An investigation of pretend play, mental state terms and false belief understanding: In search of a metarepresentational link

The aim of this study was to investigate the association between false belief comprehension, the exhibition of pretend play and the use of mental state terms in pre-school children. Ferry children, aged between 36 and 54 months were videotaped engaging in free play with each parent. The exhibit-ion of six distinct acts of pretend play and the expression of 16 mental sr:ate terms were coded during play. Each child was also administered a pantomime task and three standard false belief casks. Reliable associations were also found between false belief performance and the pretence categories of object substitution and role assignment, and the exhibition of imaginary object pantomimes. Moreover, the use of mental state terms was positively correlated with false belief and the pretence categories of object substitution, imaginary play and role assignment, and negatively correlated with the exhibition of body part object pantomimes. These findings indicate that the development of a mental state lexicon and some, bur not all, components of pretend play are dependent on the capacity for metarepresentational cognition.

Drawing insight from pictures: The development of concepts of false drawing and false belief in children with deafness, normal hearing, and autism

Theory-of-mind concepts in children with deafness, autism, and normal development (N = 154) were examined in three experiments using a set of standard inferential false-belief tasks and matched sets of tasks involving false drawings. Results of all three experiments replicated previously published findings by showing that primary school children with deafness or autism, aged 6 to 13 years, scored significantly lower than normal-developing 4-year-old preschoolers on standard misleading-container and unseen-change tests of false-belief understanding. Furthermore, deaf and autistic children generally scored higher on drawing-based tests than on corresponding standard tests and, on the most challenging of the false-drawing tests in Experiment 2, they significantly outperformed the normal-developing preschoolers by clearly understanding their own false intentions and another person's false beliefs about an actively misleading drawing. In Experiment 3, preschoolers; outperformed older deaf and autistic children on standard tasks, but did less well on a task that required the drawing of a false belief. Methodological factors could not fully explain the findings, but early social and conversational experiences in the family were deemed likely contributors.

There must be more to development of mindreading and metacognition than passing false belief tasks

We argue that while it is a valuable contribution, Carruthers' Model may be too restrictive to elaborate our understanding of the development of mindreading and metacognition, or to enrich our knowledge of individual differences and psychopathology. To illustrate, we describe pertinent examples where there may be a critical interplay between primitive social-cognitive processes and emerging self-attributions.

Mind and body: Concepts of human cognition, physiology and false belief in children with autism or typical development

This study examined theory of mind (ToM) and concepts of human biology (eyes, heart, brain, lungs and mind) in a sample of 67 children, including 25 high functioning children with autism (age 6-13), plus age-matched and preschool comparison groups. Contrary to Baron-Cohen [1989, Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 19(4), 579-600], most children with autism correctly understood the functions of the brain (84%) and the mind (64%). Their explanations were predominantly mentalistic. They outperformed typically developing preschoolers in understanding inner physiological (heart, lungs) and cognitive (brain, mind) systems, and scored as high as age-matched typical children. Yet, in line with much previous ToM research, most children with autism (60%) failed false belief, and their ToM performance was unrelated to their understanding of. human biology. Results were discussed in relation to neurobiological and social-experiential accounts of the ToM deficit in autism.

Resting state morphology predicts the effect of theta burst stimulation in false belief reasoning:ventrolateral prefrontal cortex in false belief reasoning

When required to represent a perspective that conflicts with one's own, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) suggests that the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (rvlPFC) supports the inhibition of that conflicting self-perspective. The present task dissociated inhibition of self-perspective from other executive control processes by contrasting belief reasoning-a cognitive state where the presence of conflicting perspectives was manipulated-with a conative desire state wherein no systematic conflict existed. Linear modeling was used to examine the effect of continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) to rvlPFC on participants' reaction times in belief and desire reasoning. It was anticipated that cTBS applied to rvlPFC would affect belief but not desire reasoning, by modulating activity in the Ventral Attention System (VAS). We further anticipated that this effect would be mediated by functional connectivity within this network, which was identified using resting state fMRI and an unbiased model-free approach. Simple reaction-time analysis failed to detect an effect of cTBS. However, by additionally modeling individual measures from within the stimulated network, the hypothesized effect of cTBS to belief (but, importantly, not desire) reasoning was demonstrated. Structural morphology within the stimulated region, rvlPFC, and right temporoparietal junction were demonstrated to underlie this effect. These data provide evidence that inconsistencies found with cTBS can be mediated by the composition of the functional network that is being stimulated. We suggest that the common claim that this network constitutes the VAS explains the effect of cTBS to this network on false belief reasoning. Hum Brain Mapp, 2016. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Error analyses reveal contrasting deficits in “theory of mind”: neuropsychological evidence from a 3-option false belief task

