An affective approach to moral motivation

Over the last few years, there has been a surge of work in a new field called "moral psychology", which uses experimental methods to test the psychological processes underlying human moral activity. In this paper, I shall follow this line of approach with the aim of working out a model of how people form value judgements and how they are motivated to act morally. I call this model an "affective picture": 'picture' because it remains strictly at the descriptive level and 'affective' because it has an important role for affects and emotions. This affective picture is grounded on a number of plausible and empirically supported hypotheses. The main idea is that we should distinguish between various kinds of value judgements by focusing on the sort of state of mind people find themselves in while uttering a judgement. "Reasoned judgements" are products of rational considerations and are based on preliminary acceptance of norms and values. On the contrary, "basic value judgements" are affective, primitive and non-reflective ways of assessing the world. As we shall see, this analysis has some consequences for the traditional internalism-externalism debate in philosophy; it highlights the fact that motivation is primarily linked to "basic value judgements" and that the judgements we openly defend might not have a particular effect on our actions, unless we are inclined to have an emotional attitude that conforms to them.

Memory as acquaintance with the past: some Lessons from Russell, 1912-1914

Russell's theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of 'presentation', which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell's theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance with the past falls short of fulfilling Russell's requirement that knowledge by acquaintance be discriminating knowledge - a shortcoming shared by contemporary externalist accounts of knowledge from memory.

Boundless thought. The case of conceptual mental episodes

I present and defend here a thesis named vehicleless externalism for conceptual mental episodes. According to it, the constitutive relations there are between the production of conceptual mental episodes by an individual and the inclusion of this individual in social discursive practices make it non-necessary to equate, even partially, conceptual mental episodes with the occurrence of physical events inside of that individual. Conceptual mental episodes do not have subpersonal vehicles; they have owners: persons in interpretational practices. That thesis is grounded on inferentialism and on the endorsement of the idea that "meaning is normative". After having recapitulated this heritage and after having presented that thesis, the paper especially attempts to articulate how, in that framework, we may then positively conceive the relations there are between conceptual mental episodes, intracranial events and inferential behaviour.

Inferential Rationality and Internalistic Scarecrows

Abstract In a recent paper, Manuel Pérez Otero attempted to turn the tables on Paul Boghossian's claim that content externalism is incompatible with the 'a priority of our logical abilities'. In reply, Boghossian argued that Pérez Otero's criticism misses the main point of his argument through concentrating on the semantics of singular (as opposed to general) terms. I elaborate on Boghossian's reply by showing that even taken on its own terms Pérez Otero's paper fails to engage with internalism through systematically misrepresenting what a truly internalistic account of the semantics of singular terms should be.

New Terms of Envatment

The argument against skepticism relying on content externalism, which was made famous by Hilary Putnam, has been considered inconclusive by many philosophers. However, some believe that this argument has precluded the possibility of skeptical hypotheses. These hypotheses typically are fictional scenarios where a deceptive power makes your experiences indistinguishable from those you would have if you were not in such a scenario, making most of your justified belief false. Some philosophers, such as Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul, have taken this problem seriously and, in response to Putnam, have developed an alternative to the argument from ignorance: the piecemeal fashion strategy. I wish to defend, contra Brueckner and Altschul, the idea that some skeptical hypotheses remain untouched by content externalism, making the piecemeal fashion strategy obsolete.

Externalismo social: mente, pensamento e linguagem

Meu objetivo é mostrar que as teses externalistas os significados não estão na cabeça e os pensamentos não estão na cabeça não implicam, necessariamente, a tese mais radical a mente não está na cabeça. Trato dessa questão no âmbito do Externalismo Social de Tyler Burge e Lynne Baker, argumentando que a importância que esses pensadores atribuem à linguagem nas questões relativas à mente não significa, como uma leitura apressada poderia sugerir, a redução da mente à linguagem e, muito menos, a eliminação da mente. A minha conclusão é que o externalismo social linguístico não se constitui como uma estratégia eficaz de enfrentamento dos problemas da natureza da mente e de sua relação com o corpo.

