Design Optimisation of UAVs Systems achieved on a Framework Environment via Evolution and Game Theory

Over recent years, Unmanned Air Vehicles or UAVs have become a powerful tool for reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. These vehicles are now available in a broad size and capability range and are intended to fly in regions where the presence of onboard human pilots is either too risky or unnecessary. This paper describes the formulation and application of a design framework that supports the complex task of multidisciplinary design optimisation of UAVs systems via evolutionary computation. The framework includes a Graphical User Interface (GUI), a robust Evolutionary Algorithm optimiser named HAPEA, several design modules, mesh generators and post-processing capabilities in an integrated platform. These population –based algorithms such as EAs are good for cases problems where the search space can be multi-modal, non-convex or discontinuous, with multiple local minima and with noise, and also problems where we look for multiple solutions via Game Theory, namely a Nash equilibrium point or a Pareto set of non-dominated solutions. The application of the methodology is illustrated on conceptual and detailed multi-criteria and multidisciplinary shape design problems. Results indicate the practicality and robustness of the framework to find optimal shapes and trade—offs between the disciplinary analyses and to produce a set of non dominated solutions of an optimal Pareto front to the designer.

Adaptive dynamic path re-planning RRT algorithms with game theory for UAVs

The main aim of this paper is to describe an adaptive re-planning algorithm based on a RRT and Game Theory to produce an efficient collision free obstacle adaptive Mission Path Planner for Search and Rescue (SAR) missions. This will provide UAV autopilots and flight computers with the capability to autonomously avoid static obstacles and No Fly Zones (NFZs) through dynamic adaptive path replanning. The methods and algorithms produce optimal collision free paths and can be integrated on a decision aid tool and UAV autopilots.

Part 1 MOO methods for multidisciplinary design using parallel evolutionary algorithms, game theory and hierarchical topology. (Part 1.) Theoretical aspects

Two lecture notes describe recent developments of evolutionary multi objective optimization (MO) techniques in detail and their advantages and drawbacks compared to traditional deterministic optimisers. The role of Game Strategies (GS), such as Pareto, Nash or Stackelberg games as companions or pre-conditioners of Multi objective Optimizers is presented and discussed on simple mathematical functions in Part I , as well as their implementations on simple aeronautical model optimisation problems on the computer using a friendly design framework in Part II. Real life (robust) design applications dealing with UAVs systems or Civil Aircraft and using the EAs and Game Strategies combined material of Part I & Part II are solved and discussed in Part III providing the designer new compromised solutions useful to digital aircraft design and manufacturing. Many details related to Lectures notes Part I, Part II and Part III can be found by the reader in [68].

Part 2. MOO methods for multidisciplinary design using parallel evolutionary algorithms, game theory and hierarchical topology. (Part 2.) Numerical aspects and implementation of model test cases

These lecture notes describe the use and implementation of a framework in which mathematical as well as engineering optimisation problems can be analysed. The foundations of the framework and algorithms described -Hierarchical Asynchronous Parallel Evolutionary Algorithms (HAPEAs) - lie upon traditional evolution strategies and incorporate the concepts of a multi-objective optimisation, hierarchical topology, asynchronous evaluation of candidate solutions , parallel computing and game strategies. In a step by step approach, the numerical implementation of EAs and HAPEAs for solving multi criteria optimisation problems is conducted providing the reader with the knowledge to reproduce these hand on training in his – her- academic or industrial environment.

Part 3. MOO methods for multidisciplinary design using parallel evolutionary algorithms, game theory and hierarchical topology. (Part 3.) Practical application to the design and optimisation of UAV systems

These lecture notes highlight some of the recent applications of multi-objective and multidisciplinary design optimisation in aeronautical design using the framework and methodology described in References 8, 23, 24 and in Part 1 and 2 of the notes. A summary of the methodology is described and the treatment of uncertainties in flight conditions parameters by the HAPEAs software and game strategies is introduced. Several test cases dealing with detailed design and computed with the software are presented and results discussed in section 4 of these notes.

