Experts vs. Discounters: Consumer Free Riding and Experts Withholding Advice in Markets for Credence Goods

This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable, and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis. The unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of the good induce experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures. This makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts survive competition by discounters; we identify situations in which experts misdiagnose consumers in order to prevent them from free-riding on experts' advice; and we discuss policy options to solve the free-riding consumers–cheating experts problem.

Free-riding, cooperation, and 'peaceful revolutions' in copyright

Modern copyright law is based on the inescapable assumption that users, given the choice, will free-ride rather than pay for access. In fact, many consumers of cultural works – music, books, films, games, and other works – fundamentally want to support their production. It turns out that humans are motivated to support cultural production not only by extrinsic incentives, but also by social norms of fairness and reciprocity. This article explains how producers across the creative industries have used this insight to develop increasingly sophisticated business models that rely on voluntary payments (including pay-what-you-want schemes) to fund their costs of production. The recognition that users are not always free-riders suggests that current policy approaches to copyright are fundamentally flawed. Because social norms are so important in consumer motivations, the perceived unfairness of the current copyright system undermines the willingness of people to pay for access to cultural goods. While recent copyright reform debate has focused on creating stronger deterrence through enforcement, increasing the perceived fairness and legitimacy of copyright law is likely to be much more effective. The fact that users will sometimes willingly support cultural production also challenges the economic raison d'être of copyright law. This article demonstrates how 'peaceful revolutions' are flipping conventional copyright models and encouraging free-riding through combining incentives and prosocial norms. Because they provide a means to support production without limiting the dissemination of knowledge and culture, there is good reason to believe that these commons-based systems of cultural production can be more efficient, more fair, and more conducive to human flourishing than conventional copyright systems. This article explains what we know about free-riding so far and what work remains to be done to understand the viability and importance of cooperative systems in funding cultural production.

Looking for free riding: Energy efficiency incentives and Italian homeowners

We examine the effect of energy efficiency incentives on household energy efficiency home improvements. Starting in February 2007, Italian homeowners have been able to avail themselves of tax credits on the purchase and installation costs of certain types of energy efficiency renovations. We examine two such renovations—door/window replacements and heating system replacements—using multi-year cross-section data from the Italian Consumer Expenditure Survey and focusing on a narrow period around the introduction of the tax credits. Our regressions control for dwelling and household characteristics and economy-wide factors likely to influence the replacement rates. The effects of the policy are different for the two types of renovations. With window replacements, the policy is generally associated with a 30 % or stronger increase in the renovation rates and number of renovations. In the simplest econometric models, the effect is not statistically significant, but the results get stronger when we allow for heterogeneous effects across the country. With heating system replacements, simpler models suggest that the tax credits policy had no effect whatsoever or that free riding was rampant, i.e., people are now accepting subsidies for replacements that they would have done anyway. Further examination suggests a strong degree of heterogeneity in the effects across warmer and colder parts of the country, and effects in the colder areas that are even more pronounced than those for window replacements. These results should, however, be interpreted with caution due to the low rates of renovations, which imply that the effects are estimated relatively imprecisely.

Carbon Sink Conservation and Global Justice: Benefiting, Free Riding and Non-Compliance

It is often assumed that in order to avoid the most severe consequences of global anthropogenic climate change we have to preserve our existing carbon sinks, such as for instance tropical forests. Global carbon sink conservation raises a host of normative issues, though, since it is debatable who should pay the costs of carbon sink conservation, who has the duty to protect which sinks, and how far the duty to conserve one’s carbon sinks actually extends, especially if it conflicts with other duties one might have. According to some, forested states like Ecuador have a duty to preserve their tropical forests while the rich states of the global North have a duty of fairness to compensate states like Ecuador for the costs they incur. My aim in this paper is to critically analyse this standard line of argument and to criticise its validity both internally (i.e. with regard to its normative conclusion based on its premises) and externally (i.e. with regard to the argument’s underlying assumptions and its lack of contextualisation). As I will argue, the duty to conserve one’s forests is only a particular instantiation of a wider, more general duty to contribute towards global climate justice for which the context in which one operates (e.g. whether other agents are complying with their duties of global climate justice or not) matters significantly.

