Desmembramento de municípios e eleições legislativas municipais

O presente trabalho pretende contribuir com a literatura sobre os efeitos das divisões de municípios, avaliando possíveis impactos das mesmas sobre as eleições legislativas municipais. Os modelos teóricos informam que o desmembramento pode alterar os “outcomes” eleitorais nos municípios desmembrados, operando de maneira semelhante ao “gerrymandering”. As evidências empíricas encontradas sugerem o mesmo.

Axiomatic Districting

In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the \optimal gerrymandering rule"). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.

Axiomatic districting

In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the "optimal gerrymandering rule"). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.

The Multiple Hierarchical Legislatures in a Representative Democracy: Districting for Policy Implementation

We build a multiple hierarchical model of a representative democracy in which, for instance, voters elect county representatives, county representatives elect district representatives, district representatives elect state representatives, and state representatives elect a prime minister. We use our model to show that the policy determined by the final representative can become more extreme as the number of hierarchical levels increases because of increased opportunities for gerrymandering. Thus, a sufficiently large number of voters gives a district maker an advantage, enabling her to implement her favorite policy. We also show that the range of implementable policies increases with the depth of the hierarchical system. Consequently, districting by a candidate in a hierarchical legislative system can be viewed as a type of policy implementation device.

Voting with their feet: Migration, partisanship, and party-safe elections in Florida

Political scientists have long noted that Congressional elections are often uncompetitive, often extremely so. Many scholars argue that the cause lies in the partisan redistricting of Congressional districts, or “gerrymandering”. Other scholars emphasize polarization created by a fragmented news media, or the candidate choices made by a more ideological primary electorate. All these explanations identify the cause of party-safe elections in institutions of various kinds. This dissertation, by contrast, presents a structural explanation of uncompetitive elections. My theory is that population composition and patterns of migration are significant causes and predictors of election results in Florida. I test this theory empirically by comparing the predictions from four hypotheses against aggregate data, using the county as the unit of analysis. The first hypothesis is that Florida can be divided into clearly distinguishable, persistent partisan sections. This hypothesis is confirmed. The second hypothesis is that Florida voters have become increasingly partisan over time. This hypothesis is confirmed. The third hypothesis is that the degree of migration into a county predicts how that county will vote. This hypothesis is partially confirmed, for the migration effect appears to have waned over time. The last hypothesis is that the degree of religiosity of a county population is a predictor of how that county will vote. This hypothesis is also supported by the results of statistical analysis. By identifying the structural causes of party-safe elections, this dissertation not only broadens our understanding of elections in Florida, but also sheds light on the current polarization in American politics.

Fixed-boundary constituencies and the principle of equal representation in Ireland

The process of constituency boundary revision in Ireland, designed to satisfy what is perceived as a rigid requirement that a uniform deputy-population ratio be maintained across constituencies, has traditionally consumed a great deal of the time of politicians and officials. For almost two decades after a High Court ruling in 1961, the process was a political one, was highly contentious, and was marked by serious allegations of ministerial gerrymandering. The introduction in 1979 of constituency commissions made up of officials neutralised, for the most part, charges that the system had become too politicised, but it continued the process of micro-management of constituency boundaries. This article suggests that the continuing problems caused by this system – notably, the permanently changing nature of constituency boundaries and resulting difficulties of geographical identification – could be resolved by reversion to the procedure that is normal in proportional representation systems: periodic post-census allocation of seats to constituencies whose boundaries are based on those of recognised local government units and which are stable over time. This reform, replacing the principle of redistricting by the principle of reapportionment, would result in more recognisable constituencies, more predictable boundary trajectories over time, and a more efficient, fairer, and speedier process of revision.

‘DEVOTED TO THE INTERESTS OF HIS RACE’: BLACK OFFICEHOLDERS AND THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF FREEDOM IN WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, 1865-1877

This dissertation examines black officeholding in Wilmington, North Carolina, from emancipation in 1865 through 1876, when Democrats gained control of the state government and brought Reconstruction to an end. It considers the struggle for black office holding in the city, the black men who held office, the dynamic political culture of which they were a part, and their significance in the day-to-day lives of their constituents. Once they were enfranchised, black Wilmingtonians, who constituted a majority of the city’s population, used their voting leverage to negotiate the election of black men to public office. They did so by using Republican factionalism or what the dissertation argues was an alternative partisanship. Ultimately, it was not factional divisions, but voter suppression, gerrymandering, and constitutional revisions that made local government appointive rather than elective, Democrats at the state level chipped away at the political gains black Wilmingtonians had made.