Financial incentives and advanced construction procurement systems

Construction clients often use financial incentives to encourage stakeholder motivation and commitment to voluntary higher-order project goals. Despite the increased use of financial incentives, there is little literature addressing means of optimizing outcomes. Using a case study methodology, the examination of a successful Australian construction project demonstrates the features of a positively geared procurement approach that promotes the effectiveness of financial incentives. The research results show that if the incentive system is perceived to be fair and is applied to reward exceptional performance, and not to manipulate, then contractors are more likely to be positively motivated.

Client recommendations for financial incentives on construction projects

Purpose: To provide recommendations for construction clients who design and implement financial incentive mechanisms (FIMs) on projects. ---------- Methodology: Four large Australian building projects commissioned by government clients under managing contractor contracts and completed between 2001 and 2005 were examined to explore the ‘drivers’ that promoted motivation toward financial incentive goals. The results were triangulated across data sources, projects and stakeholder types. ---------- Findings: FIM design should incorporate: 1. flexibility to modify goals and measurement procedures over time, 2. multiple goals covering different project areas, 3. distribution of rewards across all the key organizations contributing to team performance (e.g. potentially not just the contractor, but the subcontractors and consultants) and a reward amount sufficient to be valued by potential recipients. FIM benefits are maximized through the following complementary procurement initiatives: 4. equitable contract risk allocation, 5. early contractor involvement in design, 6. value-driven tender selection, 7. relationship workshops, and 8. future work opportunities.---------- Research Limitations: This paper provides practical recommendations to industry and hence does not emphasize theoretical aspects.---------- Practical Implications: The uptake of these recommendations is likely to increase the impact of FIMs on motivation and improve project and industry outcomes. Although the study focuses on government clients of building projects, all the recommendations would seem to apply equally to private-sector clients and to non-building projects.---------- Originality: In order to improve motivation and reward high performance, clients are increasingly using FIM in their construction contracts. Despite the rising use of financial incentives, there is a lack of comprehensive construction-specific knowledge available to help clients maximize outcomes. The study addresses this gap in the literature.

Evaluation of financial incentives as a quality improvement strategy in the public hospital context : clinician attitudes, design variables, and economic costs

