Risk Aversion in a Mixed-Integer Nonlinear Approach to Support Decision-Making for a Hydro Power Producer

In this paper, a mixed-integer nonlinear approach is proposed to support decision-making for a hydro power producer, considering a head-dependent hydro chain. The aim is to maximize the profit of the hydro power producer from selling energy into the electric market. As a new contribution to earlier studies, a risk aversion criterion is taken into account, as well as head-dependency. The volatility of the expected profit is limited through the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). The proposed approach has been applied successfully to solve a case study based on one of the main Portuguese cascaded hydro systems.

A gestão do risco associado à negociação de energia eléctrica através de contratos bilaterais e mercado spot

Num mercado de electricidade competitivo onde existe um ambiente de incerteza, as empresas de geração adoptam estratégias que visam a maximização do lucro, e a minimização do risco. Neste contexto, é de extrema importância para desenvolver uma estratégia adequada de gestão de risco ter em conta as diferentes opções de negociação de energia num mercado liberalizado, de forma a suportar a tomada de decisões na gestão de risco. O presente trabalho apresenta um modelo que avalia a melhor estratégia de um produtor de energia eléctrica que comercializa num mercado competitivo, onde existem dois mercados possíveis para a transacção de energia: o mercado organizado (bolsa) e o mercado de contratos bilaterais. O produtor tenta maximizar seus lucros e minimizar os riscos correspondentes, seleccionando o melhor equilíbrio entre os dois mercados possíveis (bolsa e bilateral). O mercado de contratos bilaterais visa gerir adequadamente os riscos inerentes à operação de mercados no curto prazo (mercado organizado) e dar o vendedor / comprador uma capacidade real de escolher o fornecedor com que quer negociar. O modelo apresentado neste trabalho faz uma caracterização explícita do risco no que diz respeito ao agente de mercado na questão da sua atitude face ao risco, medido pelo Value at Risk (VaR), descrito neste trabalho por Lucro-em-Risco (PAR). O preço e os factores de risco de volume são caracterizados por um valor médio e um desvio padrão, e são modelizados por distribuições normais. Os resultados numéricos são obtidos utilizando a simulação de Monte Carlo implementado em Matlab, e que é aplicado a um produtor que mantém uma carteira diversificada de tecnologias de geração, para um horizonte temporal de um ano. Esta dissertação está organizada da seguinte forma: o capítulo 1, 2 e 3 descrevem o estado-da-arte relacionado com a gestão de risco na comercialização de energia eléctrica. O capítulo 4 descreve o modelo desenvolvido e implementado, onde é também apresentado um estudo de caso com uma aplicação do modelo para avaliar o risco de negociação de um produtor. No capítulo 5 são apresentadas as principais conclusões.

Bertrand model under incomplete information

We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms. In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.

Bertrand oligopoly when rivals' costs are unknown

We study a Bertrand oligopoly model with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, the ex-ante expected profit and the ex-post profit of each firm. We see that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Scheduling of a hydro producer considering head-dependency, price scenarios and risk-aversion

In this paper, a mixed-integer quadratic programming approach is proposed for the short-term hydro scheduling problem, considering head-dependency, discontinuous operating regions and discharge ramping constraints. As new contributions to earlier studies, market uncertainty is introduced in the model via price scenarios, and risk aversion is also incorporated by limiting the volatility of the expected profit through the conditional value-at-risk. Our approach has been applied successfully to solve a case Study based on one of the main Portuguese cascaded hydro systems, requiring a negligible computational time.

Stochastic Short-term Incentive-based Demand Response Scheduling of Load-serving Entities

In competitive electricity markets it is necessary for a profit-seeking load-serving entity (LSE) to optimally adjust the financial incentives offering the end users that buy electricity at regulated rates to reduce the consumption during high market prices. The LSE in this model manages the demand response (DR) by offering financial incentives to retail customers, in order to maximize its expected profit and reduce the risk of market power experience. The stochastic formulation is implemented into a test system where a number of loads are supplied through LSEs.

