Rethinking crises and the accretion of executive power: the “War on Terror” and conditionality evidence from seven political systems

External shocks to democratic systems are likely to threaten the stability of relations between the executive and the representative assembly. This article investigates the impact of the so-called “war on terror” on executive-assembly relations in comparative perspective. We analyze data from seven countries, which varied in terms of form of government, level of democracy, culture, social structure, and geographic location, to evaluate its effects. We find that whereas in some systems the “war on terror” altered the balance of power between the executive and the assembly, in other cases the extant balance of power was preserved. We postulate various conditions under which the constitutionally sanctioned balance of power is most likely to be preserved in times of crisis.

Executive Power and the People: Does the President Care What You Think?

I sought to examine the relationship between public approval of the president and his subsequent behavior. Specifically, I looked at the relationship between public approval and signing statement usage along with their usage following the 2006 outcry against President Bush's use of them.

The constitutional power to make war: domestic legal issues raised by Australia's action in Iraq

The legal power to declare war has traditionally been a part of a prerogative to be exercised solely on advice that passed from the King to the Governor-General no later than 1942. In 2003, the Governor- General was not involved in the decision by the Prime Minister and Cabinet to commit Australian troops to the invasion of Iraq. The authors explore the alternative legal means by which Australia can go to war - means the government in fact used in 2003 - and the constitutional basis of those means. While the prerogative power can be regulated and/or devolved by legislation, and just possibly by practice, there does not seem to be a sound legal basis to assert that the power has been devolved to any other person. It appears that in 2003 the Defence Minister used his legal powers under the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (as amended in 1975) to give instructions to the service head(s). A powerful argument could be made that the relevant sections of the Defence Act were not intended to be used for the decision to go to war, and that such instructions are for peacetime or in bello decisions. If so, the power to make war remains within the prerogative to be exercised on advice. Interviews with the then Governor-General indicate that Prime Minister Howard had planned to take the matter to the Federal Executive Council 'for noting', but did not do so after the Governor-General sought the views of the then Attorney-General about relevant issues of international law. The exchange raises many issues, but those of interest concern the kinds of questions the Governor-General could and should ask about proposed international action and whether they in any way mirror the assurances that are uncontroversially required for domestic action. In 2003, the Governor-General's scrutiny was the only independent scrutiny available because the legality of the decision to go to war was not a matter that could be determined in the High Court, and the federal government had taken action in March 2002 that effectively prevented the matter coming before the International Court of Justice

Government community service contracts : restraining abuse of power

The use of grant contracts to deliver community services is now a significant feature of all Australian government administrations. These contracts are the primary instrument governing the provision of such services to citizens and are largely outside the usual parliamentary review mechanisms and constraints. This article examines the extent of the erosion of fundamental constitutional principles facilitated by the use of private contracts, by applying the principles used in scrutiny of delegated legislation to standard form federal and State community service contracts. It reveals extensive executive power which, if the relationship were founded in legislative instruments rather than in private contract, would have to be justified to Parliament at least and possibly not tolerated.

Presidential power and congressional acquiescence in the "war" on terrorism: a new constitutional equilibrium?

US presidents have expanded executive power in times of war and emergency,sometimes aggressively so. This article builds on the application of punctuated equilibria theory by Burnham (1999 and Ackerman (1999). Underpinning this theory is the notion that rapid changes in - or external shocks to - domestic and international society impose new and insistent demands on the state. In so doing, they produce important and decisive moments of institutional mobilization and creativity, disrupt a pre-existing, relatively stable, equilibrium between the Congress and the president, and precipitate decisions or nondecisions by the electorate and political leaders that define the contours for action when the next crisis or external shock occurs. The article suggests that the combination of President George W. Bush's presidentialist doctrine, 9/11 and the 'war' on terror has consolidated a new, constitutional equilibrium. While some members of Congress contest the new order, the Congress collectively has acquiesced in its own marginalization. The article surveys a wide range of executive power assertions and legislative retreats. It argues that power assertions generally draw on precedent: on, for example, a tradition of wartime presidential extraconstitutional leadership extending to presidents, such as John Adams and Abraham Lincoln,as well as to Cold War and post-Cold War presidentialism.

Strengthening executive-legislative consultation on foreign policy.

Item 1017-A, 1017-B (microfiche)

Veto power of president. Hearing before the Committee on the judiciary, House of Representatives. Sixty-third Congress, first session, on H.J. res. 15. September 9, 1913.

Includes list of revenue and appropriation bills vetoed by presidents of the United States, list of states in which veto power is not vested in the governor, etc., etc.

Statement by Herbert Brownell, Jr., attorney general of the United States before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. J. Res. 1 (83d Cong.) a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to the making of treaties and executive agreements, and S. J. Res. 43 (83d Cong.) a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the legal effect of certain treaties.

Mode of access: Internet.

Speech of Mr. Barton, of Missouri, upon the power of the President to remove federal officers : and upon the restraining power and duty of the Senate over an abusive exercise of that power : and in reply to the arguments of several members of the majority.

At head of caption title: In the Senate of the United States, March 17, 1830. Executive session.

Speech on executive powers, delivered in the House of Representatives, Dec. 19, 1837.

Caption title.

Second speech of Robert Wickliffe, Jr. (of Fayette,) on the veto power : delivered in committee of the whole of the House of Representatives, January, 1842.

Mode of access: Internet.

Law and the executive in Britain : a comparative study /

Bibliographical footnotes.

The independence of the Executive,

First published 1900.