986 resultados para FOREIGN TRADE POLICY
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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DU1 .I5 1936 vol. 13, no. 5 with : Business and government under the National Recovery Administration / Theodore J. Kreps. New York : American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936. Bound together subsequent to publication.
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Incluye Bibliografía
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Incluye Bibliografía
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CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 82 S161-11
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We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.
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This work presents a fully operational interstate CGE model implemented for the Brazilian economy that tries to quantify both the role of barriers to trade on economic growth and foreign trade performance and how the distribution of the economic activity may change as the country opens up to foreign trade. Among the distinctive features embedded in the model, modeling of external scale economies, port efficiency and land-maritime transport costs provides an innovative way of dealing explicitly with theoretical issues related to integrated regional systems. In order to illustrate the role played by the quality of infrastructure and geography on the country‟s foreign and interregional trade performance, a set of simulations is presented where barriers to trade are significantly reduced. The relative importance of trade policy, port efficiency and land-maritime transport costs for the country trade relations and regional growth is then detailed and quantified, considering both short run as well as long run scenarios. A final set of simulations shed some light on the effects of liberal trade policies on regional inequality, where the manufacturing sector in the state of São Paulo, taken as the core of industrial activity in the country, is subjected to different levels of external economies of scale. Short-run core-periphery effects are then traced out suggesting the prevalence of agglomeration forces over diversion forces could rather exacerbate regional inequality as import barriers are removed up to a certain level. Further removals can reverse this balance in favor of diversion forces, implying de-concentration of economic activity. In the long run, factor mobility allows a better characterization of the balance between agglomeration and diversion forces among regions. Regional dispersion effects are then clearly traced-out, suggesting horizontal liberal trade policies to benefit both the poorest regions in the country as well as the state of São Paulo. This long run dispersion pattern, on one hand seems to unravel the fragility of simple theoretical results from recent New Economic Geography models, once they get confronted with more complex spatially heterogeneous (real) systems. On the other hand, it seems to capture the literature‟s main insight: the possible role of horizontal liberal trade policies as diversion forces leading to a more homogeneous pattern of interregional economic growth.
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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In the last two decades, trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection. Economists have argued convincingly that this is partly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping during the GATT Tokyo Round. The introduction of the cost- based dumping definition gives regulating authorities a better opportunity to choose protection according to their liking. This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification (i.e., auditing) and, in case misreporting is detected, to set penalty duties. We show that depending on the concrete assumptions, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeeds in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. In this case, the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO does not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome the informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.
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This paper aims to explain the historical development of Australia's foreign economic policy by using an analytical framework called a 'state-society coalition' approach. This approach focuses on virtual coalitions of state and society actors that share 'belief systems' and hold similar policy ideas, goals and preferences, as basic units (policy subsystems) of policy making. Major policy changes occur when a dominant coalition is replaced by another. The paper argues that, in Australia, there have been three major state-society coalitions in the foreign economic policy issue area: 'protectionists', 'trade liberalisers' and 'optional bilateralists'. The rise and fall of these coalitions resulted in distinctive shifts of Australia's foreign economic policy in the 1980s towards unilateral and multilateral liberalisation and in the late 1990s towards bilateral trade and investment arrangements.
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In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes disbursement or levy method so that the reaction function of home firm approaches infinitely close to that of foreign firm. In the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, Eaton and Grossman[1986] showed that export tax is preferable to export subsidy. In this paper, it is shown that export subsidy is preferable to export tax in some cases in the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, considering the uncertainty in demand. Historically, many economists mentioned non-linear subsidy or tax. However, optimum solution of it has not yet been shown. The optimum solution is shown in this paper.