An enhanced concave program relaxation for choice network revenue management

The network choice revenue management problem models customers as choosing from an offer-set, andthe firm decides the best subset to offer at any given moment to maximize expected revenue. The resultingdynamic program for the firm is intractable and approximated by a deterministic linear programcalled the CDLP which has an exponential number of columns. However, under the choice-set paradigmwhen the segment consideration sets overlap, the CDLP is difficult to solve. Column generation has beenproposed but finding an entering column has been shown to be NP-hard. In this paper, starting with aconcave program formulation based on segment-level consideration sets called SDCP, we add a class ofconstraints called product constraints, that project onto subsets of intersections. In addition we proposea natural direct tightening of the SDCP called ?SDCP, and compare the performance of both methodson the benchmark data sets in the literature. Both the product constraints and the ?SDCP method arevery simple and easy to implement and are applicable to the case of overlapping segment considerationsets. In our computational testing on the benchmark data sets in the literature, SDCP with productconstraints achieves the CDLP value at a fraction of the CPU time taken by column generation and webelieve is a very promising approach for quickly approximating CDLP when segment consideration setsoverlap and the consideration sets themselves are relatively small.

Affiliation, equilibrium existence and the revenue ranking of auctions

We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by assuming affiliation. We show that affiliation is a restrictive assumption in three senses: topological, measure-theoretic and statistical (affiliation is a very restrictive characterization of positive dependence). We also show that affiliation’s main implications do not generalize for alternative definitions of positive dependence. From this, we propose new approaches to the problems of pure strategy equilibrium existence in first-price auctions (PSEE) and the characterization of the revenue ranking of auctions. For equilibrium existence, we slightly restrict the set of distributions considered, without loss of economic generality, and offer a complete characterization of PSEE. For revenue ranking, we obtain a characterization of the expected revenue differences between second and first price auctions with general dependence of types.

Hybrid auctions

In this paper we analyze a hybrid auction that combines a first-price and a Vickrey auction. We show that this auction may generate more expected revenue than a standard first-price auction. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Reserve price commitments in auctions

It is well known that the optimal auction-one that maximizes the seller's expected revenue-can be implemented using a standard auction format with a suitably chosen reserve price. This reserve price is above the seller's value of retaining the object and the mechanism requires a commitment not to sell the object below the reserve. This commitment is what makes the reserve valuable to the seller. However, in practice, a reserve price commits the seller to sell the object if the reserve is reached, but does not commit her to withhold the object from sale if bidding falls short of the reserve. In this note we investigate whether reserve prices remain valuable for the seller when she may negotiate with the highest bidder if the reserve is not met. We show that the value of the reserve price may be completely undermined if the seller is a sufficiently weak bargainer. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Corruption and auctions

We investigate how corruption affects the outcome of a first-price auction (bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller's expected revenue). The auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in his bid in exchange for a bribe. The bribe can be a percentage of the difference between the winning and the second-highest bid or a fixed amount. We show that there exists a symmetric bidding strategy equilibrium that is monotone, i.e., higher valuation buyers bid higher. Corruption does not affect efficiency but both the auctioneer's expected bribe and the seller's expected revenue depend on the format of the bribe payments. We also find the optimal bribe scheme.

A Carbon Tax for Ireland

The Programme for Government 2007-2012 states that '[a]ppropriate fiscal instruments, including a carbon levy, will be phased in on a revenue-neutral basis over the lifetime of this Government.' The terms of reference of the Commission on Taxation repeats the commitment to introduce measures to further lower carbon emissions and to phase in on a revenue neutral basis appropriate fiscal measures including a carbon levy over the lifetime of the Government and invites the Commission to [i]nvestigate fiscal measures to protect and enhance the environment including the introduction of a carbon tax. This paper presents thoughts and considerations about such a carbon tax. It discusses selected design issues, and presents a preliminary impact assessment for what the authors think is a reasonable design. More specifically, It addresses ten questions: 1. Why impose a carbon tax? 2. What level should the tax be? 3. Who should be taxed? 4. What is the expected revenue? 5. What to do with the revenue? 6. What are the macro-economic implications? 7. What are the effects on emissions? 8. What are the effects on income distribution? 9. How to tax internationally traded goods and services? 10. What about fuel tourism? On some of these questions, it presents arguments and evidence. Other questions call for further research. Aspects of some questions can only be answered by the Dail �ireann.This resource was contributed by The National Documentation Centre on Drug Use.

