Corporate performance and the pay gap

Increasing disparity between executive compensation and that of the average worker (the pay gap) has generated a fierce debate about its causes and effects. This paper studies the determinants and performance effects of the pay gap through the prism of Tournament Incentives and the Equity Fairness Theory. Results show that the size of the pay gap is caused primarily by the size of the firm and by the standards of its industry and also by the unionization rate and whether the Chairman is also the CEO. The paper Concludes by showins that the pay gap has a positive effect on firm performance in the United States Keywords:

Executive pay and performance: did bankers’ bonuses cause the crisis?

This paper examines the pay-performance relationship between executive cash compensation (including bonuses) and company performance for a sample of large UK companies, focusing particularly on the financial services industry, since incentive misalignment has been blamed as one of the factors causing the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Although we find that pay in the financial services sector is high, the cash-plus-bonus pay-performance sensitivity of financial firms is not significantly higher than in other sectors. Consequently, we conclude that it unlikely that incentive structures could be held responsible for inducing bank executives to focus on short-term results.

Executive pay, tournaments and corporate performance in UK firms

Recent initiatives for modernising local government have ignored the potential contribution of parish and town councils. This article critically examines English parish and town councils in the context of the current debate about the need for government to be more responsive to community needs. It considers measures to enhance the capacity of these grassroots councils by recalibrating the responsibilities and resources between tiers of local government. It concludes by setting out possible reforms to facilitate the contribution of these local councils to the modernising agenda as both representatives of the community and potential providers of local services.

Incentives, Sustainability, and Law: The relationship between executive pay regulation and corporate social responsibility

What is the relationship between executive pay regulation and corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Currently, CSR is neither sufficiently included in economic research on executive pay, nor is pay regulation considered as a potential instrument in the growing body of CSR legislation. The successful proliferation of CSR in business practice and the attention policymakers and legislators now pay to it, however, have raised the importance of answering these questions. Thus, this blind spot in corporate governance—the relationship between compensation, CSR, and law—is the topic of this thesis. The dissertation approaches these issues in two subsequent research question: first, the role of executive pay regulation as an institutional determinant of CSR engagement is identified. From the results of this, the second research question arises: should legislators promote CSR engagement and—if so—how? Lastly, a case study is conducted to map how the influence of index funds as an important driver of CSR in corporate governance should be accommodated in the design of CSR legislation. The research project shows that pay regulation is part of the institutional determinants of CSR and, depending on its design, can incentivise or discourage different forms of CSR engagement. As a form of private self-regulation, CSR is closely interconnected with legal rules and the result of complex underlying drivers inside and outside the firm. The study develops a differentiation of CSR activities to accommodate this complexity, which is applied in an analysis of pay regulation. Together, these inquiries form a comprehensive picture of the ways in which pay regulation sets incentives for CSR engagement. Finally, the thesis shows how CSR-oriented pay regulation is consistent with the conventional goals of corporate governance and eventually provides a prospect for the integration of CSR and corporate law in general.

Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysis

The question of whether the design of the corporate executive pay package reflects an attempt to reduce agency costs between shareholders an managers is adressed. The components of senior executive pay are found to vary systematically across firms in a manner that cannot easily be explained by tax effects, and which would indicate that individual elements of pay are aimed at controlling for limited horizon and risk exposure problems. Managerial decisions and the structure of managerial pay therefore appear to be interrelated.

Corporate tournaments and executive compensation: evidence from the UK

This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance.

Executive remuneration, financial performance and corporate governance in UK and Spanish listed firms

This study examines the relationship between executive directors’ remuneration and the financial performance and corporate governance arrangements of the UK and Spanish listed firms. These countries’ corporate governance framework has been shaped by differences in legal origin, culture and backgrounds. For example, the UK legal arrangements can be defined as to be constituted in common-law, whereas for Spanish firms, the legal arrangement is based on civil law. We estimate both static and dynamic regression models to test our hypotheses and we estimate our regression using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Estimated results for both countries show that directors’ remuneration levels are positively related with measures of firm value and financial performance. This means that remuneration levels do not lead to a point whereby firm value is reduced due to excessive remuneration. These results hold for our long-run estimates. That is, estimates based on panel cointegration and panel error correction. Measures of corporate governance also impacts on the level of executive pay. Our results have important implications for existing corporate governance arrangements and how the interests of stakeholders are protected. For example, long-run results suggest that directors’ remuneration adjusts in a way to capture variation in financial performance

