Governance mechanisms in Spanish financial intermediaries

This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.

Searchig the links between "knowledge governance mechanisms", "the individual conditions of knowledge sharing", and "individual's knowledge sharing behaviour".

The objective of this study was to understand how organizational knowledge governance mechanisms affect individual motivation, opportunity, and the ability to share knowledge (MOA framework), and further, how individual knowledge-sharing conditions affect actual knowledge sharing behaviour. The study followed the knowledge governance approach and a micro-foundations perspective to develop a theoretical model and hypotheses, which could explain the casual relationships between knowledge governance mechanisms, individual knowledge sharing conditions, and individual knowledge sharing behaviour. The quantitative research strategy and multivariate data analysis techniques (SEM) were used in the hypotheses testing with a survey dataset of 256 employees from eleven military schools of Finnish Defence Forces (FDF). The results showed that “performance-based feedback and rewards” affects employee’s “intrinsic motivation towards knowledge sharing”, that “lateral coordination” affects employee’s “knowledge self-efficacy”, and that ”training and development” is positively related to “time availability” for knowledge sharing but affects negatively employee’s knowledge self-efficacy. Individual motivation and knowledge self-efficacy towards knowledge sharing affected knowledge sharing behaviour when work-related knowledge was shared 1) between employees in a department and 2) between employees in different departments, however these factors did not play a crucial role in subordinate–superior knowledge sharing. The findings suggest that individual motivation, opportunity, and the ability towards knowledge sharing affects individual knowledge sharing behaviour differently in different knowledge sharing situations. Furthermore, knowledge governance mechanisms can be used to manage individual-level knowledge sharing conditions and individual knowledge sharing behaviour but their affect also vary in different knowledge sharing situations.

Governance of open content creation:a conceptualization and analysis of control and guiding mechanisms in the open content domain

The open content creation process has proven itself to be a powerful and influential way of developing text-based content, as demonstrated by the success of Wikipedia and related sites. Distributed individuals independently edit, revise, or refine content, thereby creating knowledge artifacts of considerable breadth and quality. Our study explores the mechanisms that control and guide the content creation process and develops an understanding of open content governance. The repertory grid method is employed to systematically capture the experiences of individuals involved in the open content creation process and to determine the relative importance of the diverse control and guiding mechanisms. Our findings illustrate the important control and guiding mechanisms and highlight the multifaceted nature of open content governance. A range of governance mechanisms is discussed with regard to the varied levels of formality, the different loci of authority, and the diverse interaction environments involved. Limitations and opportunities for future research are provided.

KM governance:the mechanisms for guiding and controlling KM program

Purpose: To establish and sustain their KM programs organizations need to establish mechanisms to ensure their governance. KM programs require business integration, senior management involvement and decision making authority. The present research investigates the KM governance mechanisms organizations use to guide and control their KM programs. The research seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the governance of KM and to support organizations in the development of their KM programs. Methodology: The study employs multiple case research methodology to analyze the KM governance arrangements of twelve international organizations and identify patterns in their governance configurations. Findings: The analysis identifies a range of structural, process and relational mechanisms that are critical for governing an organizational KM program. Different patterns among the KM governance mechanisms are identified which lead to the development of generic KM governance typologies. Research implications: The development of the KM governance framework allows future research to systematically investigate the KM governance phenomenon. As the present study is based on a configurational analysis future research should particularly target the performance implications of different KM governance configurations. Practical implications: The research provides insights into the diversity of KM governance mechanisms and their impact on a KM program. The KM governance framework can assist managers in reviewing their present and prospective KM programs and thereby support benchmarking or re-organization efforts. Originality: Building on prior research that has focused on individual KM governance aspects, the present study adopts a comprehensive perspective integrating structural, process and relational governance mechanisms.