Uncertainty on a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation

The conclusions of the Bertrand model of competition are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. In this paper, we consider a Bertrand competition, with differentiated goods. Furthermore, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms’ profits and market prices. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.

Por que a poupança externa não promove crescimento

Why foreign saving fail to cause growth. The present paper is a formalization of the critique of the growth with foreign savings strategy. Although medium income countries are capital poor, current account deficits (foreign savings), financed either by loans or by foreign direct investments, will not usually increase the rate of capital accumulation or will have little impact on it in so far as current account deficits will be associated with appreciated exchange rates, artificially increased real wages and salaries and high consumption levels. In consequence, the rate of substitution of foreign savings for domestic savings will be relatively high, and the country will get indebted to consume, not to invest and grow. Only when there are large investment opportunities, stimulated by a sizeable difference between the expected profit rate and the long term interest rate, the marginal propensity to consume will get down enough so that the additional income originated from foreign capital flows will be used for investment rather than for consumption. In this special case, the rate of substitution of foreign for domestic savings tend to be small, and foreign savings will contribute positively to growth.

Essais sur la gestion des ressources forestières

Cette thèse est composée de trois essais en économie forestière. Les deux premiers s'intéressent à la fixation de la redevance optimale à laquelle fait face le propriétaire d'une ressource forestière dans un contexte d'information asymétrique. Le troisième analyse l'impact à long terme du recyclage sur la surface de terre affectée à la forêt. La gestion des ressources forestières implique souvent la délégation des droits de coupe par le propriétaire forestier à une entreprise exploitante. Cette délégation prend la forme d'un contrat de concession par lequel le propriétaire forestier octroie les droits d'exploitation aux compagnies forestières, en contrepartie d'une redevance (transfert monétaire). L'octroie des droits d'exploitation s'effectue généralement sous plusieurs modes, dont les plus répandus sont les appels d'offres publics et les contrats de gré à gré, où le propriétaire forestier et la firme exploitante spécifient entre autres la redevance dans les clauses d'exploitation de la forêt. Pour déterminer le mécanisme optimal (choix de la firme, âge de coupe et redevance), le propriétaire forestier a idéalement besoin de connaître les coûts de coupe et de reboisement. Or en réalité, les firmes sont mieux informées sur leurs coûts que le propriétaire forestier. Dans ce contexte d'information asymétrique, le mécanisme optimal doit donc prendre en considération des contraintes informationnelles. Les deux premiers essais caractérisent, sous ces conditions, l'âge de coupe optimal (la rotation optimale) et la redevance optimale. Le premier essai examine le contrat optimal quand le propriétaire forestier cède les droits de coupes à une firme par un accord de gré à gré ou par une procédure d'appel d'offre public au second prix. L'analyse du problème est menée premièrement dans un contexte statique, dans le sens que les coûts de coupe sont parfaitement corrélés dans le temps, puis dans un contexte dynamique, où les coûts sont indépendants dans le temps. L'examen en statique et en dynamique montre que la rotation optimale va satisfaire une version modifiée de la règle de Faustmann qui prévaudrait en information symétrique. Cette modification est nécessaire afin d'inciter la firme à révéler ses vrais coûts. Dans le cas statique, il en résulte que la rotation optimale est plus élevée en information asymétrique qu'en situation de pleine information. Nous montrons également comment le seuil maximal de coût de coupe peut être endogénéisé, afin de permettre au propriétaire d'accroître son profit espéré en s'assurant que les forêts non profitables ne seront pas exploitées. Nous comparons ensuite la redevance optimale en information asymétrique et symétrique. Les redevances forestières dans un arrangement de gré à gré étant