Development of a test methodology for evaluating crash compatibility and aggressiveness. Test report 2: 1975 Ford Torino-to-NHTSA test device.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

Vehicle integration and evaluation of advanced restraint systems. Phase B - test report: Torino-to-Volvo tests.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

The evaluation of 1975 Torino type 2 restraint systems with web locking and force limiting features. Test report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

Development of a test methodology for evaluating crash compatibilities and aggressiveness. Volume II: technical report. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

Book review: Ford, R.C., & Peeper, W.C. 2008. Managing Destination Marketing Organizations. Orlando: ForPer Publications

This volume represents the proceedings of the 13th ENTER conference, held at Lausanne, Switzerland during 2006. The conference brought together academics and practitioners across four tracks, which were eSolutions, refereed research papers, work-in-progress papers, and a Ph.D. workshop. This proceedings contains 40 refereed papers, which is less than the 51 papers presented in 2005. However, the editors advise that the scientific committee was stricter than in previous years, to the extent that the acceptance rate was 50%. A significant change in the current proceedings is the inclusion of extended abstracts of the 23 work-in-progress presentations. The papers cover a diverse range of topics across 16 research streams. This reviewer has adopted the approach of succinctly summarising the contribution of each of the 40-refereed papers, in the order in which they appear...

La industria automovilística en EEUU de 1908 a 1973: Henry Ford y las nuevas formas de organización del trabajo.

[es]organización del trabajo en la industria del automovil en el s. XX.

The Ford administration, Angola and the perception of Post-Vietnam US credibility, 1974-1976

This thesis is a study of how the Gerald Ford administration struggled to address a perceived loss of US credibility after the collapse of Vietnam, with a focus on the role of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the formulation, implementation and subsequent defence of US Angolan policy. By examining the immediate post-Vietnam period, this thesis shows that Vietnam had a significant impact on Kissinger’s actions on Angola, which resulted in an ill conceived covert operation in another third world conflict. In 1974, Africa was a neglected region in Cold War US foreign policy, yet the effects of the Portuguese revolution led to a rapid decolonization of its African territories, of which Angola was to become the focus of superpower competition. After South Vietnam collapsed in April 1975, Kissinger became fixated on restoring the perceived loss of US prestige, Angola provided the first opportunity to address this. Despite objections from his advisors, Kissinger methodically engineered a covert program to assist two anti-Marxist guerrilla groups in Angola. As the crisis escalated, the media discovered the operation and the Congress decided to cease all funding. A period of heated tensions ensued, resulting in Kissinger creating a new African policy to outmanoeuvre his critics publicly, while privately castigating them to foreign leaders. This thesis argues that Kissinger’s dismissal of internal dissent and opposition from the Congress was influenced by what he perceived as bureaucrats being affected by the Vietnam syndrome, and his obsession with restoring US credibility. By looking at the private and public records – as expressed in government meetings and official reports, US newspaper and television coverage and diplomatic cables – this thesis addresses the question of how the lessons of Vietnam failed to influence Kissinger’s actions in Angola, but the lessons of Angola were heavily influential in the construction of a new US-African policy.

Ford, Carter and Cambodia: US foreign policy and the Khmer Rouge

This thesis is an investigation into the US response to the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia between 1974 and 1981. It argues that the US experience in the Vietnam War acted as a causal factor in the formulation of its Cambodian policy during the presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. From taking power in April 1975 to their removal by the Vietnamese in January 1979, the Khmer Rouge initiated a revolution unrivalled in the 20th Century for its brutality and for the total eradication of modern society. This thesis demonstrates that the Ford administration viewed Cambodia only as it pertained to their strategy in Vietnam and, following US disengagement from Indochina all but ignored the atrocities occurring there as they instead pursued informal relations with the Khmer Rouge as a means of punishing the Vietnamese. The Carter administration formulated a foreign policy based on human rights yet failed to adequately address the genocide that occurred in Cambodia due to its temporal and regional proximity to Vietnam. Instead, this collective reluctance to reengage with the region and the resulting anti-Vietnamese attitude reinforced Brzezinski’s broader global strategy that allied the US with China in support of an independent Cambodia to further isolate Hanoi. Thus this thesis argues that the distorting impact of the Vietnam War, as well as global Cold War calculations, undermined any appreciation of the Cambodian conflict and caused both administrations to pursue policies in Cambodia that ultimately supported the Khmer Rouge regime. This project incorporates declassified material from the Ford and Carter Presidential Libraries, supplemented by the material from the National Archives and Library of Congress, and relevant newspapers and periodicals. It demonstrates that the limitations placed upon US foreign policy by their experience in the Vietnam War may be used to reveal unexplored elements in US-Cambodian relations.