Three essays in Swiss corporate governance

This dissertation is a combination of three relatively independent chapters on the subject of corporate governance. Corporate governance is presently at the epicenter of the global financial crisis. The lack of regulation and the misalignment of objectives have greatly contributed to the major crisis we are now in. Most governance research has been conducted in the United States in a context of widely held corporations and great executive power. It does not reflect the variety of situations around the world and we question the validity of this model in other contexts. The aim of this dissertation is to look at other governance models, in particular the Swiss corporate governance not only from a practical point of view, but also from a multi-theoretical approach. Traditional corporate governance literature has focused on the Anglo-American model that mainly follows the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) in a shareholder-manager context, and overlooked other approaches. We focus on three different aspects of corporate governance using three different theories. First, we look at the ownership type of various corporations, using the agency theory in a context where issues between shareholders predominate over the typical shareholder-manager relationship. Second, we explore the adoption process of several governance mechanisms that, due to changes in legislation, has taken place in Switzerland since 2002. We use the institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), in a context where the environmental pressures are particularly high. Finally, we spotlight the board of directors as a key element of the governance of publicly listed corporations. Particularly, we focus on the independence of the board of directors, using a combination of the agency and resource dependence theories (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).

A study of governance practices in corporate foundations

Implementation of social investments through corporate foundations is growing and, therefore, it is important to study their governance aspects better. Governance is conceptualized as a set of control and incentive mechanisms to overcome the so-called agency conflicts, which originate from the separation of property and management in for-profit organizations, a concept also applied to nonprofit institutions. It is argued that corporate foundations have the characteristics both of companies and of civil society organizations, which distinguishes them from both types of organizations. This paper analyses a study in which a set of governance mechanisms, adapted from those identified by a literature review of corporate and nonprofit governance, was selected for study. It is an exploratory descriptive case study, which analyzed data about eight organizations collected through publications and interviews with their CEOs. The data analysis indicates that it is appropriate to distinguish the different organization types and to apply the agency theory. Research results indicate that the selected governance mechanisms may be adapted and used in corporate foundations. However, they are only partially applied in the observed cases, which suggests the need for further studies that might consolidate these practices in such organizations.

Deviations of Governance In IT Multi-Sourcing: A Case Study

IT outsourcing (ITO) refers to the shift of IT/IS activities from internal to external of an organization. In prior research, the governance of ITO is recognized with persistent strategic importance for practice, because it is tightly related to ITO success. Under the rapid transformation of global market, the evolving practice of ITO requires updated knowledge on effective governance. However, research on ITO governance is still under developed due to the lack of integrated theoretical frameworks and the variety of empirical settings besides dyadic client-vendor relationships. Especially, as multi-sourcing has become an increasingly common practice in ITO, its new governance challenges must be attended by both ITO researchers and practitioners. To address this research gap, this study aims to understand multi-sourcing governance with an integrated theoretical framework incorporating both governance structure and governance mechanisms. The focus is on the emerging deviations among formal, perceived and practiced governance. With an interpretive perspective, a single case study is conducted with mixed methods of Social Network Analysis (SNA) and qualitative inquiries. The empirical setting embraces one client firm and its two IT suppliers for IT infrastructure services. The empirical material is analyzed at three levels: within one supplier firm, between the client and one supplier, and among all three firms. Empirical evidences, at all levels, illustrate various deviations in governance mechanisms, with which emerging governance structures are shaped. This dissertation contributes to the understanding of ITO governance in three domains: the governance of ITO in general, the governance of multi-sourcing in particular, and research methodology. For ITO governance in general, this study has identified two research strands of governance structure and governance mechanisms, and integrated both concepts under a unified framework. The composition of four research papers contributes to multi-sourcing research by illustrating the benefits of zooming in and out across the multilateral relationships with different aspects and scopes. Methodologically, the viability and benefit of mixed-method is illustrated and confirmed for both researchers and practitioners.

Promoting while checking self-interest : a conflict-based governance approach to rebalance corporate power disequilibria in Canada and the United States

La délégation du pouvoir de gestion aux administrateurs et aux gestionnaires, une caractéristique intrinsèque à la gestion efficace de grandes entreprises dans un contexte de capitalisme, confère une grande discrétion à l’équipe de direction. Cette discrétion, si elle n’est pas surveillée, peut mener à des comportements opportunistes envers la corporation, les actionnaires et les autres fournisseurs de capital qui n’ont pas de pouvoir de gestion. Les conflits entre ces deux classes d’agents peuvent émerger à la fois de décisions de gouvernance générale ou de transactions particulières (ie. offre publique d’achat). Dans les cas extrêmes, ces conflits peuvent mener à la faillite de la firme. Dans les cas plus typiques, ils mènent l’extraction de bénéfices privés pour les administrateurs et gestionnaires, l’expropriation des actionnaires, et des réductions de valeur pour la firme. Nous prenons le point de vue d’un petit actionnaire minoritaire pour explorer les méchanismes de gouvernance disponibles au Canada et aux États‐Unis. Après une synthèse dans la Partie 1 des théories sous‐jacentes à l’étude du pouvoir dans la corporation (séparation de la propriété et du contrôle et les conflits d’agence), nous concentrons notre analyse dans la Partie 2 sur les différents types de méchanismes (1) de gouvernance interne, (2) juridiques et (3) marchands, qui confèrent du pouvoir aux deux classes d’agents. Nous examinons comment les intérêts de ces deux classes peuvent être réalignés afin de prévenir et résoudre les conflits au sein de la firme. La Partie 3 explore un équilibre dynamique de pouvoir corporatif qui cherche à minimiser le potentiel d’opportunisme toute en préservant une quantité de discrétion suffisante pour la gestion efficace de la firme. Nous analysons des moyens pour renforcer les protections des actionnaires minoritaires et proposons un survol des pistes de réforme possibles.

The implementation of corporate governance in Germany and Brazi l: a comparative case study

The recent promotion of best corporate governance standards by several different government institutions and non-for profit organizations resulted in the implementation of more sophisticated governance mechanisms. As consequence to the separation of ownership and control the concept of agency theory arose. Agency theory argues that without out proper control mechanism managers would behave exploit owners due to information asymmetry. Regulators have promoted corporate governance mechanisms in order to address this issue. This paper aims to contrast the implementation of best corporate governance practices in Germany and Brazil on the example of two practical examples. With this purpose in mind, this paper analyzed two companies listed in the main stock exchange in Germany and Brazil throughout a period of 5 years. In order to measure the degree of corporate governance practices implemented 3 different parameters have been chosen. In line with great part of the literature the parameters considered to be relevant are; composition, procedures and deviation from the local corporate governance code. The comparison of the data revealed that board composition in the two analyzed companies is similar regarding the proportion of independent representatives but does distinguish in size. While committees are related to the same topics it can be implied that Natura’s board is more involved in the actual management of the company. Lastly, Beiersdorf has been able to comply to a larger extend with the recommendations of the local German code than Natura to the recommendations published by Brazilian code of the IBGC.

Asset accumulation by the middle class and the poor in Latin America: political economy and governance dimensions

Includes bibliography

Is the EU’s Governance ‘Good’?: An assessment of EU governance in its partnership with ACP States. IES WORKING PAPER 1/2010

This paper examines both the processes and outcomes of governance in the context of the EU’s relationship with ACP States within the period of the Cotonou Agreement (CA). It discusses and assesses a variety of governance mechanisms, including the European Commission’s use of the governance concept, EPAs, manifestations of partner preferences, the EDF, the revision of the CA, and Fisheries Partnership Agreements. Specific examples of the wielding of each mechanism are assessed based upon two criteria: a) the extent to which the wielding of the mechanism by the EU is a manifestation of “good governance”, and b) the extent to which the EU’s wielding of the mechanism has resulted, or is likely to result, in the sustainable development of and reduction of poverty in ACP countries. The examples are chosen to illustrate contradictions between rhetoric and practice and the consequential negative (actual and potential) impact upon development in ACP States. The final section offers suggestions for improving the EU’s governance processes and their outcomes for development.