La obra para piano de Gilardo Gilardi : un compositor argentino del siglo XX

En general, los compositores latinoamericanos no han gozado de reconocimiento y difusión, y muchas de sus obras se han extraviado o no han sido editadas. Objeto de estudio de esta investigación es poner luz sobre parte del patrimonio musical argentino, localizando, estudiando y catalogando la obra del compositor Gilardo Gilardi. En esta oportunidad, presentamos la primera catalogación de su música para piano. El mismo posibilita un mayor acercamiento y difusión de su obra pianística, y estimamos que motivará también futuras investigaciones sobre el total de su producción, con lo cual continuarán cubriéndose los vacíos existentes en la historia de la música argentina.

MENINGOENCEPHALITIS DUE TO VARICELLA ZOSTER VIRUS IN AIDS PATIENTS. REPORT OF ELEVEN CASES AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Neurological complications of varicella-zoster virus (VZV) are infrequent and include various clinical pictures. The reactivation of VZV in patients with AIDS is generally associated with an acute and severe meningoencephalitis. We report the epidemiological, clinical and virological data from 11 consecutive patients with diagnosis of HIV/AIDS and central nervous system (CNS) involvement due to VZV. All patients were male and seropositive for HIV. The primary risk factor for HIV infection was unprotected sexual contact. The median of CD4 T cell count was 142 cells/µL. All of them presented signs and symptoms of meningoencephalitis. Six patients (54.5%) presented pleocytosis; they all showed high CSF protein concentrations with a median of 2.1 g/dL. Polymerase chain reaction of cerebrospinal fluid specimen was positive for VZV in all of them and they were treated with intravenous acyclovir at doses of 30/mg/kg/day for 21 days. Overall survival was 63% (7 of 11 patients). The four dead patients had low cellular counts in CSF, below the median of this parameter. VZV should be included among the opportunistic pathogens that can involve CNS with a diffuse and severe meningoencephalitis in patients with advanced HIV/AIDS disease.

Ventriculoperitoneal shunts for treating increased intracranial pressure in cryptococcal meningitis with or without ventriculomegaly

Introduction Cryptococcosis is an opportunistic mycosis, especially in patients that are human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-positive, and frequently involves the central nervous system. Methods We assessed the potential of ventriculoperitoneal shunting (VPS) in preventing mortality due to uncontrollable intracranial hypertension (ICH) in 15 patients with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)-related cryptococcal meningitis. Results After 2 weeks of antifungal therapy consisting of amphotericin B deoxycholate with or without fluconazole, patients with persistent ICH underwent VPS, despite having persistent Cryptococcus neoformans infection. In 12 patients, the uncontrollable ICH was resolved by VPS. Conclusions Patients with cryptococcal meningoencephalitis who have ICH must be considered for VPS even with positive cerebrospinal fluid cultures.

Regulation in the Age of Globalization: The Difussion of Regulatory Agencies across Europe and Latin America

One of the most notable characteristics of the change in governance of the past two decades has been the restructuring of the state, most notably the delegation of authority from politicians and ministries to technocrats and regulatory agencies. Our unique dataset on the extent of these reforms in seven sectors in 36 countries reveals the widespread diffusion of these reforms in recent decades. In 1986 there were only 23 agencies across these sectors and countries (less than one agency per country); by 2002 this number had increased more than seven-fold, to 169. On average these 36 countries each have more than four agencies in the seven sectors studied. Yet the widespread diffusion of these reforms is characterized by cross-regional and cross-sectoral variations. Our data reveal two major variations: first, reforms are more widespread in economic regulation that in social spheres; second, regulatory agencies in the social spheres are more widespread in Europe than in Latin America. Why these variations in the spread of the reforms? In this paper we present for the first time the regulatory gaps across regions and sectors and then move on to offer some explanations for these gaps in a way that sheds some light on the nature of these reforms and on their limits. Our explanatory framework combines diffusion and structural explanations and in doing so sheds new light on the global diffusion of public policy ideas.