généralement, en pratique, une fonction linéaire du volume de bois, nous dérivons le contrat optimal en imposant une telle forme de redevance et nous caractérisons la perte en terme de profit espéré qui résulte de l'utilisation de ce type de contrat plutôt que du contrat non linéaire plus général. Finalement, toujours dans le contexte statique, nous montrons à travers un mécanisme optimal d'enchère au second prix qu'en introduisant ainsi la compétition entre les firmes le propriétaire forestier augmente son profit espéré. Les résultats obtenus dans le contexte dynamique diffèrent pour la plupart de ceux obtenus dans le cas statique. Nous montrons que le contrat optimal prévoit alors que chaque type de firme, incluant celle ayant le coût le plus élevé, obtient une rente strictement positive, laquelle augmente dans le temps. Ceci est nécessaire pour obtenir la révélation à moindre coût à la période courante du véritable type de la firme. Comme implication, la rotation optimale s'accroît aussi dans le temps. Finalement, nous montrons qu'il y a distorsion en asymétrique d'information par rapport à l'optimum de pleine information même pour le coût le plus bas (la réalisation la plus favorable). La concurrence introduite dans le premier essai sous forme d'enchère au second prix suppose que chaque firme connaît exactement son propre coût de coupe. Dans le deuxième essai nous relâchons cette hypothèse. En réalité, ni le propriétaire forestier ni les firmes ne connaissent avec précision les coûts de coupe. Chaque firme observe de manière privée un signal sur son coût. Par exemple chaque firme est autorisée à visiter un lot pour avoir une estimation (signal) de son coût de coupe. Cependant cette évaluation est approximative. Ainsi, le coût de chaque firme va dépendre des estimations (signaux) d'autres firmes participantes. Nous sommes en présence d'un mécanisme à valeurs interdépendantes. Dans ce contexte, la valeur d'une allocation dépend des signaux de toutes les firmes. Le mécanisme optimal (attribution des droits d'exploitation, redevance et âge de coupe) est exploré. Nous déterminons les conditions sous lesquelles le mécanisme optimal peut être implémenté par une enchère au second prix et dérivons la rotation optimale et le prix de réserve dans le contexte de ce type d'enchère. Le troisième essai de la thèse analyse l'impact à long terme du recyclage sur la surface de terre affectée à la forêt. L'un des principaux arguments qui milite en faveur du recours au recyclage est que cela entraînerait une réduction de la coupe de bois, épargnant ainsi des arbres. L'objectif est donc d'aboutir à un nombre d'arbres plus important qu'en l'absence de recyclage. L'idée d'accroître le stock d'arbre tient au fait que les forêts génèrent des externalités: elles créent un flux de services récréatifs, freinent l'érosion des sols et des rives des cours d'eau et absorbent du dioxyde de carbone présent dans l'atmosphère. Étant donné la présence d'externalités, l'équilibre des marchés résulterait en un nombre d'arbre insuffisant, justifiant donc la mise en oeuvre de politiques visant à l'accroître. Le but de ce troisième essai est de voir dans quelle mesure la promotion du recyclage est un instrument approprié pour atteindre un tel objectif. En d'autres mots, comment le recyclage affecte-t-il à long terme la surface de terre en forêt et l'âge de coupe? Nous étudions cette question en spécifiant un modèle dynamique d'allocation d'un terrain donné, par un propriétaire forestier privé, entre la forêt et une utilisation alternative du terrain, comme l'agriculture. Une fois les arbres coupés, il décide d'une nouvelle allocation du terrain. Il le fait indéfiniment comme dans le cadre du modèle de Faustmann. Le bois coupé est transformé en produit final qui est en partie recyclé comme substitut du bois original. Ainsi, les outputs passés affectent le prix courant. Nous montrons que, paradoxalement, un accroissement du taux de recyclage réduira à long terme la surface forestière et donc diminuera le nombre d'arbres plantés. Par contre l'âge de coupe optimal va s'accroître. L'effet net sur le volume de bois offert sur le marché est ambigu. Le principal message cependant est qu'à long terme le recyclage va résulter en une surface en forêt plus petite et non plus grande. Donc, si le but est d'accroître la surface en forêt, il pourrait être préférable de faire appel à d'autres types d'instruments de politique que celui d'encourager le recyclage.

