Market coupling in the power markets

The thesis analyses the European Unions’ effort to create an integrated pan-European electricity market based on “market coupling” as the proposed allocation mechanism for interconnector transfer capacity. Thus, the thesis’ main focus is if market coupling leads to a price convergence in interlinked markets and how it affects the behavior of electricity price data. The applied research methods are a qualitative, structured literature review and a quantitative analysis of electricity price data. The quantitative analysis relies on descriptive statistics of absolute price differentials and on a Cointegration analysis according to Engle & Granger (1987)’s two step approach. Main findings are that implicit auction mechanisms such as market coupling are more efficient than explicit auctions. Especially the method of price coupling leads to a price convergence in involved markets, to social welfare gains and reduces market power of producers, as shown on the example of the TLC market coupling. The market coupling initiative between Germany and Denmark, on the other hand, is evaluated as less successful and illustrates the complexity and difficulties of implementing market coupling initiatives. The cointegration analysis shows that the time series were already before the coupling date cointegrated, but the statistical significance increased. The thesis suggests that market coupling leads to a price convergence of involved markets and thus functions as method to create a single, integrated European electricity market.

Biased Random-key Genetic Algorithms For The Winner Determination Problem In Combinatorial Auctions.

Abstract In this paper, we address the problem of picking a subset of bids in a general combinatorial auction so as to maximize the overall profit using the first-price model. This winner determination problem assumes that a single bidding round is held to determine both the winners and prices to be paid. We introduce six variants of biased random-key genetic algorithms for this problem. Three of them use a novel initialization technique that makes use of solutions of intermediate linear programming relaxations of an exact mixed integer-linear programming model as initial chromosomes of the population. An experimental evaluation compares the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms with the standard mixed linear integer programming formulation, a specialized exact algorithm, and the best-performing heuristics proposed for this problem. The proposed algorithms are competitive and offer strong results, mainly for large-scale auctions.

Distinct conformational properties determined by implicit and explicit representation of protein-solvent interactions. An analytical and computer simulation study

In the protein folding problem, solvent-mediated forces are commonly represented by intra-chain pairwise contact energy. Although this approximation has proven to be useful in several circumstances, it is limited in some other aspects of the problem. Here we show that it is possible to achieve two models to represent the chain-solvent system. one of them with implicit and other with explicit solvent, such that both reproduce the same thermodynamic results. Firstly, lattice models treated by analytical methods, were used to show that the implicit and explicitly representation of solvent effects can be energetically equivalent only if local solvent properties are time and spatially invariant. Following, applying the same reasoning Used for the lattice models, two inter-consistent Monte Carlo off-lattice models for implicit and explicit solvent are constructed, being that now in the latter the solvent properties are allowed to fluctuate. Then, it is shown that the chain configurational evolution as well as the globule equilibrium conformation are significantly distinct for implicit and explicit solvent systems. Actually, strongly contrasting with the implicit solvent version, the explicit solvent model predicts: (i) a malleable globule, in agreement with the estimated large protein-volume fluctuations; (ii) thermal conformational stability, resembling the conformational hear resistance of globular proteins, in which radii of gyration are practically insensitive to thermal effects over a relatively wide range of temperatures; and (iii) smaller radii of gyration at higher temperatures, indicating that the chain conformational entropy in the unfolded state is significantly smaller than that estimated from random coil configurations. Finally, we comment on the meaning of these results with respect to the understanding of the folding process. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Protein fold recognition without Boltzmann statistics or explicit physical basis

We present a fast method for finding optimal parameters for a low-resolution (threading) force field intended to distinguish correct from incorrect folds for a given protein sequence. In contrast to other methods, the parameterization uses information from >10(7) misfolded structures as well as a set of native sequence-structure pairs. In addition to testing the resulting force field's performance on the protein sequence threading problem, results are shown that characterize the number of parameters necessary for effective structure recognition.

Simultaneous pooled auctions

Suppose a seller wants to sell k similar or identical objects and there are n > k potential buyers. Suppose that each buyer wants only one object. In this case, we suggest the use of a simultaneous auction that would work as follows. Players are asked to submit sealed bids for one object. The individual with the highest bid chooses an object first; the individual with the second-highest bid chooses the next object; and this process continues until the individual with the kth highest bid receives the last object. Each individual pays the equivalent to his or her bid. When objects are identical, we show that the proposed auction generates the same revenue as a first-price sealed-bid sequential auction. When objects are perfectly correlated, there is no known solution for sequential auctions, whereas we can characterize bidding strategies in the proposed auction. Moreover, the proposed auction is optimal (given an appropriately chosen reserve price), and it may be easier and cheaper to run than a sequential auction.

A simple analysis of the US emission permits auctions

We examine a stylized version of EPA auctions when agents know the list of values of sellers and buyers. There are inefficient equilibria where no goods are traded and efficient equilibria where all exchange occurs at a uniform price. We also provide examples under incomplete information when the uniform price equilibrium holds and when it does not hold. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D44; Q29.