The de facto independence of regulatory agencies and its consequences for policy making and regulatory outcomes

This dissertation focuses on the practice of regulatory governance, throughout the study of the functioning of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), with special attention to their de facto independence. The research goals are grounded on a "neo-positivist" (or "reconstructed positivist") position (Hawkesworth 1992; Radaelli 2000b; Sabatier 2000). This perspective starts from the ontological assumption that even if subjective perceptions are constitutive elements of political phenomena, a real world exists beyond any social construction and can, however imperfectly, become the object of scientific inquiry. Epistemologically, it follows that hypothetical-deductive theories with explanatory aims can be tested by employing a proper methodology and set of analytical techniques. It is thus possible to make scientific inferences and general conclusions to a certain extent, according to a Bayesian conception of knowledge, in order to update the prior scientific beliefs in the truth of the related hypotheses (Howson 1998), while acknowledging the fact that the conditions of truth are at least partially subjective and historically determined (Foucault 1988; Kuhn 1970). At the same time, a sceptical position is adopted towards the supposed disjunction between facts and values and the possibility of discovering abstract universal laws in social science. It has been observed that the current version of capitalism corresponds to the golden age of regulation, and that since the 1980s no government activity in OECD countries has grown faster than regulatory functions (Jacobs 1999). Following an apparent paradox, the ongoing dynamics of liberalisation, privatisation, decartelisation, internationalisation, and regional integration hardly led to the crumbling of the state, but instead promoted a wave of regulatory growth in the face of new risks and new opportunities (Vogel 1996). Accordingly, a new order of regulatory capitalism is rising, implying a new division of labour between state and society and entailing the expansion and intensification of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005). The previous order, relying on public ownership and public intervention and/or on sectoral self-regulation by private actors, is being replaced by a more formalised, expert-based, open, and independently regulated model of governance. Independent regulation agencies (IRAs), that is, formally independent administrative agencies with regulatory powers that benefit from public authority delegated from political decision makers, represent the main institutional feature of regulatory governance (Gilardi 2008). IRAs constitute a relatively new technology of regulation in western Europe, at least for certain domains, but they are increasingly widespread across countries and sectors. For instance, independent regulators have been set up for regulating very diverse issues, such as general competition, banking and finance, telecommunications, civil aviation, railway services, food safety, the pharmaceutical industry, electricity, environmental protection, and personal data privacy. Two attributes of IRAs deserve a special mention. On the one hand, they are formally separated from democratic institutions and elected politicians, thus raising normative and empirical concerns about their accountability and legitimacy. On the other hand, some hard questions about their role as political actors are still unaddressed, though, together with regulatory competencies, IRAs often accumulate executive, (quasi-)legislative, and adjudicatory functions, as well as about their performance.

Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis

Independent regulatory agencies are one of the main institutional features of the 'rising regulatory state' in Western Europe. Governments are increasingly willing to abandon their regulatory competencies and to delegate them to specialized institutions that are at least partially beyond their control. This article examines the empirical consistency of one particular explanation of this phenomenon, namely the credibility hypothesis, claiming that governments delegate powers so as to enhance the credibility of their policies. Three observable implications are derived from the general hypothesis, linking credibility and delegation to veto players, complexity and interdependence. An independence index is developed to measure agency independence, which is then used in a multivariate analysis where the impact of credibility concerns on delegation is tested. The analysis relies on an original data set comprising independence scores for thirty-three regulators. Results show that the credibility hypothesis can explain a good deal of the variation in delegation. The economic nature of regulation is a strong determinant of agency independence, but is mediated by national institutions in the form of veto players.

