A responsabilização criminal no estado democrático de direito: o equilíbrio entre a efetividade e os limites da pretensão punitiva da sociedade

This paper analyzes the relationship between fundamental rights and the exercise of the claim punitive society in a democratic state. It starts with the premise that there are fundamental rights that limit and determine the validity of all forms of manifestation of the claim punitive society (legislating, investigative, adjudicative or ministerial) and there are others that require the state the right exercise, fast and effective of these activities. Travels to history in order to see that the first meaning of these rights was built between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, after all a history of abuses committed by state agents in the exercise of criminal justice, and positively valued in the declarations of human rights and proclaimed in the constitutions after the American and French Revolutions, while the second meaning has been assigned between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when, because of the serious social problems generated largely by absenteeism state, it was noted that in addition to subjective rights the individual against the state, fundamental rights are also objective values, which trigger an order directed the state to protect them against the action of the offending individuals themselves (duty to protect), the mission of which the State seeks to discharge, among other means, through the issue of legal rules typifying the behavior detrimental to such rights, subject to penalties, and the concrete actions of public institutions created by the Constitution to operate penal law. Under this double bias, it is argued that the rule violates the Constitution in the exercise of the claim punitive society as much as by excess malfere fundamental rights that limit, as when it allows facts wrong by offending fundamental rights, remain unpunished either by inaction or by insufficient measures taken abstractly or concretely provided

Fundamental Rights of workers in the Digital Age: A methodological approach from a case study. WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT - 89/2011

The relationship between employer and worker is not only obligatory but above all, as Sinzheimer said, a ‘relationship of power’. In the Digital Age this statement is confirmed by the massive introduction of ICT in most of the companies that increase, in practice, employer’s supervisory powers. This is a worrying issue for two reasons: on one hand, ICT emerge as a new way to weaken the effectiveness of fundamental rights and the right to dignity of workers; and, on the other hand, Spanish legal system does not offer appropriate solutions to ensure that efficacy. Moreover, in a scenario characterized by a hybridization of legal systems models –in which traditional hard law methods are combined with soft law and self regulation instruments–, the role of our case law has become very important in this issue. Nevertheless, despite the increase of judicialization undergone, solutions offered by Courts are so different that do not give enough legal certainty. Facing this situation, I suggest a methodological approach –using Alchourron and Bulygin’s normative systems theory and Alexy’s fundamental rights theory– which can open new spaces of decision to legal operators in order to solve properly these problems. This proposal can allow setting a policy that guarantees fundamental rights of workers, deepening their human freedom in companies from the Esping-Andersen’s de-commodification perspective. With this purpose, I examine electronic communications in the company as a case study.

What ‘Security’, whose ‘Rights’ and which ‘Law’? : the Israeli High Court of Justice and the Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank

Cette thèse examine l’interprétation et l’application, par l’Haute Cour d'Israël (HCJ), de principes du droit international de l’occupation et du droit international des droits de la personne dans le traitement de requêtes judiciaires formulées par des justiciables palestiniens. Elle s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux jugements rendus depuis le déclenchement de la deuxième Intifada (2000) suite à des requêtes mettant en cause la légalité des mesures adoptées par les autorités israéliennes au nom d’un besoin prétendu d’accroitre la sécurité des colonies et des colons israéliens dans le territoire occupé de la Cisjordanie. La première question sous étude concerne la mesure dans laquelle la Cour offre un recours effectif aux demandeurs palestiniens face aux violations alléguées de leurs droits internationaux par l’occupant. La recherche fait sienne la position de la HJC selon laquelle le droit de l’occupation est guidé par une logique interne tenant compte de la balance des intérêts en cause, en l’occurrence le besoin de sécurité de l’occupant, d’une part, et les droits fondamentaux de l’occupé, d’autre part. Elle considère, en outre, que cette logique se voit reflétée dans les principes normatifs constituant la base de ce corpus juridique, soit que l’occupation est par sa nature temporaire, que de l’occupation découle un rapport de fiduciaire et, finalement, que l’occupant n’acquiert point de souveraineté sur le territoire. Ainsi, la deuxième question qui est posée est de savoir si l’interprétation du droit par la Cour (HCJ) a eu pour effet de promouvoir ces principes normatifs ou, au contraire, de leur porter préjudice. La réunion de plusieurs facteurs, à savoir la durée prolongée de l’occupation de la Cisjordanie par Israël, la menace accrue à la sécurité depuis 2000 ainsi qu’une politique de colonisation israélienne active, soutenue par l’État, présentent un cas de figure unique pour vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle les tribunaux nationaux des États démocratiques, généralement, et ceux jouant le rôle de la plus haute instance judiciaire d’une puissance occupante, spécifiquement, parviennent à assurer la protection des droits et libertés fondamentaux et de la primauté du droit au niveau international. Le premier chapitre présente une étude, à la lumière du premier principe normatif énoncé ci-haut, des jugements rendus par la HCJ dans les dossiers contestant la légalité de la construction du mur à l’intérieur de la Cisjordanie et de la zone dite fermée (Seam Zone), ainsi que des zones de sécurité spéciales entourant les colonies. Le deuxième chapitre analyse, cette fois à la lumière du deuxième principe normatif, des jugements dans les dossiers mettant en cause des restrictions sur les déplacements imposées aux Palestiniens dans le but allégué de protéger la sécurité des colonies et/ou des colons. Le troisième chapitre jette un regard sur les jugements rendus dans les dossiers mettant en cause la légalité du tracé du mur à l’intérieur et sur le pourtour du territoire annexé de Jérusalem-Est. Les conclusions découlant de cette recherche se fondent sur des données tirées d’entrevues menées auprès d’avocats israéliens qui s’adressent régulièrement à la HCJ pour le compte de justiciables palestiniens.

What ‘Security’, whose ‘Rights’ and which ‘Law’? : the Israeli High Court of Justice and the Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank

Cette thèse examine l’interprétation et l’application, par l’Haute Cour d'Israël (HCJ), de principes du droit international de l’occupation et du droit international des droits de la personne dans le traitement de requêtes judiciaires formulées par des justiciables palestiniens. Elle s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux jugements rendus depuis le déclenchement de la deuxième Intifada (2000) suite à des requêtes mettant en cause la légalité des mesures adoptées par les autorités israéliennes au nom d’un besoin prétendu d’accroitre la sécurité des colonies et des colons israéliens dans le territoire occupé de la Cisjordanie. La première question sous étude concerne la mesure dans laquelle la Cour offre un recours effectif aux demandeurs palestiniens face aux violations alléguées de leurs droits internationaux par l’occupant. La recherche fait sienne la position de la HJC selon laquelle le droit de l’occupation est guidé par une logique interne tenant compte de la balance des intérêts en cause, en l’occurrence le besoin de sécurité de l’occupant, d’une part, et les droits fondamentaux de l’occupé, d’autre part. Elle considère, en outre, que cette logique se voit reflétée dans les principes normatifs constituant la base de ce corpus juridique, soit que l’occupation est par sa nature temporaire, que de l’occupation découle un rapport de fiduciaire et, finalement, que l’occupant n’acquiert point de souveraineté sur le territoire. Ainsi, la deuxième question qui est posée est de savoir si l’interprétation du droit par la Cour (HCJ) a eu pour effet de promouvoir ces principes normatifs ou, au contraire, de leur porter préjudice. La réunion de plusieurs facteurs, à savoir la durée prolongée de l’occupation de la Cisjordanie par Israël, la menace accrue à la sécurité depuis 2000 ainsi qu’une politique de colonisation israélienne active, soutenue par l’État, présentent un cas de figure unique pour vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle les tribunaux nationaux des États démocratiques, généralement, et ceux jouant le rôle de la plus haute instance judiciaire d’une puissance occupante, spécifiquement, parviennent à assurer la protection des droits et libertés fondamentaux et de la primauté du droit au niveau international. Le premier chapitre présente une étude, à la lumière du premier principe normatif énoncé ci-haut, des jugements rendus par la HCJ dans les dossiers contestant la légalité de la construction du mur à l’intérieur de la Cisjordanie et de la zone dite fermée (Seam Zone), ainsi que des zones de sécurité spéciales entourant les colonies. Le deuxième chapitre analyse, cette fois à la lumière du deuxième principe normatif, des jugements dans les dossiers mettant en cause des restrictions sur les déplacements imposées aux Palestiniens dans le but allégué de protéger la sécurité des colonies et/ou des colons. Le troisième chapitre jette un regard sur les jugements rendus dans les dossiers mettant en cause la légalité du tracé du mur à l’intérieur et sur le pourtour du territoire annexé de Jérusalem-Est. Les conclusions découlant de cette recherche se fondent sur des données tirées d’entrevues menées auprès d’avocats israéliens qui s’adressent régulièrement à la HCJ pour le compte de justiciables palestiniens.