Perspective taking is a crucial ability that guides our social interactions. In this study, we show how the specific patterns of errors of brain-damaged patients in perspective taking tasks can help us further understand the factors contributing to perspective taking abilities. Previous work (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004; Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005) distinguished two components of perspective taking: the ability to inhibit our own perspective and the ability to infer someone else’s perspective. We assessed these components using a new nonverbal false belief task which provided different response options to detect three types of response strategies that participants might be using: a complete and spared belief reasoning strategy, a reality-based response selection strategy in which participants respond from their own perspective, and a simplified mentalising strategy in which participants avoid responding from their own perspective but rely on inaccurate cues to infer the other person’s belief. One patient, with a self-perspective inhibition deficit, almost always used the reality-based response strategy; in contrast, the other patient, with a deficit in taking other perspectives, tended to use the simplified mentalising strategy without necessarily transposing her own perspective. We discuss the extent to which the pattern of performance of both patients could relate to their executive function deficit and how it can inform us on the cognitive and neural components involved in belief reasoning.

Children’s reasoning about other’s intentions: False-belief and counterfactual conditional inferences

Dados suplementares associados com o artigo e epígrafe estão disponíveis em: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.08.007

Developmental Readiness in the Understanding of Own and Other’s False Beliefs

One of the most important milestones in the development of theory of mind is the understanding of false beliefs. This study compares children’s understanding of representational change and others’ false beliefs and evaluates the effectiveness of an appearance-reality training for improving children’s false belief understanding. A total of 78 children ranging in age from 41 to 47 months were trained in three sessions and evaluated in a pretest and in a posttest. The results show that for children it is easier to understand representational change than false beliefs in others, and that the improvement after training was greater when starting from a higher score in the pretest. The implications of this for training in false belief understanding are discussed

Multiple roles for executive control in belief-desire reasoning:distinct neural networks are recruited for self perspective inhibition and complexity of reasoning

Belief-desire reasoning is a core component of 'Theory of Mind' (ToM), which can be used to explain and predict the behaviour of agents. Neuroimaging studies reliably identify a network of brain regions comprising a 'standard' network for ToM, including temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex. Whilst considerable experimental evidence suggests that executive control (EC) may support a functioning ToM, co-ordination of neural systems for ToM and EC is poorly understood. We report here use of a novel task in which psychologically relevant ToM parameters (true versus false belief; approach versus avoidance desire) were manipulated orthogonally. The valence of these parameters not only modulated brain activity in the 'standard' ToM network but also in EC regions. Varying the valence of both beliefs and desires recruits anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting a shared inhibitory component associated with negatively valenced mental state concepts. Varying the valence of beliefs additionally draws on ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, reflecting the need to inhibit self perspective. These data provide the first evidence that separate functional and neural systems for EC may be recruited in the service of different aspects of ToM.

Children's understanding of pictorial and mental representations

Two studies demonstrate dissociation between children's understanding of pictorial representations (photos and drawings) and mental representations (beliefs). In Study 1, 37 preschoolers were tested on false belief, appearance-reality, false photo, and false drawing tasks. The false picture tasks were significantly easier, and no correlation was found between children's performances on false belief and false picture tasks. Ln Study 2, 30 children who failed a false belief pretest were randomly assigned to 3 training groups: Belief (trained on false belief tasks), Picture (trained on false picture tasks), or Control (trained on number conservation tasks). Training was conducted in 2 sessions over the course of 2 weeks, tasks were presented and feedback was provided. All children were posttested on theory of mind tasks, false picture tasks, and a number conservation task. The posttest results showed differential patterns of performance, with the Belief group scoring highest on the theory of mind posttests, the Picture group scoring highest on the false picture posttests, and the Control group scoring highest on the number conservation posttest. Results are discussed with respect to competing models of theory of mind development.