In 2008, a three-year pilot ‘pay for performance’ (P4P) program, known as ‘Clinical Practice Improvement Payment’ (CPIP) was introduced into Queensland Health (QHealth). QHealth is a large public health sector provider of acute, community, and public health services in Queensland, Australia. The organisation has recently embarked on a significant reform agenda including a review of existing funding arrangements (Duckett et al., 2008). Partly in response to this reform agenda, a casemix funding model has been implemented to reconnect health care funding with outcomes. CPIP was conceptualised as a performance-based scheme that rewarded quality with financial incentives. This is the first time such a scheme has been implemented into the public health sector in Australia with a focus on rewarding quality, and it is unique in that it has a large state-wide focus and includes 15 Districts. CPIP initially targeted five acute and community clinical areas including Mental Health, Discharge Medication, Emergency Department, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, and Stroke. The CPIP scheme was designed around key concepts including the identification of clinical indicators that met the set criteria of: high disease burden, a well defined single diagnostic group or intervention, significant variations in clinical outcomes and/or practices, a good evidence, and clinician control and support (Ward, Daniels, Walker & Duckett, 2007). This evaluative research targeted Phase One of implementation of the CPIP scheme from January 2008 to March 2009. A formative evaluation utilising a mixed methodology and complementarity analysis was undertaken. The research involved three research questions and aimed to determine the knowledge, understanding, and attitudes of clinicians; identify improvements to the design, administration, and monitoring of CPIP; and determine the financial and economic costs of the scheme. Three key studies were undertaken to ascertain responses to the key research questions. Firstly, a survey of clinicians was undertaken to examine levels of knowledge and understanding and their attitudes to the scheme. Secondly, the study sought to apply Statistical Process Control (SPC) to the process indicators to assess if this enhanced the scheme and a third study examined a simple economic cost analysis. The CPIP Survey of clinicians elicited 192 clinician respondents. Over 70% of these respondents were supportive of the continuation of the CPIP scheme. This finding was also supported by the results of a quantitative altitude survey that identified positive attitudes in 6 of the 7 domains-including impact, awareness and understanding and clinical relevance, all being scored positive across the combined respondent group. SPC as a trending tool may play an important role in the early identification of indicator weakness for the CPIP scheme. This evaluative research study supports a previously identified need in the literature for a phased introduction of Pay for Performance (P4P) type programs. It further highlights the value of undertaking a formal risk assessment of clinician, management, and systemic levels of literacy and competency with measurement and monitoring of quality prior to a phased implementation. This phasing can then be guided by a P4P Design Variable Matrix which provides a selection of program design options such as indicator target and payment mechanisms. It became evident that a clear process is required to standardise how clinical indicators evolve over time and direct movement towards more rigorous ‘pay for performance’ targets and the development of an optimal funding model. Use of this matrix will enable the scheme to mature and build the literacy and competency of clinicians and the organisation as implementation progresses. Furthermore, the research identified that CPIP created a spotlight on clinical indicators and incentive payments of over five million from a potential ten million was secured across the five clinical areas in the first 15 months of the scheme. This indicates that quality was rewarded in the new QHealth funding model, and despite issues being identified with the payment mechanism, funding was distributed. The economic model used identified a relative low cost of reporting (under $8,000) as opposed to funds secured of over $300,000 for mental health as an example. Movement to a full cost effectiveness study of CPIP is supported. Overall the introduction of the CPIP scheme into QHealth has been a positive and effective strategy for engaging clinicians in quality and has been the catalyst for the identification and monitoring of valuable clinical process indicators. This research has highlighted that clinicians are supportive of the scheme in general; however, there are some significant risks that include the functioning of the CPIP payment mechanism. Given clinician support for the use of a pay–for-performance methodology in QHealth, the CPIP scheme has the potential to be a powerful addition to a multi-faceted suite of quality improvement initiatives within QHealth.

When financial incentives do more good than harm : a checklist

Financial incentives can sometimes improve the quality of clinical practice, but they may also be an expensive distraction. Paul Glasziou and colleagues have devised a checklist to help prevent their premature or inappropriate implementation

Private sector to invest in off-shore fishing and to encourage the financial incentives to be introduced for deep-sea fishing in Sri Lanka

The author discusses the financial aspects of private sector investment in off-shore fishing, with particular attention to tax incentives, such as those offered to tourist hotels, which are considered applicable to the current case of fishing vessel purchase, and the operation of the vessels themselves, hiring, publicity and profitability. Tax incentives which were introduced to encourage investment in the tourist industry should be introduced to encourage investment in the fishing industry on the lines presented. It is essential that wide publicity be given for the incentives introduced so as to achieve the desired results.

Management practices on public lands: hearings, Ninety-second Congress, first [and second] session[s], on S. 350, a bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to Institute Programs designed to reforest and restore the quality of public and private forest lands; to enhance and expand recreational opportunity on such lands; to provide financial incentives to improve management of state and private forest lands; to establish a federal forest lands management fund; to facilitate public participation in Federal Resource Management; and to enhance the quality of the environment ad the resources of the public lands; [and] S. 1734, a bill to provide for comprehensive management of the nation's forest lands through the application of sound forest practices, and for other purposes.

Frank Church, subcommittee chairman.

Financial incentives for living kidney donors: are they necessary?