Income differentials and corporate performance

Purpose – This paper seeks to make the case for new research into the perceived fairness and impact of executive pay. Design/methodology/approach – The paper reviews the literature regarding executive compensation and corporate performance and examines the evidence that a more egalitarian approach to pay could be justified in terms of long-term shareholder value. Findings – There would appear to be no evidence to suggest that the growing gap between the pay of executives and that of the average employee generates long-term enterprise value, and it may even be detrimental to firms, if not the liberal capitalist consensus on which the corporate licence to operate is based. Research limitations/implications – The paper outlines a new approach to tracking income differentials with corporate performance through the development of a corporate Gini coefficient “league table”. Social implications – The proposed research is expected to point towards better practice in executive remuneration, and support the growing momentum for a sustainable and enlightened approach to business, in which the key goal is long-term enterprise value based on a fair distribution of the rewards of business. Originality/value – In producing a deeper understanding of the impact of widening income differentials, the paper should be of interest to senior executives in publicly quoted companies as well as press commentators, government officials and academics.

Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.

Executive function and memory in patients with relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis. 'Funci??n ejecutiva y memoria en pacientes con esclerosis m??ltiple recurrente-remitente'

Resumen tomado de la publicaci??n

Mnesic performance and executive functions in patients with multiple sclerosis (MS)

The Episodic Memory (EM) and the Executive Functions (EF) are cognitive areas that are affected in patients with diagnosis of Multiple Sclerosis (MS). Nowadays there exists scarce works destined to explore the infl uence of the EF on measures of mnesic performance in MS. For this reason, we analyze the effect of the EF on the performance in a set of memory measures. We worked with a clinical group (n=36) and with a control group (n=36) compared by age and educational level. The results show that the clinical group obtained significantly low average values in all the mnesic indexes (with exception of recognition) and in all the executive measures. All the executive indexes showed significant associations with some of the indexes of mnesic performance. These findings suggest that the problems in the episodic memory in EM patients could be analyzed as the manifestation of a global disorder that could be similar to the one that involves the EF. 

Scrambling to pay the bills : building allies for America's working families : a set of comprehensive, specific Democratic proposals to address wage and income stagnation to produce long-term, higher rates of economic growth, shared with working families, in the United States : full report : executive summary /

"February 28, 1996."

Random error in willingness to pay measurement: A multiple indicators, latent variable approach to the reliability of contingent values

The reliability of measurement refers to unsystematic error in observed responses. Investigations of the prevalence of random error in stated estimates of willingness to pay (WTP) are important to an understanding of why tests of validity in CV can fail. However, published reliability studies have tended to adopt empirical methods that have practical and conceptual limitations when applied to WTP responses. This contention is supported in a review of contingent valuation reliability studies that demonstrate important limitations of existing approaches to WTP reliability. It is argued that empirical assessments of the reliability of contingent values may be better dealt with by using multiple indicators to measure the latent WTP distribution. This latent variable approach is demonstrated with data obtained from a WTP study for stormwater pollution abatement. Attitude variables were employed as a way of assessing the reliability of open-ended WTP (with benchmarked payment cards) for stormwater pollution abatement. The results indicated that participants' decisions to pay were reliably measured, but not the magnitude of the WTP bids. This finding highlights the need to better discern what is actually being measured in VVTP studies, (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Multiple roles for executive control in belief-desire reasoning:distinct neural networks are recruited for self perspective inhibition and complexity of reasoning

Belief-desire reasoning is a core component of 'Theory of Mind' (ToM), which can be used to explain and predict the behaviour of agents. Neuroimaging studies reliably identify a network of brain regions comprising a 'standard' network for ToM, including temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex. Whilst considerable experimental evidence suggests that executive control (EC) may support a functioning ToM, co-ordination of neural systems for ToM and EC is poorly understood. We report here use of a novel task in which psychologically relevant ToM parameters (true versus false belief; approach versus avoidance desire) were manipulated orthogonally. The valence of these parameters not only modulated brain activity in the 'standard' ToM network but also in EC regions. Varying the valence of both beliefs and desires recruits anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting a shared inhibitory component associated with negatively valenced mental state concepts. Varying the valence of beliefs additionally draws on ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, reflecting the need to inhibit self perspective. These data provide the first evidence that separate functional and neural systems for EC may be recruited in the service of different aspects of ToM.