Financial incentives in academia: research versus development

This paper investigates the effects of monetary rewards on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable to obtain innovative ideas. We analyse how the legal environment affects the allocation of researcher's time between research and development. Although technology transfer objectives reduce the time spent in research, they might also induce researchers to conduct research that is more basic in nature, contrary to what the skewing problem would presage. We also show that our results hold even if development delays publication.

Do Financial Incentives Affect Firms' Demand For Disabled Workers?

A number of OECD countries aim to encourage work integration of disabled persons using quota policies. For instance, Austrian firms must provide at least one job to a disabled worker per 25 nondisabled workers and are subject to a tax if they do not. This "threshold design" provides causal estimates of the noncompliance tax on disabled employment if firms do not manipulate nondisabled employment; a lower and upper bound on the causal effect can be constructed if they do. Results indicate that firms with 25 nondisabled workers employ about 0.04 (or 12%) more disabled workers than without the tax; firms do manipulate employment of nondisabled workers but the lower bound on the employment effect of the quota remains positive; employment effects are stronger in low-wage firms than in high-wage firms; and firms subject to the quota of two disabled workers or more hire 0.08 more disabled workers per additional quota job. Moreover, increasing the noncompliance tax increases excess disabled employment, whereas paying a bonus to overcomplying firms slightly dampens the employment effects of the tax.

Management practices on public lands: hearings, Ninety-second Congress, first [and second] session[s], on S. 350, a bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to Institute Programs designed to reforest and restore the quality of public and private forest lands; to enhance and expand recreational opportunity on such lands; to provide financial incentives to improve management of state and private forest lands; to establish a federal forest lands management fund; to facilitate public participation in Federal Resource Management; and to enhance the quality of the environment ad the resources of the public lands; [and] S. 1734, a bill to provide for comprehensive management of the nation's forest lands through the application of sound forest practices, and for other purposes.

Frank Church, subcommittee chairman.

A systematic review of organizational workplace wellness programs and their financial and nonfinancial incentives

Workplace wellness programs have revealed immense beneficial results for both the employer and employee. Examples of results include decrease in absenteeism, turnover rate, medical claims and increases in employee satisfaction, productivity, and return on investment. However, the approach taken when implementing requires greater attention since such programs and the financial and/or non-financial incentives chosen have shown to significantly impact employee participation thus the amount of savings the organization experiences. A systematic review was conducted to evaluate the overall effectiveness of workplace wellness programs on employee health status and lifestyle change, recognize the majority types of returns observed by such programs, and identify whether financial or non-financial incentives created a greater effect on the employee. Overall employee health status improvement occurred when participating in wellness programs. The dominant indirect benefit for the organization was employee weight loss leading to a decrease in absenteeism and direct benefits included decreases in medical claims and increases in return on investment. In general, factors such as rate of participation and health status changes were most influenced when a financial incentives was provided in the wellness program. The basis of providing a program with effective incentives resides from efforts made by the employer and their efforts to play a role on every level of the organization regarding planning, implementing, and strategizing the most optimal approach for creating changes for the employees' wellbeing and productivity, thus the organizations overall returns.^

Single mothers and incentives to work: The French experience

This paper analyzes the effect of the 1998 reform of the French single parents allowanceon the labor supply of single mothers with very young children. The reform aimed atencouraging participation by allowing eligible single parents to accumulate benefits andlabor earnings for a limited period of time. Using data from the French EmploymentSurvey, the analysis shows that single mothers affected by the reform had experienced asignificant increase in their employment rate four years after the reform wasimplemented. During the same period, the employment rate of married mothers withyoung children did not experience a significant change, suggesting that at least part ofthe increase was a consequence of the reform. These results provide some evidence thatbenefit schedules that provide financial incentives to work can have significant effectsin getting single moms back to work, even in the presence of very young children.

Chronic disease management: a qualitative study investigating the barriers, facilitators and incentives perceived by Swiss healthcare stakeholders.

BACKGROUND: Chronic disease management has been implemented for some time in several countries to tackle the increasing burden of chronic diseases. While Switzerland faces the same challenge, such initiatives have only emerged recently in this country. The aim of this study is to assess their feasibility, in terms of barriers, facilitators and incentives to participation. METHODS: To meet our aim, we used qualitative methods involving the collection of opinions of various healthcare stakeholders, by means of 5 focus groups and 33 individual interviews. All the data were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Thematic analysis was then performed and five levels were determined to categorize the data: political, financial, organisational/ structural, professionals and patients. RESULTS: Our results show that, at each level, stakeholders share common opinions towards the feasibility of chronic disease management in Switzerland. They mainly mention barriers linked to the federalist political organization as well as to financing such programs. They also envision difficulties to motivate both patients and healthcare professionals to participate. Nevertheless, their favourable attitudes towards chronic disease management as well as the fact that they are convinced that Switzerland possesses all the resources (financial, structural and human) to develop such programs constitute important facilitators. The implementation of quality and financial incentives could also foster the participation of the actors. CONCLUSIONS: Even if healthcare stakeholders do not have the same role and interest regarding chronic diseases, they express similar opinions on the development of chronic disease management in Switzerland. Their overall positive attitude shows that it could be further implemented if political, financial and organisational barriers are overcome and if incentives are found to face the scepticism and non-motivation of some stakeholders.

Are local economic development incentives promoting job growth? An empirical case study

At a time when cities are competing with one another to attract or retain jobs within a globalizing economy, city governments are providing an array of financial incentives to stimulate job growth and retain existing jobs, particularly in high cost locations. This paper provides the first systematic and comprehensive analysis of datasets on economic development incentives in New York City over the last fifteen years. The evidence on job retention and creation is mixed. Although many companies do not meet their agreed-upon job targets in absolute terms, the evidence suggests that companies receiving subsidies outperform their respective industries in terms of employment growth, that is, the grow more, or decline less. We emphasize that this finding is difficult to interpret, since firms receiving incentives may not be representative of the industry as a whole. In other words, their above-average performance may simply reflect the fact that the Economic Development Corporation (EDC) selects economically promising companies within manufacturing (or other industries) when granting incentives. At the same time, it is also possible that receiving incentives helps these companies to become stronger.

Financial impact of the Medicare prospective payment system on long term acute care hospitals

Objective. Long Term Acute Care Hospitals (LTACs) are subject to Medicare rules because they accept Medicare and Medicaid patients. In October 2002, Medicare changed the LTAC reimbursement formulas, from a cost basis system to a Prospective Payment System (PPS). This study examines whether the PPS has negatively affected the financial performance of the LTAC hospitals in the period following the reimbursement change (2003-2006), as compared to the period prior to the change (1999-2003), and if so, to what extent. This study will also examine whether the PPS has resulted in a decreased average patient length of stay (LOS) in the LTAC hospitals for the period of 2003-2006 as compared to the prior period of 1999-2003, and if so, to what extent. ^ Methods. The study group consists of two large LTAC hospital systems, Kindred Healthcare Inc. and Select Specialty Hospitals of Select Medical Corporation. Financial data and operational indicators were reviewed, tabulated and dichotomized into two groups, covering the two periods: 1999-2002 and 2003-2006. The financial data included net annual revenues, net income, revenue per patient per day and profit margins. It was hypothesized that the profit margins for the LTAC hospitals were reduced because of the new PPS. Operational indicators, such as annual admissions, annual patient days, and average LOS were analyzed. It was hypothesized that LOS for the LTAC hospitals would have decreased. Case mix index, defined as the weighted average of patients’ DRGs for each hospital system, was not available to cast more light on the direction of LOS. ^ Results. This assessment found that the negative financial impacts did not materialize; instead, financial performance improved during the PPS period (2003-2006). The income margin percentage under the PPS increased for Kindred by 24%, and for Select by 77%. Thus, the study’s working hypothesis of reduced income margins for the LTACs under the PPS was contradicted. As to the average patient length of stay, LOS decreased from 34.7 days to 29.4 days for Kindred, and from 30.5 days to 25.3 days for Select. Thus, on the issue of LTAC shorter length of stay, the study’s working hypothesis was confirmed. ^ Conclusion. Overall, there was no negative financial effect on the LTAC hospitals during the period of 2003-2006 following Medicare implementation of the PPS in October 2002. On the contrary, the income margins improved significantly. ^ During the same period, LOS decreased following the implementation of the PPS. This was consistent with the LTAC hospitals’ pursuit of financial incentives.^

Financial impact of the Medicare prospective payment system on long term acute care hospitals

Objective. Long Term Acute Care Hospitals (LTACs) are subject to Medicare rules because they accept Medicare and Medicaid patients. In October 2002, Medicare changed the LTAC reimbursement formulas, from a cost basis system to a Prospective Payment System (PPS). This study examines whether the PPS has negatively affected the financial performance of the LTAC hospitals in the period following the reimbursement change (2003–2006), as compared to the period prior to the change (1999–2003), and if so, to what extent. This study will also examine whether the PPS has resulted in a decreased average patient length of stay (LOS) in the LTAC hospitals for the period of 2003–2006 as compared to the prior period of 1999-2003, and if so, to what extent. ^ Methods. The study group consists of two large LTAC hospital systems, Kindred Healthcare Inc. and Select Specialty Hospitals of Select Medical Corporation. Financial data and operational indicators were reviewed, tabulated and dichotomized into two groups, covering the two periods: 1999–2002 and 2003–2006. The financial data included net annual revenues, net income, revenue per patient per day and profit margins. It was hypothesized that the profit margins for the LTAC hospitals were reduced because of the new PPS. Operational indicators, such as annual admissions, annual patient days, and average LOS were analyzed. It was hypothesized that LOS for the LTAC hospitals would have decreased. Case mix index, defined as the weighted average of patients’ DRGs for each hospital system, was not available to cast more light on the direction of LOS. ^ Results. This assessment found that the negative financial impacts did not materialize; instead, financial performance improved during the PPS period (2003–2006). The income margin percentage under the PPS increased for Kindred by 24%, and for Select by 77%. Thus, the study’s working hypothesis of reduced income margins for the LTACs under the PPS was contradicted. As to the average patient length of stay, LOS decreased from 34.7 days to 29.4 days for Kindred, and from 30.5 days to 25.3 days for Select. Thus, on the issue of LTAC shorter length of stay, the study’s working hypothesis was confirmed. ^ Conclusion. Overall, there was no negative financial effect on the LTAC hospitals during the period of 2003–2006 following Medicare implementation of the PPS in October 2002. On the contrary, the income margins improved significantly. ^ During the same period, LOS decreased following the implementation of the PPS. This was consistent with the LTAC hospitals’ pursuit of financial incentives. ^

CEO compensation, option incentives and information disclosure

This paper examines the impact of information disclosure on the valuation of CEO options and the incentives created by those options. Prior executive compensation research in the US has made assumptions about key input variables that can affect the calculation of option values and financial incentives. Accordingly, biases may have ensued due to incomplete information disclosure about noncurrent option grants. Using new data on a sample of UK CEOs, we value executive option holdings and incentives for the first time and estimate the levels of distortion created by the less than complete US-style disclosure requirements. We also investigate the levels of distortion in the UK for the minority of companies that choose to reveal only partial information. Our results suggest that there have to date been few economic biases arising from less than complete information disclosure. Furthermore, we demonstrate that researchers using US data, who made reasonable assumptions about the inputs of noncurrent option grants, are unlikely to have made significant errors when calculating CEO financial incentives or option wealth. However, the recent downturn in the US stock market could result in the same assumptions, producing exaggerated incentive estimates in the future.

Essays on the Role of Government Incentives in the Private Provision of Social Goods

The economic rationale for public intervention into private markets through price mechanisms is twofold: to correct market failures and to redistribute resources. Financial incentives are one such price mechanism. In this dissertation, I specifically address the role of financial incentives in providing social goods in two separate contexts: a redistributive policy that enables low income working families to access affordable childcare in the US and an experimental pay-for-performance intervention to improve population health outcomes in rural India. In the first two papers, I investigate the effects of government incentives for providing grandchild care on grandmothers’ short- and long-term outcomes. In the third paper, coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato, and Marcos Vera-Hernandez, we use an experimental framework to consider the the effects of financial incentives in improving maternal and child health outcomes in the Indian state of Karnataka.

Grandmothers provide a significant amount of childcare in the US, but little is known about how this informal, and often uncompensated, time transfer impacts their economic and health outcomes. The first two chapters of this dissertation address the impact of federally funded, state-level means-tested programs that compensate grandparent-provided childcare on the retirement security of older women, an economically vulnerable group of considerable policy interest. I use the variation in the availability and generosity of childcare subsidies to model the effect of government payments for grandchild care on grandmothers’ time use, income, earnings, interfamily transfers, and health outcomes. After establishing that more generous government payments induce grandmothers to provide more hours of childcare, I find that grandmothers adjust their behavior by reducing their formal labor supply and earnings. Grandmothers make up for lost earnings by claiming Social Security earlier, increasing their reliance on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and reducing financial transfers to their children. While the policy does not appear to negatively impact grandmothers’ immediate economic well-being, there are significant costs to the state, in terms of both up-front costs for care payments and long-term costs as a result of grandmothers’ increased reliance on social insurance.

The final paper, The Role of Non-Cognitive Traits in Response to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial of Obstetrics Care Providers in India, is coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato and Marcos Vera-Hernandez. We report the results from “Improving Maternal and Child Health in India: Evaluating Demand and Supply Side Strategies” (IMACHINE), a randomized controlled experiment designed to test the effectiveness of supply-side incentives for private obstetrics care providers in rural Karnataka, India. In particular, the experimental design compares two different types of incentives: (1) those based on the quality of inputs providers offer their patients (inputs contracts) and (2) those based on the reduction of incidence of four adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (outcomes contracts). Along with studying the relative effectiveness of the different financial incentives, we also investigate the role of provider characteristics, preferences, expectations and non-cognitive traits in mitigating the effects of incentive contracts.

We find that both contract types input incentive contracts reduce rates of post-partum hemorrhage, the leading cause of maternal mortality in India by about 20%. We also find some evidence of multitasking as output incentive contract providers reduce the level of postnatal newborn care received by their patients. We find that patient health improvements in response to both contract types are concentrated among higher trained providers. We find improvements in patient care to be concentrated among the lower trained providers. Contrary to our expectations, we also find improvements in patient health to be concentrated among the most risk averse providers, while more patient providers respond relatively little to the incentives, and these difference are most evident in the outputs contract arm. The results are opposite for patient care outcomes; risk averse providers have significantly lower rates of patient care and more patient providers provide higher quality care in response to the outputs contract. We find evidence that overconfidence among providers about their expectations about possible improvements reduces the effectiveness of both types of incentive contracts for improving both patient outcomes and patient care. Finally, we find no heterogeneous response based on non-cognitive traits.

Economia social, pilar de um novo modelo de desenvolvimento económico sustentável

Dissertação apresentada ao Instituto Superior de Contabilidade para a obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Auditoria Orientada por Dr.ª Alcina Portugal Dias