"Call for prices": Strategic implications of raising consumers' costs

Many consumer durable retailers often do not advertise their prices and instead ask consumers to call them for prices. It is easy to see that this practice increases the consumers' cost of learning the prices of products they are considering, yet firms commonly use such practices. Not advertising prices may reduce the firm's advertising costs, but the strategic effects of doing so are not clear. Our objective is to examine the strategic effects of this practice. In particular, how does making price discovery more difficult for consumers affect competing retailers' price, service decisions, and profits? We develop a model in which a manufacturer sells its product through a high-service retailer and a low-service retailer. Consumers can purchase the retail service at the high-end retailer and purchase the product at the competing low-end retailer. Therefore, the high-end retailer faces a free-riding problem. A retailer first chooses its optimal service levels. Then, it chooses its optimal price levels. Finally, a retailer decides whether to advertise its prices. The model results in four structures: (1) both retailers advertise prices, (2) only the low-service retailer advertises price, (3) only the high-service retailer advertises price, and (4) neither retailer advertises price. We find that when a retailer does not advertise its price and makes price discovery more difficult for consumers, the competition between the retailers is less intense. However, the retailer is forced to charge a lower price. In addition, if the competing retailer does advertise its prices, then the competing retailer enjoys higher profit margins. We identify conditions under which each of the above four structures is an equilibrium and show that a low-service retailer not advertising its price is a more likely outcome than a high-service retailer doing so. We then solve the manufacturer's problem and find that there are several instances when a retailer's advertising decisions are different from what the manufacturer would want. We describe the nature of this channel coordination problem and identify some solutions. © 2010 INFORMS.

Obfuscation and Strict Online Anonymity

I consider the case for genuinely anonymous web searching. Big data seems to have it in for privacy. The story is well known, particularly since the dawn of the web. Vastly more personal information, monumental and quotidian, is gathered than in the pre-digital days. Once gathered it can be aggregated and analyzed to produce rich portraits, which in turn permit unnerving prediction of our future behavior. The new information can then be shared widely, limiting prospects and threatening autonomy. How should we respond? Following Nissenbaum (2011) and Brunton and Nissenbaum (2011 and 2013), I will argue that the proposed solutions—consent, anonymity as conventionally practiced, corporate best practices, and law—fail to protect us against routine surveillance of our online behavior. Brunton and Nissenbaum rightly maintain that, given the power imbalance between data holders and data subjects, obfuscation of one’s online activities is justified. Obfuscation works by generating “misleading, false, or ambiguous data with the intention of confusing an adversary or simply adding to the time or cost of separating good data from bad,” thus decreasing the value of the data collected (Brunton and Nissenbaum, 2011). The phenomenon is as old as the hills. Natural selection evidently blundered upon the tactic long ago. Take a savory butterfly whose markings mimic those of a toxic cousin. From the point of view of a would-be predator the data conveyed by the pattern is ambiguous. Is the bug lunch or potential last meal? In the light of the steep costs of a mistake, the savvy predator goes hungry. Online obfuscation works similarly, attempting for instance to disguise the surfer’s identity (Tor) or the nature of her queries (Howe and Nissenbaum 2009). Yet online obfuscation comes with significant social costs. First, it implies free riding. If I’ve installed an effective obfuscating program, I’m enjoying the benefits of an apparently free internet without paying the costs of surveillance, which are shifted entirely onto non-obfuscators. Second, it permits sketchy actors, from child pornographers to fraudsters, to operate with near impunity. Third, online merchants could plausibly claim that, when we shop online, surveillance is the price we pay for convenience. If we don’t like it, we should take our business to the local brick-and-mortar and pay with cash. Brunton and Nissenbaum have not fully addressed the last two costs. Nevertheless, I think the strict defender of online anonymity can meet these objections. Regarding the third, the future doesn’t bode well for offline shopping. Consider music and books. Intrepid shoppers can still find most of what they want in a book or record store. Soon, though, this will probably not be the case. And then there are those who, for perfectly good reasons, are sensitive about doing some of their shopping in person, perhaps because of their weight or sexual tastes. I argue that consumers should not have to pay the price of surveillance every time they want to buy that catchy new hit, that New York Times bestseller, or a sex toy.

