Remarks prepared for delivery by Fred W. Friendly on the occasion of the tenth presentation of the Hubert H. Humphrey First Amendment Freedoms Prize.

Typescript (photocopy) of a speach delivered by Prof. Friendly at the New York Marriott Marquis Hotel, June 10, 1988.

High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment

Lying has a complicated relationship with the First Amendment. It is beyond question that some lies – such as perjury or pretending to be a police officer – are not covered by the First Amendment. But it is equally clear that some lies, even intentionally lying about military honors, are entitled to First Amendment protection. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). To date, however, both Supreme Court doctrine and academic commentary has taken for granted that any constitutional protection for lies is purely prophylactic – it protects the liar to avoid chilling truthful speech. This Article is the first to argue, contrary to conventional wisdom, that certain types of lies paradoxically advance the values underlying the First Amendment. Our framework is descriptively novel and doctrinally important insofar as we provide the first comprehensive post-Alvarez look at the wide range of lies that may raise First Amendment issues. Because there was no majority opinion in Alvarez, there is uncertainty about which standard of constitutional scrutiny should apply to protected lies, an issue we examine at length. Moreover, our normative claim is straightforward: when a lie has intrinsic or instrumental value it should be treated differently from other types of lies and warrant the greatest constitutional protection. Specifically, we argue that investigative deceptions – lies used to secure truthful factual information about matters of public concern – deserve the utmost constitutional protection because they advance the underling purposes of free speech: they enhance political discourse, help reveal the truth, and promote individual autonomy. A prototypical investigative deception is the sort of misrepresentation required in order for an undercover journalist, investigator, or activist to gain access to information or images of great political significance that would not be available if the investigator disclosed her reporting or political objectives. Tactical use of such lies have a long history in American journalism and activism, from Upton Sinclair to his modern day heirs. Using the proliferation of anti-whistleblower statutes like Ag Gag laws as an illustrative example, we argue that investigative deceptions are a category of high value lies that ought to receive rigorous protection under the First Amendment. At the same time, we recognize that not all lies are alike and that in other areas, the government regulation of lies serves legitimate interests. We therefore conclude the Article by drawing some limiting principles to our theory.

Memorandum on the impact of the First Amendment to the Constitution upon Federal aid to education : Memorandum on the Constitutional authority of the Congress to enact S. 1021. Federal programs under which institutions with religious affiliation receive Federal funds through grants or loans.

Documents prepared by the Department's legal staff in response to the request of Senator Morse, Chairman, Subcommittee on Education, committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

Ratification of the twenty-first amendment to the Constitution of the United States ; state convention records and laws.

Mode of access: Internet.

Mike Wallace & unidentified Asian-heritage man holding framed Leonard Zeidenberg First Amendment Award, presented March 11, 1998

printing info on back of print includes "IMG_0651.JPG"

Advertising Legalized Gambling: A Late Bloomer Under the First Amendment

New federal laws and court cases have put a new perspective on the ability of the industry to advertise as it has never been able to do before. With gaming becoming more prevalent, the acceptability of the legal industry is making promotion easier. The author discusses these new influences.

Rip, mix, burn: The politics of peer to peer and copyright law

Whereas Lessig's recent work engages with questions of culture and creativity in society, this paper looks at the role of culture and creativity in the law. The paper evaluates the Napster, DeCSS, Felten and Sklyarov litigation in terms of the new social, legal, economic and cultural relations being produced. This involves a deep discussion of law's economic relations, and the implications of this for litigation strategy. The paper concludes with a critique of recent attempts to define copyright law in terms of first amendment rights and communicative freedom.

Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech

This is a study of free speech and hate speech with reference to the international standards and to the United States jurisprudence. The study, in a comparative and critical fashion, depicts the historical evolution and the application of the concept of ‘free speech,’ within the context of ‘hate speech.’ The main question of this article is how free speech can be discerned from hate speech, and whether the latter should be restricted. To this end, it examines the regulation of free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and in light of the international standards, particularly under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The study not only illustrates how elusive the endeavour of striking a balance between free speech and other vital interests could be, but also discusses whether and how hate speech should be eliminated within the ‘marketplace of ideas.’

Wolves in sheeps' clothing: Creationist manipulation of Kansas science standards

So the question that animates this paper is this: what happens when a state's education policy seeks to make popular social and religious values a central part of its education standards in direct confrontation with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? I will try to answer that question in three ways. First, I will examine the tactics used in the manipulation of curricula to reflect social and religious values, with special focus on the Kansas case. Second, I will try to ascertain the determinants of success in these efforts; under what conditions are movements to impose creation science on public school curricula likely to succeed, and when to fail? Third, I will try to place these struggles over educational curricula, and between religion and science, in broader context, focusing on what they tell us about the nature of public policy making in the contemporary United States.

Libraries in the Cyberage--Part I

First Amendment issues heat up with the advent of the digital age and its ability to bring pornography to every library, free of charge.

Filter-tipped Libraries

Is it possible to say something positive about Internet filtering in libraries and not have everyone, including your mother, call you a wild-eyed, hidebound, neo-Nazi bashi-bazouk? No, of course not, but I'm going to try to anyway.

As práticas de assistência ao deficiente no município de Assis/SP: delimitações históricas

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Men's Modesty, Religion, and the State: Spaces of Collision

This article examines religious practices in the United States, which govern modesty and other dress norms for men. I focus both on the spaces within which they most collide with regulatory regimes of the state and the legal implications of these norms, particularly for observant Muslim men. Undergirding the research are those ‘‘gender equality’’ claims made by many religious adherents, that men are required to maintain proper modesty norms just as are women. Also undergirding the research is the extensive anti-Islam bias in American culture today. The spaces within which men’s religiously proscribed dress and grooming norms are most at issue—indicated by First Amendment legal challenges to rights of religious practice—are primarily those state-controlled, total institutions Goffman describes, such as in the military and prisons. The implications of gendered modesty norms are important, as state control over religious expression in prisons, for example, is much more difficult to contest than in other spaces, although this depends entirely on who is doing the contesting and within which religious context. In American society today—and particularly within the context of growing Islamaphobia following the 9/11 attacks—the implications are greatest for those men practicing ‘‘prison Islam.’’