In the face of the perceived failure of altruistic organ donation programs to generate sufficient kidneys to meet demand, introducing financial incentives for living donors is sometimes argued as the only effective strategy by which lives currently lost while awaiting kidney transplantation might be saved. This argument from life-saving necessity is implicit in many incentive proposals, but rarely challenged by opponents. The core empirical claims on which it rests are thus rarely interrogated: that the gap between supply of and demand for donor kidneys is large and growing, the current system cannot meet demand, and financial incentives would increase the overall supply of kidneys and thus save lives. We consider these claims in the context of the United States. While we acknowledge the plausibility of claims that incentives, if sufficiently large, may successfully recruit greater numbers of living donors, we argue that strategies compatible with the existing altruistic system may also increase the supply of kidneys and save lives otherwise lost to kidney failure. We conclude that current appeals to the life-saving necessity argument have yet to establish sufficient grounds to justify trials of incentives.

Risk, regulation, and financial incentives for living kidney donation

In his comprehensive review of the hazards of existing,largely unregulated markets in human kidneys, Koplin(2014) argues that advocates of regulated markets mayunderestimate the potential physical, psychosocial andfinancial harms risked by vendors. He acknowledges, however,that market proponents will likely be undeterred incalling for “trials” or “pilot studies” of financial incentivesin developed countries on the grounds that the experienceof international black markets is of limited predictive valuein anticipating the outcomes of regulated markets. We contendthat there is good evidence to support the concernthat living vendors would be at higher risk of adversehealth outcomes compared to altruistic donors in the contextof a regulated market. This has important implicationsnot only for the informed consent of prospective vendors,but also for the potential regulations that would berequired to mitigate these risks. We argue here that pilotstudies would be at the very least premature until suchtime as market proponents have sufficiently engaged withpotential harms to prospective kidney vendors.

A systematic review of organizational workplace wellness programs and their financial and nonfinancial incentives

Workplace wellness programs have revealed immense beneficial results for both the employer and employee. Examples of results include decrease in absenteeism, turnover rate, medical claims and increases in employee satisfaction, productivity, and return on investment. However, the approach taken when implementing requires greater attention since such programs and the financial and/or non-financial incentives chosen have shown to significantly impact employee participation thus the amount of savings the organization experiences. A systematic review was conducted to evaluate the overall effectiveness of workplace wellness programs on employee health status and lifestyle change, recognize the majority types of returns observed by such programs, and identify whether financial or non-financial incentives created a greater effect on the employee. Overall employee health status improvement occurred when participating in wellness programs. The dominant indirect benefit for the organization was employee weight loss leading to a decrease in absenteeism and direct benefits included decreases in medical claims and increases in return on investment. In general, factors such as rate of participation and health status changes were most influenced when a financial incentives was provided in the wellness program. The basis of providing a program with effective incentives resides from efforts made by the employer and their efforts to play a role on every level of the organization regarding planning, implementing, and strategizing the most optimal approach for creating changes for the employees' wellbeing and productivity, thus the organizations overall returns.^

Motivating construction organisations through incentives : a case study for client-side project managers

Client-side project managers face challenges in motivating project organisations to pursue exceptional design and construction performance. One approach to improving the motivation of project organisations is by offering a financial incentive reward for the achievement of voluntary performance standards above the minimum required standard. However, little investigation has been undertaken into the features of a successful incentive system as a part of an overall procurement strategy. In response to a lack of information available to client-side project managers tasked with the initial design of an incentive system, the paper explores motivation under a successful incentive and identifies key learnings for client-side project managers to consider when designing incentives. Our findings are based on the results of a large Australian case study which is interpreted against a conceptual framework based on both economic and psychological perspectives of motivation. The results suggest that motivation towards incentive goals is influenced by the value the project organisations place on the incentive reward as a commercial opportunity to increase their profit margins. However, perhaps more important are the relationship management processes that promote commitment to the project; and pride in the achievement of project goals. In the case study, these processes intensified the direct motivational effect of the incentive reward on offer. The findings also highlight the importance of ensuring that incentive goals and performance measurement processes remain relevant to the organisations throughout a project to continuously encourage motivation under changing project conditions.