Policy Diffusion: An Agent-Based Approach

Methods like Event History Analysis can show the existence of diffusion and part of its nature, but do not study the process itself. Nowadays, thanks to the increasing performance of computers, processes can be studied using computational modeling. This thesis presents an agent-based model of policy diffusion mainly inspired from the model developed by Braun and Gilardi (2006). I first start by developing a theoretical framework of policy diffusion that presents the main internal drivers of policy diffusion - such as the preference for the policy, the effectiveness of the policy, the institutional constraints, and the ideology - and its main mechanisms, namely learning, competition, emulation, and coercion. Therefore diffusion, expressed by these interdependencies, is a complex process that needs to be studied with computational agent-based modeling. In a second step, computational agent-based modeling is defined along with its most significant concepts: complexity and emergence. Using computational agent-based modeling implies the development of an algorithm and its programming. When this latter has been developed, we let the different agents interact. Consequently, a phenomenon of diffusion, derived from learning, emerges, meaning that the choice made by an agent is conditional to that made by its neighbors. As a result, learning follows an inverted S-curve, which leads to partial convergence - global divergence and local convergence - that triggers the emergence of political clusters; i.e. the creation of regions with the same policy. Furthermore, the average effectiveness in this computational world tends to follow a J-shaped curve, meaning that not only time is needed for a policy to deploy its effects, but that it also takes time for a country to find the best-suited policy. To conclude, diffusion is an emergent phenomenon from complex interactions and its outcomes as ensued from my model are in line with the theoretical expectations and the empirical evidence.Les méthodes d'analyse de biographie (event history analysis) permettent de mettre en évidence l'existence de phénomènes de diffusion et de les décrire, mais ne permettent pas d'en étudier le processus. Les simulations informatiques, grâce aux performances croissantes des ordinateurs, rendent possible l'étude des processus en tant que tels. Cette thèse, basée sur le modèle théorique développé par Braun et Gilardi (2006), présente une simulation centrée sur les agents des phénomènes de diffusion des politiques. Le point de départ de ce travail met en lumière, au niveau théorique, les principaux facteurs de changement internes à un pays : la préférence pour une politique donnée, l'efficacité de cette dernière, les contraintes institutionnelles, l'idéologie, et les principaux mécanismes de diffusion que sont l'apprentissage, la compétition, l'émulation et la coercition. La diffusion, définie par l'interdépendance des différents acteurs, est un système complexe dont l'étude est rendue possible par les simulations centrées sur les agents. Au niveau méthodologique, nous présenterons également les principaux concepts sous-jacents aux simulations, notamment la complexité et l'émergence. De plus, l'utilisation de simulations informatiques implique le développement d'un algorithme et sa programmation. Cette dernière réalisée, les agents peuvent interagir, avec comme résultat l'émergence d'un phénomène de diffusion, dérivé de l'apprentissage, où le choix d'un agent dépend en grande partie de ceux faits par ses voisins. De plus, ce phénomène suit une courbe en S caractéristique, poussant à la création de régions politiquement identiques, mais divergentes au niveau globale. Enfin, l'efficacité moyenne, dans ce monde simulé, suit une courbe en J, ce qui signifie qu'il faut du temps, non seulement pour que la politique montre ses effets, mais également pour qu'un pays introduise la politique la plus efficace. En conclusion, la diffusion est un phénomène émergent résultant d'interactions complexes dont les résultats du processus tel que développé dans ce modèle correspondent tant aux attentes théoriques qu'aux résultats pratiques.

The policy-making structure of European regulatory networks and the domestic adoption of standards

European regulatory networks (ERNs) constitute the main governance instrument for the informal co-ordination of public regulation at the European Union (EU) level. They are in charge of co-ordinating national regulators and ensuring the implementation of harmonized regulatory policies across the EU, while also offering sector-specific expertise to the Commission. To this aim, ERNs develop 'best practices' and benchmarking procedures in the form of standards, norms and guidelines to be adopted in member states. In this paper, we focus on the Committee of European Securities Regulators and examine the consequences of the policy-making structure of ERNs on the domestic adoption of standards. We find that the regulators of countries with larger financial industries tend to occupy more central positions in the network, especially among newer member states. In turn, network centrality is associated with a more prompt domestic adoption of standards.