (like political competition, usefulness and experience) also evidence some explanatory power in the model. Some mixed results were found that appeal to further research in the future. Our empirical results contribute to understand the importance of interconnecting the contingency and institutional approaches to gain a clear picture of cost accounting changes in the public sector.

Simultaneous decisions or leadership in an international competition

In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the firms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Maximum-revenue tariff with different roles in a price-setting competition

Published also at Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science

Government preference, environmental taxes and privatization

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for environmental tax revenue. The model that we consider is more general than the one consider in Wang and Wang (2009), in the sense that we put a larger weight in the environment tax revenue than on the other terms of the government's objective function. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.