The Court of Justice of the European Union as a fundamental rights tribunal: challenges for the effective delivery of fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 49, 29 August 2012

This paper reflects on the challenges facing the effective implementation of the new EU fundamental rights architecture that emerged from the Lisbon Treaty. Particular attention is paid to the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its ability to function as a ‘fundamental rights tribunal’. The paper first analyses the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and its long-standing experience in overseeing the practical implementation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Against this analysis, it then examines the readiness of the CJEU to live up to its consolidated and strengthened mandate on fundamental rights as one of the prime guarantors of the effective implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. We specifically review the role of ‘third-party interventions’ by non-governmental organisations, international and regional human rights actors as well as ‘interim relief measures’ when ensuring effective judicial protection of vulnerable individuals in cases of alleged violations of fundamental human rights. To flesh out our arguments, we rely on examples within the scope of the relatively new and complex domain of EU legislation, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), and its immigration, external border and asylum policies. In view of the fundamental rights-sensitive nature of these domains, which often encounter shifts of accountability and responsibility in their practical application, and the Lisbon Treaty’s expansion of the jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret and review EU AFSJ legislation, this area can be seen as an excellent test case for the analyses at hand. The final section puts forth a set of policy suggestions that can assist the CJEU in the process of adjusting itself to the new fundamental rights context in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting.

Exergetic analysis of carbon dioxide vapour compression refrigeration cycle using the new fundamental equation of state

The purpose of this paper is to present exergy charts for carbon dioxide (CO2) based on the new fundamental equation of state and the results of a thermodynamic analysis of conventional and trans-critical vapour compression refrigeration cycles using the data thereof. The calculation scheme is anchored on the Mathematica platform. There exist upper and lower bounds for the high cycle pressure for a given set of evaporating and pre-throttling temperatures. The maximum possible exergetic efficiency for each case was determined. Empirical correlations for exergetic efficiency and COP, valid in the range of temperatures studied here, are obtained. The exergy losses have been quantified. (C) 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

ECJ Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence between Member States' Prerogatives and Citizens' Autonomy

This chapter provides an analysis of the European Court of Justice's Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence, focused on the potential of Member States to maintain any positive regulatory role in supporting citizens' autonomy on the one hand, and on the impact of the Court's case law on citizens' opportunities to actually enjoy human rights within societies (substantive autonomy). It first sketches the notion of autonomy which is proposed as base of fundamental rights protection and promotion within a social reality characterized by not democratically legitimated dominance based on wealth and economic power. It proceeds to contextualize ECJ case law on fundamental rights. This section starts with a quantitative appetizer, which will formalize some assumptions and test them on a total of 150 cases before the European judiciary. The paper then offers a more conceptual recount around fundamental rights to equality and non-discrimination on the one hand and around fundamental rights of workers to actively shape employment and labor relations on the other hand. In conclusion some suggestions are made of how ECJ fundamental rights doctrine could develop more positively in order to moderate diverging interests of different parts of the citizenry in protecting fundamental rights.

Book Review: Critical Perspectives on Human Rights and Disability Law

Book Review

The company of heaven /

Poems.

The history of a sanitary failure : extracts (mainly from official sources) showing the results of 90 years experiments in the hygienic regulation of prostitution in India /

Mode of access: Internet.