Coordinating Inventory Control and Pricing Strategies with Random Demand and Fixed Ordering Cost: The Finite Horizon Case

We analyze a finite horizon, single product, periodic review model in which pricing and production/inventory decisions are made simultaneously. Demands in different periods are random variables that are independent of each other and their distributions depend on the product price. Pricing and ordering decisions are made at the beginning of each period and all shortages are backlogged. Ordering cost includes both a fixed cost and a variable cost proportional to the amount ordered. The objective is to find an inventory policy and a pricing strategy maximizing expected profit over the finite horizon. We show that when the demand model is additive, the profit-to-go functions are k-concave and hence an (s,S,p) policy is optimal. In such a policy, the period inventory is managed based on the classical (s,S) policy and price is determined based on the inventory position at the beginning of each period. For more general demand functions, i.e., multiplicative plus additive functions, we demonstrate that the profit-to-go function is not necessarily k-concave and an (s,S,p) policy is not necessarily optimal. We introduce a new concept, the symmetric k-concave functions and apply it to provide a characterization of the optimal policy.

Exercise sheet 3

Exercises and solutions in LaTex

Exercise sheet 3 pdf

Exercises and solutions in PDF

Production risk, pesticide use and GM crop technology in South Africa

Technology involving genetic modification of crops has the potential to make a contribution to rural poverty reduction in many developing countries. Thus far, pesticide-producing Bacillus thuringensis (Bt) varieties of cotton have been the main GM crops under cultivation in developing nations. Several studies have evaluated the farm-level performance of Bt varieties in comparison to conventional ones by estimating production technology, and have mostly found Bt technology to be very successful in raising output and/or reducing pesticide input. However, the production risk properties of this technology have not been studied, although they are likely to be important to risk-averse smallholders. This study investigates the output risk aspects of Bt technology by estimating two 'flexible risk' production function models allowing technology to independently affect the mean and higher moments of output. The first is the popular Just-Pope model and the second is a more general 'damage control' flexible risk model. The models are applied to cross-sectional data on South African smallholders, some of whom used Bt varieties. The results show no evidence that a 'risk-reduction' claim can be made for Bt technology. Indeed, there is some evidence to support the notion that the technology increases output risk, implying that simple (expected) profit computations used in past evaluations may overstate true benefits.

Production risk, pesticide use and GM crop technology in South Africa

Technology involving genetic modification of crops has the potential to make a contribution to rural poverty reduction in many developing countries. Thus far, pesticide-producing Bacillus thuringensis (Bt) varieties of cotton have been the main GM crops under cultivation in developing nations. Several studies have evaluated the farm-level performance of Bt varieties in comparison to conventional ones by estimating production technology, and have mostly found Bt technology to be very successful in raising output and/or reducing pesticide input. However, the production risk properties of this technology have not been studied, although they are likely to be important to risk-averse smallholders. This study investigates the output risk aspects of Bt technology by estimating two 'flexible risk' production function models allowing technology to independently affect the mean and higher moments of output. The first is the popular Just-Pope model and the second is a more general 'damage control' flexible risk model. The models are applied to cross-sectional data on South African smallholders, some of whom used Bt varieties. The results show no evidence that a 'risk-reduction' claim can be made for Bt technology. Indeed, there is some evidence to support the notion that the technology increases output risk, implying that simple (expected) profit computations used in past evaluations may overstate true benefits.

Does The Risk Of Groundwater Depletion Drive Tube-Well Technology Adoption: A Case Of Pakistan

We employ a moment-based approach to empirically analyse farmer’s decisions about adoption of tube-well technology under depleting groundwater resources using a farm level data from 200 farming households in the Punjab province, Pakistan. The results indicate that the higher the expected profit the greater the probability of adoption. Similarly, with increasing variance the probability of adopting tube-well increases significantly indicating that farmers choose to adopt tube-well technology in order to hedge against production risks. Statistical non-significant the third moment i.e., skewness indicates that farmer generally do not consider downside yield risk when decide to adopt tube-well technology whereas highly significant fourth moment (kurtosis) employ that probability of adoption decreases as a result of extreme events in profit distribution. In addition, we show that land tenureship and three other exogenous variables, i.e., extension services, access to different sources of information and off-farm income play a significant role in the adoption process.