Eyewitness testimony

Eyewitnesses have always played a fundamental role in the legal process. However, eyewitness evidence is not always as reliable or as accurate as one might hope, given the weight that decision-makers often ascribe to it. In this article, we review some of the many factors that can determine the reliability of witness testimony, including factors that are, and those that are not, within the control of investigative and judicial processes. In doing so, we consider how policies might assist in ensuring that witness testimony can play the most effective and informative role in the legal process as possible.

Can fabricated evidence induce false eyewitness testimony?

False information can influence people's beliefs and memories. But can fabricated evidence induce individuals to accuse another person of doing something they never did? We examined whether exposure to a fabricated video could produce false eyewitness testimony. Subjects completed a gambling task alongside a confederate subject, and later we falsely told subjects that their partner had cheated on the task. Some subjects viewed a digitally manipulated video of their partner cheating; some were told that video evidence of the cheating exists; and others were not told anything about video evidence. Subjects were asked to sign a statement confirming that they witnessed the incident and that their corroboration could be used in disciplinary action against the accused. See-video subjects were three times more likely to sign the statement than Told-video and Control subjects. Fabricated evidence may, indeed, produce false eyewitness testimony; we discuss probable cognitive mechanisms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Effects of inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony on mock-juror decision-making

In attempting to impeach eyewitnesses, attorneys often highlight inconsistencies in the eyewitness's recall. This study examined the differential impact of types of inconsistent testimony on mock-juror decisions. Each of 100 community members and 200 undergraduates viewed one of four versions of a videotaped trial in which the primary evidence against the defendant was the testimony of the eyewitness. I manipulated the types of inconsistent statements given by the eyewitness in the four versions: (1) consistent testimony, (2) information given on-the-stand but not given during the pre-trial investigation, (3) contradictions between on-the-stand and pre-trial statements, and (4) contradictions made on the witness stand. Subjects exposed to any form of inconsistent testimony were less likely to convict and found the defendant less culpable and the eyewitness less effective. These effects were larger for contradictions than for information given on the stand but not during pre-trial investigations. ^

Effects of inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony on mock-juror decisionmaking

In attempting to impeach eyewitnesses, attorney's often highlight inconsistencies in the eyewitness's recall. This study examined the differential impact of types of inconsistent testimony on mock-juror decisions. Each of 100 community members and 200 undergraduates viewed one of four versions of a videotaped trial in which the primary evidence against the defendant was the testimony of the eyewitness. I manipulated the types of inconsistent statements given by the eyewitness in the four versions: (1) consistent testimony, (2) information given on-the-stand but not given during the pre-trial investigation, (3) contradictions between on-the-stand and pre-trial statements, and (4) contradictions made on the witness stand. Subjects exposed to any form of inconsistent testimony were less likely to convict and found the defendant less culpable and the eyewitness less effective. These effects were larger for contradictions than for information given on the stand but not during pre-trial investigations.

A theoretical analysis of eyewitness identification: Dual -process theory, signal detection theory and eyewitness confidence

Given the growing number of wrongful convictions involving faulty eyewitness evidence and the strong reliance by jurors on eyewitness testimony, researchers have sought to develop safeguards to decrease erroneous identifications. While decades of eyewitness research have led to numerous recommendations for the collection of eyewitness evidence, less is known regarding the psychological processes that govern identification responses. The purpose of the current research was to expand the theoretical knowledge of eyewitness identification decisions by exploring two separate memory theories: signal detection theory and dual-process theory. This was accomplished by examining both system and estimator variables in the context of a novel lineup recognition paradigm. Both theories were also examined in conjunction with confidence to determine whether it might add significantly to the understanding of eyewitness memory. ^ In two separate experiments, both an encoding and a retrieval-based manipulation were chosen to examine the application of theory to eyewitness identification decisions. Dual-process estimates were measured through the use of remember-know judgments (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). In Experiment 1, the effects of divided attention and lineup presentation format (simultaneous vs. sequential) were examined. In Experiment 2, perceptual distance and lineup response deadline were examined. Overall, the results indicated that discrimination and remember judgments (recollection) were generally affected by variations in encoding quality and response criterion and know judgments (familiarity) were generally affected by variations in retrieval options. Specifically, as encoding quality improved, discrimination ability and judgments of recollection increased; and as the retrieval task became more difficult there was a shift toward lenient choosing and more reliance on familiarity. ^ The application of signal detection theory and dual-process theory in the current experiments produced predictable results on both system and estimator variables. These theories were also compared to measures of general confidence, calibration, and diagnosticity. The application of the additional confidence measures in conjunction with signal detection theory and dual-process theory gave a more in-depth explanation than either theory alone. Therefore, the general conclusion is that eyewitness identifications can be understood in a more complete manor by applying theory and examining confidence. Future directions and policy implications are discussed. ^

Conversational influences on young children's responses to misleading questions

The present study investigated the degree to which young children's suggestible responses were related to their pragmatic language ability. In Experiment 1, forty-seven 5- and 6-year-olds were read a short picture story followed the next day by a postevent synopsis that included both consistent and misleading details about the original story. Six days later, a suggestibility effect was evident with responses to questions about the details that had been misled being less accurate than to those about details not misled. Although age significantly correlated with this effect, the relationship was not significant after controlling for the children's pragmatic language ability. The procedure in Experiment 2 was identical with the exception that the thirty-nine 5- and 6-year-olds were questioned in a format that made explicit the intended reference point of the interrogation. A suggestibility effect was now not evident nor was accuracy related to age. Taken together, these results support the position that young children's suggestibility requires a consideration not only in terms of suggestible memories but also in terms of suggestible responses that can result from incorrectly interpreting the intended message of an experimenter's questions. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.

An Investigation of the Role of Attention in the Cross-Race Effect: An Ecological Approach

The current set of studies was conducted to examine the cross-race effect (CRE), a phenomenon commonly found in the face perception literature. The CRE is evident when participants display better own-race face recognition accuracy than other-race recognition accuracy (e.g. Ackerman et al., 2006). Typically the cross-race effect is attributed to perceptual expertise, (i.e., other-race faces are processed less holistically; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung & Caldara, 2006), and the social cognitive model (i.e., other-race faces are processed at the categorical level by virtue of being an out-group member; Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010). These effects may be mediated by differential attention. I investigated whether other-race faces are disregarded and, consequently, not remembered as accurately as own-race (in-group) faces. In Experiment 1, I examined how the magnitude of the CRE differed when participants learned individual faces sequentially versus when they learned multiple faces simultaneously in arrays comprising faces and objects. I also examined how the CRE differed when participants recognized individual faces presented sequentially versus in arrays of eight faces. Participants’ recognition accuracy was better for own-race faces than other-race faces regardless of familiarization method. However, the difference between own- and other-race accuracy was larger when faces were familiarized sequentially in comparison to familiarization with arrays. Participants’ response patterns during testing differed depending on the combination of familiarization and testing method. Participants had more false alarms for other-race faces than own-race faces if they learned faces sequentially (regardless of testing strategy); if participants learned faces in arrays, they had more false alarms for other-race faces than own-races faces if ii i they were tested with sequentially presented faces. These results are consistent with the perceptual expertise model in that participants were better able to use the full two seconds in the sequential task for own-race faces, but not for other-race faces. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine participants’ attentional allocation in complex scenes. Participants were shown scenes comprising people in real places, but the head stimuli used in Experiment 1 were superimposed onto the bodies in each scene. Using a Tobii eyetracker, participants’ looking time for both own- and other-race faces was evaluated to determine whether participants looked longer at own-race faces and whether individual differences in looking time correlated with individual differences in recognition accuracy. The results of this experiment demonstrated that although own-race faces were preferentially attended to in comparison to other-race faces, individual differences in looking time biases towards own-race faces did not correlate with individual differences in own-race recognition advantages. These results are also consistent with perceptual expertise, as it seems that the role of attentional biases towards own-race faces is independent of the cognitive processing that occurs for own-race faces. All together, these results have implications for face perception tasks that are performed in the lab, how accurate people may be when remembering faces in the real world, and the accuracy and patterns of errors in eyewitness testimony.

Does expert psychological testimony improve juror sensitivity to lineup suggestiveness?

Previous research has examined the validity of behavioral assumptions underlying the presumed effectiveness of safeguards against erroneous conviction resulting from mistaken eyewitness identification. In keeping with this agenda, this study examined juror sensitivity to lineup suggestiveness in the form of foil, instruction, and presentation biases and whether expert psychological testimony further sensitizes jurors to the factors that influence the likelihood of false identifications. One hundred and sixty jury eligible citizens watched versions of a videotaped trial that included information about the identification of the defendant by an eyewitness and that varied the suggestiveness of the eyewitness identification procedure. In addition, half of the mock-jurors heard the testimony of an expert psychologist regarding the factors that influence lineup suggestiveness. Mock-jurors rendered individual verdicts, rated the defendant's culpability and the suggestiveness and fairness of the identification procedure. Results indicated that jurors are somewhat sensitive to foil bias but are insensitive to instruction and presentation biases. No evidence was found to suggest that expert testimony leads to juror skepticism or juror sensitization. These results question the effectiveness of cross-examination and expert testimony as safeguards against erroneous convictions resulting from mistaken identification. ^

The National Institute of Justice guide for eyewitness identification evidence: Can it improve juror decision-making?

Mistaken eyewitness identifications of innocent lead to more false convictions in the United States than any other cause. In response to concerns about the reliability of eyewitness evidence, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in 1999 published a Guide for the gathering and preservation of eyewitness evidence by law enforcement personnel. Previous research has shown that eyewitness identifications are more accurate when obtained using procedures recommended in the NIJ Guide. This experiment assessed whether informing jurors about the Guide can improve their ability to discriminate between eyewitness identifications likely to be accurate and those likely to be inaccurate and, if so, how to most effectively provide jurors with such information. ^ Seven hundred sixteen U.S. citizens who reported for criminal jury duty participated. Half of the participant jurors read a summary of an armed robbery trial in which the police followed the NIJ Guide when obtaining an eyewitness identification of the defendant. The other half read about an identical case in which the police did not follow the Guide. Jurors received information about the Guide from a court-appointed expert witness, one of the attorneys in the case, the trial judge, the judge in combination with one of the attorneys, or from no one (in the control groups). Jurors then rendered a verdict in the case and answered questions about the evidence in the case. ^ When an expert witness or the judge (either alone or in combination with one of the attorneys) informed jurors about the Guide, the jurors voted to convict defendants likely to be guilty and to acquit defendants likely to be innocent more often than did uninformed jurors assigned to a control group. These data suggest that informing jurors about the NIJ Guide using expert testimony or instructions from a judge will improve the quality and accuracy of jurors' verdict decisions in cases involving eyewitness identification evidence. However, more research is needed to determine whether the judge will remain an effective source of information about the Guide in a longer, more detailed trial scenario and to learn more about the underlying psychological processes governing the effects observed in this experiment. ^

Eyewitness memory: Balancing the accuracy, precision, and quantity of information through metacognitive monitoring and control

Historically, memory has been evaluated by examining how much is remembered, however a more recent conception of memory focuses on the accuracy of memories. When using this accuracy-oriented conception of memory, unlike with the quantity-oriented approach, memory does not always deteriorate over time. A possible explanation for this seemingly surprising finding lies in the metacognitive processes of monitoring and control. Use of these processes allows people to withhold responses of which they are unsure, or to adjust the precision of responses to a level that is broad enough to be correct. The ability to accurately report memories has implications for investigators who interview witnesses to crimes, and those who evaluate witness testimony. ^ This research examined the amount of information provided, accuracy, and precision of responses provided during immediate and delayed interviews about a videotaped mock crime. The interview format was manipulated such that a single free narrative response was elicited, or a series of either yes/no or cued questions were asked. Instructions provided by the interviewer indicated to the participants that they should either stress being informative, or being accurate. The interviews were then transcribed and scored. ^ Results indicate that accuracy rates remained stable and high after a one week delay. Compared to those interviewed immediately, after a delay participants provided less information and responses that were less precise. Participants in the free narrative condition were the most accurate. Participants in the cued questions condition provided the most precise responses. Participants in the yes/no questions condition were most likely to say “I don’t know”. The results indicate that people are able to monitor their memories and modify their reports to maintain high accuracy. When control over precision was not possible, such as in the yes/no condition, people said “I don’t know” to maintain accuracy. However when withholding responses and adjusting precision were both possible, people utilized both methods. It seems that concerns that memories reported after a long retention interval might be inaccurate are unfounded. ^

Eyewitness Memory: Balancing the Accuracy, Precision, and Quantity of Information through Metacognitive Monitoring and Control

Historically, memory has been evaluated by examining how much is remembered, however a more recent conception of memory focuses on the accuracy of memories. When using this accuracy-oriented conception of memory, unlike with the quantity-oriented approach, memory does not always deteriorate over time. A possible explanation for this seemingly surprising finding lies in the metacognitive processes of monitoring and control. Use of these processes allows people to withhold responses of which they are unsure, or to adjust the precision of responses to a level that is broad enough to be correct. The ability to accurately report memories has implications for investigators who interview witnesses to crimes, and those who evaluate witness testimony. This research examined the amount of information provided, accuracy, and precision of responses provided during immediate and delayed interviews about a videotaped mock crime. The interview format was manipulated such that a single free narrative response was elicited, or a series of either yes/no or cued questions were asked. Instructions provided by the interviewer indicated to the participants that they should either stress being informative, or being accurate. The interviews were then transcribed and scored. Results indicate that accuracy rates remained stable and high after a one week delay. Compared to those interviewed immediately, after a delay participants provided less information and responses that were less precise. Participants in the free narrative condition were the most accurate. Participants in the cued questions condition provided the most precise responses. Participants in the yes/no questions condition were most likely to say “I don’t know”. The results indicate that people are able to monitor their memories and modify their reports to maintain high accuracy. When control over precision was not possible, such as in the yes/no condition, people said “I don’t know” to maintain accuracy. However when withholding responses and adjusting precision were both possible, people utilized both methods. It seems that concerns that memories reported after a long retention interval might be inaccurate are unfounded.

Jurors' responses to expert witness testimony: The effects of gender stereotypes

The present study investigated whether the impact of expert testimony was influenced by the congruency between the gender of the expert and the gender orientation of the case. Participants (N = 62) read a trial transcript involving a price-fixing allegation in either a male or female oriented domain. Within the case, the gender of the expert was manipulated. As predicted, the impact of the expert (e.g. damage awards) was greater when the gender of the expert and domain of the case were congruent as opposed to incongruent. Results also indicated that the impact of gender-domain congruency was particularly pronounced following group discussion. In addition, there was evidence that this effect was mediated through participants' evaluations of the expert witness.

The impact of expert testimony on jurors' decisions: Gender of the expert and testimony complexity

The present study investigated whether people used the gender of an expert witness as a heuristic cue to evaluate the evidence presented by the expert. Specifically, the gender of the expert and the complexity of the expert's testimony (low, high) were varied systematically within a simulated civil trial involving an antitrust price-fixing agreement. It was expected that the male expert would be more persuasive than the female expert, but only when the testimony presented was complex. As predicted, this interaction was revealed across a range of dependent measures. Somewhat unexpected was the finding of a female expert advantage in the low-complexity condition. The implications of these findings are discussed.