Detecting Free Riders in Collective Brands through a Hierarchical Choice Process

Free-riding behaviors exist in tourism and they should be analyzed from a comprehensive perspective; while the literature has mainly focused on free riders operating in a destination, the destinations themselves might also free ride when they are under the umbrella of a collective brand. The objective of this article is to detect potential free-riding destinations by estimating the contribution of the different individual destinations to their collective brands, from the point of view of consumer perception. We argue that these individual contributions can be better understood by reflecting the various stages that tourists follow to reach their final decision. A hierarchical choice process is proposed in which the following choices are nested (not independent): “whether to buy,” “what collective brand to buy,” and “what individual brand to buy.” A Mixed Logit model confirms this sequence, which permits estimation of individual contributions and detection of free riders.

From the Editor

The five articles appearing in this issue of the journal reflect the breadth of project management research and the cross-fertilization of ideas from other management disciplines with project management. These articles focus on the evolution of project management theory (“A Bibliometric View on the Use of Contingency Theory in Project Management Research” by Hanisch and Wald), interfirm knowledge management and learning in project networks (“Exploring Negotiation Through Boundary Objects in Global Design Project Networks” by Di Marco, Alin, and Taylor), learning within one project organization (“Organizational Learning in Project-Based Companies: A Process Thinking Approach” by Koskinen), identifying the factors affecting project performance (“Factors Causing Design Schedule Delays in Turnkey Projects in Taiwan: An Empirical Study of Power Distribution Substation Projects” by Yau and Yang), and considering the antecedents of negative employee behavior and its consequences for project team performance (“Counteracting Free-Riding With Team Morale—An Experimental Study” by He).

Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle

The generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the alliance may break up, and its members may fight against each other over the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after the break-up of the alliance. Former ‘brothers in arms’ fight even more vigorously against each other than strangers do. Furthermore, this vigorous internal fighting is anticipated and reduces the ability of the alliance to mobilize the joint fighting effort, compared to a situation in which victorious alliance members share the spoils of victory equally and peacefully

Essays on the Bioeconomics of the Northern Baltic Fisheries

World marine fisheries suffer from economic and biological overfishing: too many vessels are harvesting too few fish stocks. Fisheries economics has explained the causes of overfishing and provided a theoretical background for management systems capable of solving the problem. Yet only a few examples of fisheries managed by the principles of the bioeconomic theory exist. With the aim of bridging the gap between the actual fish stock assessment models used to provide management advice and economic optimisation models, the thesis explores economically sound harvesting from national and international perspectives. Using data calibrated for the Baltic salmon and herring stocks, optimal harvesting policies are outlined using numerical methods. First, the thesis focuses on the socially optimal harvest of a single salmon stock by commercial and recreational fisheries. The results obtained using dynamic programming show that the optimal fishery configuration would be to close down three out of the five studied fisheries. The result is robust to stock size fluctuations. Compared to a base case situation, the optimal fleet structure would yield a slight decrease in the commercial catch, but a recreational catch that is nearly seven times higher. As a result, the expected economic net benefits from the fishery would increase nearly 60%, and the expected number of juvenile salmon (smolt) would increase by 30%. Second, the thesis explores the management of multiple salmon stocks in an international framework. Non-cooperative and cooperative game theory are used to demonstrate different "what if" scenarios. The results of the four player game suggest that, despite the commonly agreed fishing quota, the behaviour of the countries has been closer to non-cooperation than cooperation. Cooperation would more than double the net benefits from the fishery compared to a past fisheries policy. Side payments, however, are a prerequisite for a cooperative solution. Third, the thesis applies coalitional games in the partition function form to study whether the cooperative solution would be stable despite the potential presence of positive externalities. The results show that the cooperation of two out of four studied countries can be stable. Compared to a past fisheries policy, a stable coalition structure would provide substantial economic benefits. Nevertheless, the status of the salmon stocks would not improve significantly. Fourth, the thesis studies the prerequisites for and potential consequences of the implementation of an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system in the Finnish herring fishery. Simulation results suggest that ITQs would result in a decrease in the number of fishing vessels, but enables positive profits to overlap with a higher stock size. The empirical findings of the thesis affirm that the profitability of the studied fisheries could be improved. The evidence, however, indicates that incentives for free riding exist, and thus the most preferable outcome both in economic and biological terms is elusive.