Banco BPI SA financial institutions

Equity research report

The International Banking Facility Deposit Insurance Act : hearing before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, on H.R. 4879 ... November 4, 1981.

Item 1013-A, 1013-B (microfiche)

Application of the National Environmental Policy Act to U.S. participation in actions of international financial institutions [microform] : hearing before the Subcommittee on Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, One Hundredth Congress, second session, June 16, 1988.

CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 88 S321-59

International bank lending : hearings before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, first session, April 20 and 21, 1983.

Item 1013-A, 1013-B (microfiche)

International finance : market access concerns of U.S. financial institutions in Japan : briefing report to Congressional requesters /

"GAO/NSIAD-88-108R."

"Policy externalisation" inherent failure : international financial institutions' conditionality in developing countries

Conditionalities – i.e. ‘exchanging finance for policy reform’ in an asymmetrical relationship between the ‘donor’ and the ‘recipient’ – are central mechanisms of the reform programmes of international financial institutions (IFIs). As they are imposed by outside entities, they can also be viewed as ‘policy externalisation’, which is paradoxically a massive intrusion in the shaping of a country’s domestic policies. The resilience of such devices is remarkable, however. Indeed, in the early 1980s, many developing countries were facing balance of payments difficulties and called upon these international financial institutions for financial relief. In exchange for this relief, they devised economic reforms (fiscal, financial, monetary), which were the conditions for their lending. These reforms were not associated with better economic performance, and this led the IFIs to devise in the 1990s different reforms, which this time targeted the functioning of the government and its ‘governance’, economic problems being explained by governments’ characteristics (e.g., rent-seekers). The paper demonstrates the limitations of the device of conditionality, which is a crucial theoretical and policy issue given its stability across time and countries. These limitations stem from: i) the concept of conditionality per se - the mechanism of exchanging finance for reform; ii) the contents of the prescribed reforms given developing countries economic structure (typically commodity-based export structures) and the weakness of the concept of ‘governance’ in view of these countries’ political economies; and iii) the intrinsic linkages between economic and political conditionalities, whose limitations thus retroact on each other, in particular regarding effectiveness and credibility.

Sovereign default, domestic banks and financial institutions

We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaultsare costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financial institutionsallow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults.Our predictions: government defaults should lead to declines in private credit, and these declines should belarger in countries where financial institutions are more developed and banks hold more government bonds.In these same countries, government defaults should be less likely. Using a large panel of countries, we findevidence consistent with these predictions.

Measuring and testing for the systemically important financial institutions

This paper analyzes the measure of systemic importance ∆CoV aR proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009, 2010) within the context of a similar class of risk measures used in the risk management literature. In addition, we develop a series of testing procedures, based on ∆CoV aR, to identify and rank the systemically important institutions. We stress the importance of statistical testing in interpreting the measure of systemic importance. An empirical application illustrates the testing procedures, using equity data for three European banks.

Network externalities across financial institutions

We propose and estimate a financial distress model that explicitly accounts for the interactions or spill-over effects between financial institutions, through the use of a spatial continuity matrix that is build from financial network data of inter bank transactions. Such setup of the financial distress model allows for the empirical validation of the importance of network externalities in determining financial distress, in addition to institution specific and macroeconomic covariates. The relevance of such specification is that it incorporates simultaneously micro-prudential factors (Basel 2) as well as macro-prudential and systemic factors (Basel 3) as determinants of financial distress. Results indicate network externalities are an important determinant of financial health of a financial institutions. The parameter that measures the effect of network externalities is both economically and statistical significant and its inclusion as a risk factor reduces the importance of the firm specific variables such as the size or degree of leverage of the financial institution. In addition we analyze the policy implications of the network factor model for capital requirements and deposit insurance pricing.

Performance of financial institutions in Bhutan

The Kingdom of Bhutan is a small landlocked country in South Asia, located in the eastern Himalayas, and bordered by India and China. Bhutan is a small and fragile economy with a population of about 687,000. Nevertheless, its banking system plays an essential role in the growth and development of the country. This paper analyzes the financial performance, the development and growth of bank and non-bank financial institutions of Bhutan for the period 1999-2008 using both traditional and data envelopment analysis (DEA). The DEA analysis shows that financial institutions in are efficient and Bhutan National Bank has been the most efficient one. Overall, the paper finds that the ROE of the financial institutions in Bhutan are comparable to the international banks.

Environmental impact indicators estimation in European rural devlopment programs. Limitations of evaluators and financial institutions? Expectatios

The European Commission established Mid-term evaluation for the period 2007-2013 on Rural Development Programs as part of a continuous evaluation system. Mid-term evaluations are important for the Commission because they help measuring the success of a program, as well as giving advice and pointing out good practices for the current and consecutive programming periods. One of the main elements used to achieve these objectives is the impact indicators estimation of the program. This paper will focus on how impact indicators estimation is done for just the environmental indicators. To do this the 88 Mid-term evaluations of Rural Development Programs for 2007-2013 period, were analyzed. This study shows how far the actual methodologies to obtain impact indicators? values are from what the European Commission expects when demanding this task to be done.