Location of Pathogenic Bacteria during Persistent Infections: Insights from an Analysis Using Game Theory

Bacterial persistent infections are responsible for a significant amount of the human morbidity and mortality. Unlike acute bacterial infections, it is very difficult to treat persistent bacterial infections (e.g. tuberculosis). Knowledge about the location of pathogenic bacteria during persistent infection will help to treat such conditions by designing novel drugs which can reach such locations. In this study, events of bacterial persistent infections were analyzed using game theory. A game was defined where the pathogen and the host are the two players with a conflict of interest. Criteria for the establishment of Nash equilibrium were calculated for this game. This theoretical model, which is very simple and heuristic, predicts that during persistent infections pathogenic bacteria stay in both intracellular and extracellular compartments of the host. The result of this study implies that a bacterium should be able to survive in both intracellular and extracellular compartments of the host in order to cause persistent infections. This explains why persistent infections are more often caused by intracellular pathogens like Mycobacterium and Salmonella. Moreover, this prediction is in consistence with the results of previous experimental studies.

Pattern clustering using cooperative game theory

In this paper, we approach the classical problem of clustering using solution concepts from cooperative game theory such as Nucleolus and Shapley value. We formulate the problem of clustering as a characteristic form game and develop a novel algorithm DRAC (Density-Restricted Agglomerative Clustering) for clustering. With extensive experimentation on standard data sets, we compare the performance of DRAC with that of well known algorithms. We show an interesting result that four prominent solution concepts, Nucleolus, Shapley value, Gately point and \tau-value coincide for the defined characteristic form game. This vindicates the choice of the characteristic function of the clustering game and also provides strong intuitive foundation for our approach.

Sustaining cooperation on networks: an analytical study based on evolutionary game theory

We analytically study the role played by the network topology in sustaining cooperation in a society of myopic agents in an evolutionary setting. In our model, each agent plays the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game with its neighbors, as specified by a network. Cooperation is the incumbent strategy, whereas defectors are the mutants. Starting with a population of cooperators, some agents are switched to defection. The agents then play the PD game with their neighbors and compute their fitness. After this, an evolutionary rule, or imitation dynamic is used to update the agent strategy. A defector switches back to cooperation if it has a cooperator neighbor with higher fitness. The network is said to sustain cooperation if almost all defectors switch to cooperation. Earlier work on the sustenance of cooperation has largely consisted of simulation studies, and we seek to complement this body of work by providing analytical insight for the same. We find that in order to sustain cooperation, a network should satisfy some properties such as small average diameter, densification, and irregularity. Real-world networks have been empirically shown to exhibit these properties, and are thus candidates for the sustenance of cooperation. We also analyze some specific graphs to determine whether or not they sustain cooperation. In particular, we find that scale-free graphs belonging to a certain family sustain cooperation, whereas Erdos-Renyi random graphs do not. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first analytical attempt to determine which networks sustain cooperation in a population of myopic agents in an evolutionary setting.

Novel Biobjective Clustering (BiGC) Based on Cooperative Game Theory

We propose a new approach to clustering. Our idea is to map cluster formation to coalition formation in cooperative games, and to use the Shapley value of the patterns to identify clusters and cluster representatives. We show that the underlying game is convex and this leads to an efficient biobjective clustering algorithm that we call BiGC. The algorithm yields high-quality clustering with respect to average point-to-center distance (potential) as well as average intracluster point-to-point distance (scatter). We demonstrate the superiority of BiGC over state-of-the-art clustering algorithms (including the center based and the multiobjective techniques) through a detailed experimentation using standard cluster validity criteria on several benchmark data sets. We also show that BiGC satisfies key clustering properties such as order independence, scale invariance, and richness.

Pricing and Power allocation in Femtocells using Stackelberg Game Theory

We consider a system with multiple Femtocells operating in a Macrocell. The transmissions in one Femtocell interfere with its neighboring Femtocells as well as with the Macrocell Base Station. We model Femtocells as selfish nodes and the Macrocell Base Station protects itself by pricing subchannels for each usage. We use Stackelberg game model to study this scenario and obtain equilibrium policies that satisfy certain quality of service.

A reason for unreason: returns-based beliefs in game theory

Players cooperate in experiments more than game theory would predict. We introduce the ‘returns-based beliefs’ approach: the expected returns of a particular strategy in proportion to total expected returns of all strategies. Using a decision analytic solution concept, Luce’s (1959) probabilistic choice model, and ‘hyperpriors’ for ambiguity in players’ cooperability, our approach explains empirical observations in various classes of games including the Prisoner’s and Traveler’s Dilemmas. Testing the closeness of fit of our model on Selten and Chmura (2008) data for completely mixed 2 × 2 games shows that with loss aversion, returns-based beliefs explain the data better than other equilibrium concepts.