Social cognition, language acquisition and the development of the theory of mind

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the cognitive achievement that enables us to report our propositional attitudes, to attribute such attitudes to others, and to use such postulated or observed mental states in the prediction and explanation of behavior. Most normally developing children acquire ToM between the ages of 3 and 5 years, but serious delays beyond this chronological and mental age have been observed in children with autism, as well is in those with severe sensory impairments. We examine data from Studies of ToM in normally developing children and those with deafness, blindness, autism and Williams syndrome, as well as data from lower primates, in a search for answers to key theoretical questions concerning the origins, nature and representation of knowledge about the mind. In answer to these, we offer a framework according to which ToM is jointly dependent upon language and social experience, and is produced by a conjunction of language acquisition with children's growing social understanding, acquired through conversation and interaction with others. We argue that adequate language and adequate social skills are jointly causally sufficient, and individually causally necessary, for producing ToM. Thus our account supports a social developmental theory of the genesis of human cognition, inspired by the work of Sellars and Vygotsky.

Theory of mind and peer acceptance in preschool children

Two studies tested the hypothesis that preschool children's theory of mind ability is related to their levels of peer acceptance. In Study 1, 78 children between the ages of 4 and 6 provided peer nominations that allowed determination of social preference and social impact scores, and classification in one of five peer status groups (following Coie & Dodge, 1983). Children were also tested on five different theory of mind tasks. The results showed that theory of mind scores were significantly related to social preference scores in a subsample of children who were over 5 years old. Further, popular children were found to score higher on theory of mind tasks than children classified as rejected. Study 2 replicated and extended the first study with a new sample of 87 4- to 6-year-old children. Study 2 included measures of peer acceptance, theory of mind ability and verbal intelligence, as well as teacher ratings of prosocial and aggressive behaviours. The results of Study 2 showed that for the total group of children, prosocial behaviour was the best predictor of social preference scores. When the Study 2 sample was split into older and younger children, theory of mind ability was found to be the best predictor of social preference scores for the older children (over age 5), while aggressive and prosocial behaviours were the best predictors of peer acceptance in the younger children. Overall, the pattern of results suggests that the impact of theory of mind ability on peer acceptance is modest but increases with children's age.

Opening windows into the mind: mothers' preferences for mental state explanations and children's theory of mind

A new questionnaire, the Maternal Mental State Input Inventory (MMSII) was created to measure mothers' preferences for introducing and elaborating on mental states in conversation with their young children. In two studies, the questionnaire was given to mothers of young children, and the children's theory of mind (ToM) development was assessed with standard tasks. In both studies, the questionnaire exhibited good internal reliability, and significant correlations emerged between mothers' self-reported preferences for elaborated, explanatory talk about the mental states and children's theory of mind performance. Further, mothers' conversational preferences, as measured by the MMSII, were the best predictors of children's theory of mind development when relevant control variables were included in the analyses. These results converge with naturalistic observational research that has demonstrated links between mothers' conversational styles and their children's theory of mind. They go further in suggesting that mothers' tendencies toward elaborated, explanatory talk about a range of mental states is particularly beneficial to children's theory of mind development. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Modelling an e-learning environment for learning programming languages

It is widely accepted that solving programming exercises is fundamental to learn how to program. Nevertheless, solving exercises is only effective if students receive an assessment on their work. An exercise solved wrong will consolidate a false belief, and without feedback many students will not be able to overcome their difficulties. However, creating, managing and accessing a large number of exercises, covering all the points in the curricula of a programming course, in classes with large number of students, can be a daunting task without the appropriated tools working in unison. This involves a diversity of tools, from the environments where programs are coded, to automatic program evaluators providing feedback on the attempts of students, passing through the authoring, management and sequencing of programming exercises as learning objects. We believe that the integration of these tools will have a great impact in acquiring programming skills. Our research objective is to manage and coordinate a network of eLearning systems where students can solve computer programming exercises. Networks of this kind include systems such as learning management systems (LMS), evaluation engines (EE), learning objects repositories (LOR) and exercise resolution environments (ERE). Our strategy to achieve the interoperability among these tools is based on a shared definition of programming exercise as a Learning Object (LO).