Mobiilialan Start-up -yrityksen jakelukanavan valinta

Diplomityössä tutkitaan mobiilisovellusten keskitettyjä jakelukanavia Start-up – yritysten näkökulmasta. Työssä selvitetään, mitkä tekijät vaikuttavat Start-up – yrityksen jakelukanavan valintaan ja millä perusteilla valinta tehdään. Työn tuloksena saatiin 318 sovelluskehittäjän arvio kymmeneen valintakriteeriin. Merkittävin yksittäinen tekijä Start-up –yrityksille on laitekannan koko. Lisäksi Start-up –yritykset arvostavat muita enemmän sovellusten löydettävyyttä, odotettuja tulovirtoja ja omaa asiantuntemustansa. Mielipiteet Start-up –yritysten kesken jakaa kuitenkin valittu jakelukanava. Suurin yksittäinen päätöskriteeri on markkinatutkimus, yksin tai yhdessä media- ja lehdistötietojen kanssa.

Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions

In this note, in an independent private values auction framework, I discuss the relationship between the set of types and the distribution of types. I show that any set of types, finite dimensional or not, can be extended to a larger set of types preserving incentive compatibility constraints, expected revenue and bidder’s expected utilities. Thus for example we may convexify a set of types making our model amenable to the large body of theory in economics and mathematics that relies on convexity assumptions. An interesting application of this extension procedure is to show that although revenue equivalence is not valid in general if the set of types is not convex these mechanism have underlying distinct allocation mechanism in the extension. Thus we recover in these situations the revenue equivalence.

Análise da alocação de ativos para carteiras de planos tradicionais em entidades abertas de previdência complementar

Neste trabalho discutimos a evolução recente do mercado de previdência privada complementar aberta no Brasil, e os principais fatores motivadores dessa evolução. Concentramo-nos na participação dos chamados planos tradicionais de previdência complementar, com mínimos garantidos e reversão de excedentes financeiros. Mostramos que essa modalidade de plano possui um conjunto de opções embutidas que representam direitos do participante, ou cliente, sobre o capital da seguradora ou entidade aberta de previdência complementar (EAPC). Essas opções representam riscos adicionais no balanço da EAPC que não estão necessariamente neutralizados. Para tentar neutralizar esses riscos a gestão dos ativos garantidores dos passivos dos planos tradicionais precisa levar em consideração as características desses passivos. Apresentamos cinco critérios comuns, alguns detalhadamente descritos na literatura de finanças, para escolha e alocação de carteiras de ativos em EAPCs, considerando as especificidades dos planos tradicionais e as suas opções embutidas. Testamos carteiras selecionadas com base nesses critérios para o passado recente e procuramos avaliar o impacto dos resultados na geração de receita esperada por essa modalidade de produto. Os resultados indicam que, quanto mais correlacionada for à performance da carteira de ativos com o perfil de evolução dos passivos, mais eficiente será a neutralização dos riscos representados pelas opções emitidas pela EAPC, e menos volátil será o fluxo de receita gerado por essa modalidade de produto.

Hybrid Auctions I: Theory

In this paper we examine the properties of a hybrid auction that combines a sealed bid and an ascending auction. In this auction, each bidder submits a sealed bid. Once the highest bid is known, the bidder who submitted it is declared the winner if her bid is higher than the second highest by more than a predetermined amount or percentage. If at least one more bidder submitted a bid su¢ciently close to the highest bid (that is, if the di¤erence between this bid and the highest bid is smaller than the predetermined amount or percentage) the quali…ed buyers compete in an open ascending auction that has the highest bid of the …rst stage as the reserve price. Quali…ed bidders include not only the highest bidder in the …rst stage but also those who bid close enough to her. We show that this auction generates more revenue than a standard auction. Although this hybrid auction does not generate as much revenue as the optimal auction, it is ex-post e¢cient.

Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual’s value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing. There are several corollaries. First, the seller is indi¤erent between selling the objects simultaneously as a bundle or sequentially when synergies are positive. Second, when synergies are negative, the expected revenue generated by the simultaneous auction can be larger or smaller than the expected revenue generated by the sequential auction. In addition, in the presence of positive synergies, an option to buy the additional object at the price of the …rst object is never exercised in the symmetric equilibrium and the seller’s revenue is unchanged. Under negative synergies, in contrast, if there is an equilibrium where the option is never exercised, then equilibrium prices may either increase or decrease and, therefore, the net e¤ect on the seller’s revenue of the introduction of an option is ambiguous. Finally, we examine two special cases with asymmetric players. In the …rst case, players have distinct synergies. In this example, even if one player has positive synergies and the other has negative synergies, it is still possible for expected prices to decline. In the second case, one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. For this example, we show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco (1997). The reason is that players with singleunit demand will generally bid less than their true valuations in the …rst period. Therefore, there are two opposing forces; the reduction in the bid of the player with multiple-demand in the last auction and less aggressive bidding in the …rst auction by the players with single-unit demand.

Mid-auction information acquisition

This paper studies a model of a sequential auction where bidders are allowed to acquire further information about their valuations of the object in the middle of the auction. It is shown that, in any equilibrium where the distribution of the final price is atornless, a bidder's best response has a simple characterization. In particular, the optimal information acquisition point is the same, regardless of the other bidders' actions. This makes it natural to focus on symmetric, undominated equilibria, as in the Vickrey auction. An existence theorem for such a class of equilibria is presented. The paper also presents some results and numerical simulations that compare this sequential auction with the one-shot auction. 8equential auctions typically yield more expected revenue for the seller than their one-shot counterparts. 80 the possibility of mid-auction information acquisition can provide an explanation for why sequential procedures are more often adopted.

Share bidding auctions, sliding scale royalty rates and the new brazilian regulatory framework for the pre-salt areas

O governo brasileiro recentemente aprovou uma legislação instituindo um novo marco regulatório para as reservas petrolíferas do pré-sal. Segundo as novas regras, estas áreas deverão ser licitadas mediante um leilão de partilha de lucro. Motivado por esta mudança, apresentamos um modelo de leilão de partilha sob afiliação, demonstrando a existência de um equilíbrio monótono em estratégias puras e caracterizando a solução. Alem disso, provamos que este mecanismo gera receita esperada maior ou igual a um leilão de primeiro preço usual. Em seguida, introduzimos no modelo uma função representando taxas de royalties que dependem do valor do objeto. Este instrumento permite uma elevação na receita esperada de ambos os modelos, fazendo com que a diferença entre eles encolha. Finalmente, analisando o novo marco regulatório sob o ponto de vista dos resultados obtidos, concluímos que o antigo modelo de concessão utilizado pelo governo brasileiro é mais adequado e lucrativo.

Uma abordagem fuzzy para a avaliação técnico-econômica de redes de acesso

O surgimento de novas tecnologias e serviços vem impondo mudanças substanciais ao tradicional sistema de telecomunicações. Múltiplas possibilidades de evolução do sistema fazem da etapa de planejamento um procedimento não só desejável como necessário, principalmente num ambiente de competitividade. A utilização de metodologias abrangentes e flexíveis que possam auxiliar no processo de decisão, fundadas em modelos de otimização, parece um caminho inevitável. Este artigo propõe um modelo de programação linear inteiro misto para ajudar no planejamento estratégico de sistemas de telecomunicações, e em particular da rede de acesso. Os principais componentes de custo e receita são identificados e o modelo é desenvolvido para determinar a configuração da rede (serviços, tecnologias, etc) que maximize a receita esperada pelo operador do sistema. O conceito de números fuzzy é adotado para avaliar o risco técnico-econômico em situações de imprecisão nos dados de demanda. Resultados de experimentos computacionais são apresentados e discutidos.

Nonparametric Identication and Structural Estimation of Auction Models

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06