Popper and his Commentators on the Discovery of Neptune: a close shave for the Law of Gravitation?

Knowledge of residual perturbations in the orbit of Uranus in the early 1840s did not lead to the refutation of Newton's law of gravitation but instead to the discovery of Neptune in 1846. Karl Popper asserts that this case is atypical of science and that the law of gravitation was at least prima facie falsified by these perturbations. I argue that these assertions are the product of a false, a priori methodological position I call, 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF). Further, on the evidence the law was not prima facie false and was not generally considered so by astronomers at the time. Many of Popper's commentators (Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend and others) presuppose WPF and their views on this case and its implications for scientific rationality and method suffer from this same defect.

Eternal recurrence in a Neo-Kantian context

In this essay, I argue that someone who adopted a falsificationism of the sort that I have attributed to Nietzsche would be attracted to the doctrine of eternal recurrence. For Nietzsche, to think the becoming revealed through the senses means falsifying it through being. But the eternal recurrence offers the possibility of thinking becoming without falsification. I then argue that someone who held Nietzsche's falsificationism would see in human agency a conflict between being and becoming similar to that in empirical judgment. In the light of this conflict only the eternal recurrence would offer the possibility of truly affirming life. I end by discussing how this reading of the eternal recurrence solves a number of puzzles that have bedeviled interpreters.

Popper e o convencionalismo

Pós-graduação em Filosofia - FFC