The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law in the EU: Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism. CEPS Paperbacks. November 2013

This study examines the protection of fundamental rights, democracy and rule of law in the European Union, and the challenges that arise in reflecting on ways to strengthen EU competences in these contested terrains. It provides a ‘state of play’ and critical account of EU-level policy and legal mechanisms assessing the relationship between rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights in the member states of the Union. The cross-cutting challenges affecting their uses, effective implementation and practical operability constitute a central point of the analysis. The study argues that the relationship between rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights is co-constitutive. Any future rule of law-related policy discussion in the EU should start from an understanding of the triangular relationship between these dimensions from the perspective of ‘democratic rule of law with fundamental rights’, i.e. the legally based rule of a democratic state that delivers fundamental rights. The three criteria are inherently and indivisibly interconnected, and interdependent on each of the others, and they cannot be separated without inflicting profound damage to the whole and changing its essential shape and configuration.

An EU mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 91/April 2016 Thursday, 21 April 2016

The European Union is founded on a set of common principles of democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights, as enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union. Whereas future Member States are vetted for their compliance with these values before they accede to the Union, no similar method exists to supervise adherence to these foundational principles after accession. EU history proved that this ‘Copenhagen dilemma’ was far from theoretical. EU Member State governments’ adherence to foundational EU values cannot be taken for granted. Violations may happen in individual cases, or in a systemic way, which may go as far as overthrowing the rule of law. Against this background the European Parliament initiated a Legislative Own-Initiative Report on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights and proposed among others a Scoreboard on the basis of common and objective indicators by which foundational values can be measured. This Research Paper assesses the need and possibilities for the establishment of an EU Scoreboard, as well as its related social, economic, legal and political ‘costs and benefits’.

The Equalization of Effective Communicative Freedom: Democratic Justice in the Constitutional State and Beyond

Jurgen Habermas takes the realization of rights through the democratic self-organization of legal communities to be the normative core of emancipatory politics. In this article I explore the implications of this claim in relation to the requirements of justice. I argue that Habermas's discourse theory of democratic legitimacy presupposes a substantive principle of justice that demands the equalization of effective communicative freedom for all structurally constituted social groups in any constitutional state. This involves the elimination of a range of structural injustices rooted in the complex interrelationships between political, economic and cultural orders. In the final section I sketch briefly the implications of this analysis in the context of ongoing globalization processes. It is suggested that the most effective way to establish a just system of global governance is to equalize effective communicative freedom among nation-states.

Is there any room for the doctrine of fundamental rights of states in today's international law?

This article serves as a general substantive introduction to the special issue on the fundamental rights of states in international law. It introduces the concept in theoretical and doctrinal terms, and lays out the questions that will be addressed by the contributions to the special issue. These questions include: 1) What do attributes like ‘inherent’, ‘inalienable’ and ‘permanent’ mean with regard to state rights?; 2) Do they lead to identifying a unitary distinct category of fundamental rights of states?; 3) If so, what is their source and legal character?; 4) What are their legal implications, eg, when they come into conflict with other obligations of the right holder or with the actions of other states and international organisations?; and ultimately, 5) Is there still room in today’s international law for a doctrine of ‘fundamental’ rights of states? The article reviews the fundamental rights of states in positive law sources and in international legal scholarship, and identifies the reasons for a renaissance of attention for this doctrine.

Democratic governance and the rule of law : lessons from Colombia /

"Colombia has experienced conflict for decades. In the 1990s it was a paradigm of the failing state, beset with all manner of troubles: terrorism, kidnapping, murder, drug trafficking, corruption, an economic downturn of major scope, general lawlessness, and brain drain. Today the country is much safer, and the agents of violence are clearly on the defensive. Nonetheless, much work lies ahead to secure the democratic system. Security and the rule of law are fundamental to the task. As the monopoly over the legitimate use of force is established, democratic governance also needs the architecture of law: ministry of justice, courts, legislative scrutiny, law enforcement agencies, regulatory bodies, public defenders, police, correctional system, legal statutes, contracts, university level academic education to train lawyers, judges, and investigators, along with engagement with civil society to promote a culture of lawfulness. Security without the rule of law puts a society at risk of falling into a Hobbesian hell."--P. v.