A landscape-scale test of the predictive ability of a spatially explicit model for population viability analysis

1. Although population viability analysis (PVA) is widely employed, forecasts from PVA models are rarely tested. This study in a fragmented forest in southern Australia contrasted field data on patch occupancy and abundance for the arboreal marsupial greater glider Petauroides volans with predictions from a generic spatially explicit PVA model. This work represents one of the first landscape-scale tests of its type. 2. Initially we contrasted field data from a set of eucalypt forest patches totalling 437 ha with a naive null model in which forecasts of patch occupancy were made, assuming no fragmentation effects and based simply on remnant area and measured densities derived from nearby unfragmented forest. The naive null model predicted an average total of approximately 170 greater gliders, considerably greater than the true count (n = 81). 3. Congruence was examined between field data and predictions from PVA under several metapopulation modelling scenarios. The metapopulation models performed better than the naive null model. Logistic regression showed highly significant positive relationships between predicted and actual patch occupancy for the four scenarios (P = 0.001-0.006). When the model-derived probability of patch occupancy was high (0.50-0.75, 0.75-1.00), there was greater congruence between actual patch occupancy and the predicted probability of occupancy. 4. For many patches, probability distribution functions indicated that model predictions for animal abundance in a given patch were not outside those expected by chance. However, for some patches the model either substantially over-predicted or under-predicted actual abundance. Some important processes, such as inter-patch dispersal, that influence the distribution and abundance of the greater glider may not have been adequately modelled. 5. Additional landscape-scale tests of PVA models, on a wider range of species, are required to assess further predictions made using these tools. This will help determine those taxa for which predictions are and are not accurate and give insights for improving models for applied conservation management.

Hybrid auctions

In this paper we analyze a hybrid auction that combines a first-price and a Vickrey auction. We show that this auction may generate more expected revenue than a standard first-price auction. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

A Study of the Corporative Portals as a Tool of Explicit Knowledge Externalization in Universities

The corporative portals, enabled by Information Technology and Communication tools, provide the integration of heterogeneous data proceeding from internal information systems, which are available for access and sharing of the interested community. They can be considered an important instrument of explicit knowledge evaluation in the. organization, once they allow faster and,safer, information exchanges, enabling a healthful collaborative environment. In the specific case of major Brazilian universities, the corporate portals assume a basic aspect; therefore they offer an enormous variety and amount of information and knowledge, due to the multiplicity of their activities This. study aims to point out important aspects of the explicit knowledge expressed by the searched universities; by the analysis, of the content offered in their corporative portals` This is an exploratory study made through, direct observation of the existing contents in the corporative portals of two public universities as. Well as three private ones. A. comparative analysis of the existing contents in these portals was carried through;. it can be useful to evaluate its use as factor of optimization of the generated explicit knowledge in the university. As results, the existence of important differences, could be verified in the composition and in the content of the corporative portals of the public universities compared to the private institutions. The main differences are about the kind of services and the destination-of the,information that have as focus different public-target. It-could also be concluded that the searched private universities, focus, on the processes related to the attendance of the students, the support for the courses as well as the spreading of information to the public interested in joining the institution; whereas the anal public universities prioritize more specific information, directed to,the dissemination-of the research, developed internally or with institutional objectives.

Auction price anomalies: Evidence from wool auctions in Australia

Using detailed Australian wool auction data we test for further evidence of pricing anomalies at sequential auctions. We find that an anomaly frequently exists and order is frequently endogenously determined. Moreover, prices increase through some sales and decrease through others. We examine whether it is possible to explain the variation in the anomaly across sales and conclude that there is no systematic relationship between the direction of the price anomaly and the characteristics of the wool or the auction. We do, however, find evidence that an anomaly, is more likely in longer sales.

Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers

In this paper we consider sequential auctions with synergies where one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. We show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco [Econ. Lett. 54 (1997) 159]. Indeed we show that expected prices can actually increase. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.

Reserve price commitments in auctions

It is well known that the optimal auction-one that maximizes the seller's expected revenue-can be implemented using a standard auction format with a suitably chosen reserve price. This reserve price is above the seller's value of retaining the object and the mechanism requires a commitment not to sell the object below the reserve. This commitment is what makes the reserve valuable to the seller. However, in practice, a reserve price commits the seller to sell the object if the reserve is reached, but does not commit her to withhold the object from sale if bidding falls short of the reserve. In this note we investigate whether reserve prices remain valuable for the seller when she may negotiate with the highest bidder if the reserve is not met. We show that the value of the reserve price may be completely undermined if the seller is a sufficiently weak bargainer. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Corruption and auctions

We investigate how corruption affects the outcome of a first-price auction (bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller's expected revenue). The auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in his bid in exchange for a bribe. The bribe can be a percentage of the difference between the winning and the second-highest bid or a fixed amount. We show that there exists a symmetric bidding strategy equilibrium that is monotone, i.e., higher valuation buyers bid higher. Corruption does not affect efficiency but both the auctioneer's expected bribe and the seller's expected revenue depend on the format of the bribe payments. We also find the optimal bribe scheme.

Sequential asymmetric auctions with endogenous participation

In this paper we suggest a model of sequential auctions with endogenous participation where each bidder conjectures about the number of participants at each round. Then, after learning his value, each bidder decides whether or not to participate in the auction. In the calculation of his expected value, each bidder uses his conjectures about the number of participants for each possible subgroup. In equilibrium, the conjectured probability is compatible with the probability of staying in the auction. In our model, players face participation costs, bidders may buy as many objects as they wish and they are allowed to drop out at any round. Bidders can drop out at any time, but they cannot come back to the auction. In particular we can determine the number of participants and expected prices in equilibrium. We show that for any bidding strategy, there exists such a probability of staying in the auction. For the case of stochastically independent objects, we show that in equilibrium every bidder who decides to continue submits a bid that is equal to his value at each round. When objects are stochastically identical, we are able to show that expected prices are decreasing.