US Foreign Sales Corporations, Export Tax Credits and the WTO

Rhodes, Mark. 'US Foreign Sales Corporations, Export Tax Credits and the WTO', in: 'The WTO and the Regulation of International Trade: Recent Trade Disputes between the European Union and the United States', (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), pp.177-189 RAE2008

A quase-estagnação brasileira e sua explicação novo-desenvolvimentista

The Brazilian economy is quasi-stagnant since 1980, with exception of the short 2006-2010 boom, caused by the high prices of the commodities. Up to 1994, the causes were the major financial crisis of the 1980s and the ensuing high inertial inflation. Since these two causes were overcome, the Brazilian economy should have resumed growth, but didn’t. According to new developmental macroeconomics, the new fact that explains this low growth is the 1990-91 trade liberalization, which had as non-predicted consequence the suspension of the neutralization of the Dutch disease. This fact made the Brazilian manufacturing industry to have since then a competitive disadvantage of 20 to 25%, which is causing premature deindustrialization and quasi-stagnation. There is a solution for this stalemate today, but liberal as well as developmental Brazilian economists are not being able to consider the new macroeconomic models that justify it

The fiscal impact of trade liberalization and commodity price fluctuation: the case of Dominican Republic, 1980-1998

Includes bibliography

The fiscal impact of trade liberalization and commodity price fluctuation: the case of Costa Rica, 1980-1998

Includes bibliography

Strategic trade policy and non-linear subsidy : in the case of price competition

In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes disbursement or levy method so that the reaction function of home firm approaches infinitely close to that of foreign firm. In the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, Eaton and Grossman[1986] showed that export tax is preferable to export subsidy. In this paper, it is shown that export subsidy is preferable to export tax in some cases in the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, considering the uncertainty in demand. Historically, many economists mentioned non-linear subsidy or tax. However, optimum solution of it has not yet been shown. The optimum solution is shown in this paper.

Trade policies and trade mis-reporting in Myanmar

While the trade statistics of Myanmar show surpluses for 2007 through 2010, the corresponding statistics of trade partner countries indicate deficits. Such discrepancies in mirror trade statistics are analyzed in connection with the ‘export-first and import-second’ policy provisioning import permissions on permission applicants possessing a sufficient amount of the export-tax-deducted export earnings. Under this policy, the recorded imports and exports of the private sector have been maintaining equilibrium, whereas discrepancies in the mirror statistics have fluctuated. This suggests that traders adjusted mis-reporting in accordance with the supply and demand of the export earnings.

Export, Import and Inter—State Sales - A Study in Tax Law

This thesis is a study in sales tax law, a study on the triple concept of export, import and inters—State sales. It is in seventeen chapters spread in five parts. The introductory is an overview. It presents the thematic thrust of what follows. Part two deals with incidence of sales tax on export and import and the scope of exemption. Part three focuses attention on the various dimensions of the problem of inter—State sale. Part four is an inquiry into parliamentary control on taxes over sales and purchases and highlights inter—State and intra-State implications of discriminatory tax. Part five contains the results of empirical study and the general conclusions of the thesis. In the past no attempt has been made to analyse on identical lines the problems dealt with in this thesis

Special Tax Treatment as Trade Policy: A Database on Export Processing and Special Economic Zones

Many countries treat income generated via exports favourably, especially when production takes places in special zones known as export processing zones (EPZs). EPZs can be defined as specific, geographically defined zones or areas that are subject to special administration and that generally offer tax incentives, such as duty‐free imports when producing for export, exemption from other regulatory constraints linked to import for the domestic market, sometimes favourable treatment in terms of industrial regulation, and the streamlining of border clearing procedures. We describe a database of WTO Members that employ special economic zones as part of their industrial policy mix. This is based on WTO notification and monitoring through the WTO’s trade policy review mechanism (TPRM), supplemented with information from the ILO, World Bank, and primary sources. We also provide some rough analysis of the relationship between use of EPZs and the carbon intensity of exports, and relative levels of investment across countries with and without special zones.

International tax and the Australian wine industry: Is your client’s product destined to sail the seven seas?

The export market for Australian wine continues to grow at a rapid rate, with imported wines also playing a role in market share in sales in Australia. It is estimated that over 60 per cent of all Australian wine is exported, while 12 per cent of wine consumed in Australia has overseas origins. In addition to understanding the size and direction (import or export) of wines, the foreign locales also play an important role in any tax considerations. While the export market for Australian produced alcohol continues to grow, it is into the Asian market that the most significant inroads are occurring. Sales into China of bottled wine over $7.50 per litre recently overtook the volume sold our traditional partners of the United States and Canada. It is becoming easier for even small to medium sized businesses to export their services or products overseas. However, it is vital for those businesses to understand the tax rules applying to any international transactions. Specifically, one of the first tax regimes that importers and exporters need to understand once they decide to establish a presence overseas is transfer pricing. These are the rules that govern the cross-border prices of goods, services and other transactions entered into between related parties. This paper is Part 2 of the seminar presented on transfer pricing and international tax issues which are particularly relevant to the wine industry. The predominant focus of Part 2 is to discuss four key areas likely to affect international expansion. First, the use of the available transfer pricing methodologies for international related party transactions is discussed. Second, the affects that double tax agreements will have on taking a business offshore are considered. Third, the risks associated with aggressive tax planning through tax information exchange agreements is reviewed. Finally, the paper predicts future ‘trip-wires’ and areas to ‘watch out for’ for practitioners dealing with clients operating in the international arena.

When do export subsidies have a redistributional role?

If an export subsidy is efficient, that is, has a surplus-transfer role, then there exists an implicit function relating the optimal level of the subsidy to the income target in the agricultural sector. If an export subsidy is inefficient no such function exists. We show that dependence exists in large-export equilibrium, not in small-export equilibrium and show that these results remain robust to concerns about domestic tax distortions. The failure of previous work to produce this result stems from its neglect of the income constraint on producer surplus in the programming problem transferring surplusfrom consumersand taxpayers to farmers.

Tax policy when countries compete for third market exports

We examine the welfare and other consequences of tax policy in a third market export model where duopolists located in two countries compete in prices. With tax competition between governments, we allow for welfare-maximizing governments in the two countries to delegate tax setting responsibility to policy-makers who have different objectives than the governments. The unique equilibrium in the tax competition environment involves both governments delegating tax setting responsibility to tax revenue-maximizing policy-makers. This equilibrium yields higher welfare for both countries than the outcome when the governments delegate to welfare-maximizing policy-makers. The paper also compares tax competition with tax harmonization and shows that when the entire export market is served, tax harmonization improves the welfare of the country that houses the low cost firm, while the other country may be immiserized.

Public-private partnerships for innovation and export development: the Irish model of development

Includes Bibliography

Export promotion policies in Central America

Includes bibliography