Pedagogia etnomatemática : ações e reflexões em matemática do Ensino Fundamental com um grupo sócio cultural específico

mongst the trends in Mathematics Education, which have as their object a more significant and criticallearning, is the Ethnomathematics. This field of knowledge, still very recent amongst us, besides analyzing an externalist history of the sciences in a search for a relationship between the development of the scientific disciplines and the socio-cultural context, goes beyond this externalism, for it also approaches the intimate relationships betwe_n cognition and culture. In fact, the Ethnomathematics proposes an alternative epistemological approach associated with a wider historiography. It struggles to understand the reality and come to the pedagogical action by means of a cognitive approach with strong cultural basis. But the difficulty of inserting the Ethnomathematics into the educational context is met by resistance from some mathematics educators who seem indifferent to the influence of the culture on the understanding of the mathematics ideas. It was with such concerns in mind that I started this paper that had as object to develop a curricular reorientation pedagogical proposal in mathematics education, at the levei of the 5th grade of the Ensino Fundamental (Elementary School), built from the mathematical knowledge of a vegetable farmers community, 30 km away from the center of Natal/RN, but in accordance with the teaching dimensions of mathematics of the 1 st and 2nd cycles proposed by the Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais - PCN: Numbers and Operations, Space and Form, Units and Measures, and Information Treatment. To achieve that, I developed pedagogical activities from the mathematical concepts of the vegetable farmers of that community, explained in my dissertation research in the period 2000 through 2002. The pedagogical process was developed from August through Oecember 2007 with 24 students of the 5th Grade of the Ensino Fundamental (Elementary School) of the school of that community. The qualitative analysis of the data was conducted taking into account three categories of students: one made up of students that helped their parents in the work with vegetables. Another one by students whose parents and relatives worked with vegetables, though they did not participate directly of this working process and one third category of students that never worked with vegetables, not to mention their parents, but lived adjacent to that community. From the analyses and results of the data gathered by these three distinct categories of students, I concluded that those students that assisted their parents with the daily work with vegetables solved the problem-situations with understanding, and, sometimes, with enriching contributions to the proposed problems. The other categories of students, in spite of the various field researches to the gardens of that community, before and during the pedagogical activities, did not show the same results as those students/vegetable farmers, but showed interest and motivation in ali activities of the pedagogical process in that period

Um estudo acerca dos estados mentais: o debate internalismo versus externalismo

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Conseqüências do externalismo behaviorista radical

O artigo discute a proposta de Skinner para a ciência do comportamento, caracterizando-a como "externalista" (voltada para as relações do organismo com eventos que lhe são externos). Examina-se o discurso de Skinner sobre diferentes explicações para o comportamento, em obras de 1938, 1953 e 1990, a fim de indicar sua preocupação permanente com a definição das fronteiras entre análise do comportamento e (neuro)fisiologia. Apontam-se aspectos da elaboração skinneriana que a tornam insuficiente para sustentar uma declaração coerente sobre a autonomia de uma ciência do comportamento e procura-se ilustrar como essa dificuldade se reflete na literatura contemporânea da área.

Davidson's externalisms

Donald Davidson ha tenido un papel extremamente importante en lo que hoy se llama Externismo. Sin embargo, la formulación exacta de su externismo no es obvia porque sus compromisos están dispersos a lo largo de muchos de sus artículos. El objetivo de este trabajo es explorar los detalles de su externismo. Indicaremos que Davidson, sin duda defiende, que la mente no está auto-contenida. No obstante, tal idea tiene por lo menos dos sentidos distintos en su trabajo: por un lado, estados y contenidos mentales deben ser individuados, en parte, respecto a factores externos a la piel de uno, porque fueron causados por ellos; y por otro lado, estados y contenidos mentales deben ser individuados por factores externos porque la mente está constituida por conocimiento. Indicaremos que la relación entre estos dos niveles explicativos, aparentemente armoniosa, se vuelve conflictiva dentro del mismo programa davidsoniano. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT