Why England and Germany went to war ... the "white papers" of England and Germany, republished from the New York times. August 23d and 24th, 1914.

Mode of access: Internet.

Antwoord op het Duitsche witboek van 10 mei 1915 : Die völkerrechtswidrige Führung des belgischen Volkskriegs /

Translation of: Réponse au Livre blanc allemand du 10 mai 1915.

The German army in Belgium, the white book of May 1915,

Translation of Die völkerrechtswidridge Führung des belgischen Volkskriegs.

Le sac de Dinant et les legendes du Livre blanc allemand du 10 mai 1915.

Mode of access: Internet.

Deutschland schuldig : deutsches Weissbuch über die Verantwortlichkeit der Urheber des Krieges /

Mode of access: Internet.

Documents allemands relatifs à l'origine de la guerre : collection complète des documents officiels rassemblés avec quelques compléments /

t. 1. De l'attentat de Sarajevo à la réception de la réponse serbe avec quelques documents des semaines qui ont prédédé. -- t. 2. De la réception de la réponse serbe à la nouvelle de la mobilisation générale russe. -- t. 3. De la nouvelle de la mobilisation générle russe à la déclaration de guerre à la France. -- t. 4. De la déclaration de guerre à la France à la declaration de guerre de l'Autriche-Hongrie à la Russie (avec annexes)

German Foreign Ministry Archives 1867-1920 a selection [microform].

For detailed list of contents see typewritten list accompanying the microfilms.

Griechische Presse.

Individual issues for have title: Griechenland.

Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch.

Vol.5, pt.2 pub. also separately under title: Glossen zum Kautsky-Buch.

Das deutsche weissbuch über den ausbruch des weltkrieges, bearbeitet nach dem Reichstag vorgelegten material.

Mode of access: Internet.

Schriftwechsel mit der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, betreffend den Unterseehandelskrieg.

Cover-title.

Wipert von Blücher und Finnland : Alternativpolitik und Diplomatie im 'Dritten Reich'

This dissertation explores the role of the German minister to Helsinki, Wipert von Blücher (1883-1963), within the German-Finnish relations of the late 1930s and the Second World War. Blücher was a key figure – and certainly one of the constants – within German Finland policy and the complex international diplomacy surrounding Finland. Despite representing Hitler’s Germany, he was not a National Socialist in the narrower sense of the term, but a conservative civil servant in the Wilhelmine tradition of the German foreign service. Along with a significant number of career diplomats, Blücher attempted to restrict National Socialist influence on the exercise of German foreign policy, whilst successfully negotiating a modus vivendi with the new regime. The study of his political biography in the Third Reich hence provides a highly representative example of how the traditional élites of Germany were caught in an cycle of conformity and, albeit tacit, opposition. Above all, however, the biographical study of Blücher and his behaviour offers an hitherto unexplored approach to the history of the German-Finnish relations. His unusually long tenure in Helsinki covered the period leading up to the so-called Winter War, which left Blücher severely distraught by Berlin’s effectively pro-Soviet neutrality and brought him close to resigning his post. It further extended to the German-Finnish rapprochement of 1940/41 and the military cooperation of both countries from mid-1941 to 1944. Throughout, Blücher developed a diverse and ambitious set of policy schemes, largely rooted in the tradition of Wilhelmine foreign policy. In their moderation and commonsensical realism, his designs – indeed his entire conception of foreign policy – clashed with the foreign political and ideological premises of the National Socialist regime. In its theoretical grounding, the analysis of Blücher’s political schemes is built on the concept of alternative policy and indebted to A.J.P. Taylor’s definition of dissent in foreign policy. It furthermore rests upon the assumption, introduced by Wolfgang Michalka, that National Socialist foreign policy was dominated by a plurality of rival conceptions, players, and institutions competing for Hitler’s favour (‘Konzeptionen-Pluralismus’). Although primarily a study in the history of international relations, my research has substantially benefited from more recent developments within cultural history, particularly research on nobility and élites, and the renewed focus on autobiography and conceptions of the self. On an abstract level, the thesis touches upon some of the basic components of German politics, political culture, and foreign policy in the first half of the 20th century: national belonging and conflicting loyalties, self-perception and representation, élites and their management of power, the modern history of German conservatism, the nature and practice of diplomacy, and, finally, the intricate relationship between the ethics of the professional civil service and absolute moral principles. Against this backdrop, the examination of Blücher’s role both within Finnish politics and the foreign policy of the Third Reich highlights the biographical dimension of the German-Finnish relationships, while fathoming the determinants of individual human agency in the process.

KNOWING THE ENEMY: NAZI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN WAR, HOLOCAUST, AND POSTWAR

“Knowing the Enemy: Nazi Foreign Intelligence in War, Holocaust and Postwar,” reveals the importance of ideologically-driven foreign intelligence reporting in the wartime radicalization of the Nazi dictatorship, and the continued prominence of Nazi discourses in postwar reports from German intelligence officers working with the U.S. Army and West German Federal Intelligence Service after 1945. For this project, I conducted extensive archival research in Germany and the United States, particularly in overlooked and files pertaining to the wartime activities of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Abwehr, Fremde Heere Ost, Auswärtiges Amt, and German General Staff, and the recently declassified intelligence files pertaining to the postwar activities of the Gehlen Organization, Bundesnachrichtendienst, and Foreign Military Studies Program. Applying the technique of close textual analysis to the underutilized intelligence reports themselves, I discovered that wartime German intelligence officials in military, civil service, and Party institutions all lent the appearance of professional objectivity to the racist and conspiratorial foreign policy beliefs held in the highest echelons of the Nazi dictatorship. The German foreign intelligence services’ often erroneous reporting on Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, and international Jewry simultaneously figured in the radicalization of the regime’s military and anti-Jewish policies and served to confirm the ideological preconceptions of Hitler and his most loyal followers. After 1945, many of these same figures found employment with the Cold War West, using their “expertise” in Soviet affairs to advise the West German Government, U.S. Military, and CIA on Russian military and political matters. I chart considerable continuities in personnel and ideas from the wartime intelligence organizations into postwar West German and American intelligence institutions, as later reporting on the Soviet Union continued to reproduce the flawed wartime tropes of innate Russian military and racial inferiority.

Zentral-blatt fe ur das Deutsche Reich /

Mode of access: Internet.