633 resultados para Fuller
Resumo:
Province of Upper Canada Grant (vellum) to Isaac Fuller of the Township of Niagara. He was formerly a private in the Militia. He is granted 100 acres in the west half of lot no.29 in the 2nd Concession in the Township of Nissouri – Folio no. 233. This was registered Nov. 1833. The outside of this document is quite discoloured. This does not affect the text, Oct. 13, 1833.
Resumo:
Indenture between Abraham Fuller Atkinson of St. Catharines, rector of St. George’s Church, Henry Riggs Goodman and William Hamilton Merritt, wardens of St. George’s Church, to Thomas Lees Helliwell for pew no. 15 in St. George’s Church, Mar. 21, 1857.
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Letter addressed to “My Dear Sir” from Thomas Fuller (1 ½ pages) stating that Isaac Fuller died without a will. His eldest son, John Fuller died under age without a will. This is accompanied by a 1 page note bearing the same information, n.d.
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Indenture between Isaac Fuller of the Township of Niagara and George Upper of the Township of Niagara for the west half of Lot no. 29 in the 2nd Concession of the Township of Nissouri, Jan. 29, 1830.
Resumo:
Indenture of quit claim between Thomas Fuller of the Township of Niagara and George Upper of the Township of Niagara for 100 acres in the back half of Lot no. 29 in the 2nd Concession in the Township of Niagara, Oct. 26, 1852.
Resumo:
A debate occurred in 1958 at the Harvard Law Review has become a landmark for contemporary philosophy of law. Still under the philosophical and moral impact of the Second World War, Herbert L. A. Hart published his version of legal positivism whitin the article entitled Positivism and the Separation of Law and Moral. The answer came from Lon Fuller’s Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Prof. Hart. Much of the debate took place over a seemingly prosaic exemple: a rule prohibiting vehicles from a park. With this exemple, Hart argued that rules have a core of clear aplications, but this core meaning would be sorrounded by a penumbra of uncertainty. Fuller uses a counter-exemple to instist that legal language, by itself, cannot determine a certain outcome: it is necessary to understand the purpose for wich the rule was suppose to serve. This paper analyses this controversy from its most important features: i) the connection between legal philosophy and philosophy of language; ii) the possibility of legal interpretation; iii) and the different possibles points of view for the analysis of law. This paper argues that the study of these features sheds light on the problems we encounter in contemporary philosophy of law, especialy with regard to theories of legal argumentation and its relation with legal langague and legal interpretation.