Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games

We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.

The land hoarding and land inspector dilemma in China : an evolutionary game theoretic perspective

China has experienced considerable economic growth since 1978, which was accompanied by unprecedented growth in urbanization and, more recently, by associated rising urban housing and land banking issues. One such issue is that of land hoarding - where real estate developers purchase land to hold unused in the rising market for a future lucrative sale, often several years later. This practice is outlawed in China, where land use is controlled by increasingly strengthened Government policies and inspectors. Despite this, land hoarding continues apace, with the main culprits being the developers and inspectors working subversively. This resembles a game between two players - the inspector and the developer - which provides the setting for this paper in developing an evolutionary game theory model to provide insights into dealing with the dilemmas faced by the players. The logic and dilemma of land banking strategy and illegal land banking issues are analysed, along with the land inspector’s role from a game theory perspective by determining the replication dynamic mechanism and evolutionary stable strategies under the various conditions that the players face. The major factors influencing the actions of land inspectors, on the other hand, are the costs of inspection, no matter if it is strict or indolent, conflict costs, and income and penalties from corruption. From this, it is shown that, when the net loss for corruption (income from corruption minus the penalties for corruption and cost of strict inspections) is less than the cost of strict inspections, the final evolutionary stable strategy of the inspectors is to carry out indolent inspections. Then, whether penalising developers for hoarding is severe or not, the evolutionary strategy for the developer is to hoard. The implications for land use control mechanisms and associated developer-inspector actions and counteractions are then examined in the light of the model's properties.

Evolutionary demography of long-lived monocarpic perennials: a time-lagged integral projection model

1. The evolution of flowering strategies (when and at what size to flower) in monocarpic perennials is determined by balancing current reproduction with expected future reproduction, and these are largely determined by size-specific patterns of growth and survival. However, because of the difficulty in following long-lived individuals throughout their lives, this theory has largely been tested using short-lived species (< 5 years). 2. Here, we tested this theory using the long-lived monocarpic perennial Campanula thyrsoides which can live up to 16 years. We used a novel approach that combined permanent plot and herb chronology data from a 3-year field study to parameterize and validate integral projection models (IPMs). 3. Similar to other monocarpic species, the rosette leaves of C. thyrsoides wither over winter and so size cannot be measured in the year of flowering. We therefore extended the existing IPM framework to incorporate an additional time delay that arises because flowering demography must be predicted from rosette size in the year before flowering. 4. We found that all main demographic functions (growth, survival probability, flowering probability and fecundity) were strongly size-dependent and there was a pronounced threshold size of flowering. There was good agreement between the predicted distribution of flowering ages obtained from the IPMs and that estimated in the field. Mostly, there was good agreement between the IPM predictions and the direct quantitative field measurements regarding the demographic parameters lambda, R-0 and T. We therefore conclude that the model captures the main demographic features of the field populations. 5. Elasticity analysis indicated that changes in the survival and growth function had the largest effect (c. 80%) on lambda and this was considerably larger than in short-lived monocarps. We found only weak selection pressure operating on the observed flowering strategy which was close to the predicted evolutionary stable strategy. 6. Synthesis. The extended IPM accurately described the demography of a long-lived monocarpic perennial using data collected over a relatively short period. We could show that the evolution of flowering strategies in short- and long-lived monocarps seem to follow the same general rules but with a longevity-related emphasis on survival over fecundity.

A model for the evolution of pathogen-induced leaf shedding

A size-structured plant population model is developed to study the evolution of pathogen-induced leaf shedding under various environmental conditions. The evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the leaf shedding rate is determined for two scenarios: i) a constant leaf shedding strategy and ii) an infection load driven leaf shedding strategy. The model predicts that ESS leaf shedding rates increase with nutrient availability. No effect of plant density on the ESS leaf shedding rate is found even though disease severity increases with plant density. When auto-infection, that is increased infection due to spores produced on the plant itself, plays a key role in further disease increase on the plant, shedding leaves removes disease that would otherwise contribute to disease increase on the plant itself. Consequently leaf shedding responses to infections may evolve. When external infection, that is infection due to immigrant spores, is the key determinant, shedding a leaf does not reduce the force of infection on the leaf shedding plant. In this case leaf shedding will not evolve. Under a low external disease pressure adopting an infection driven leaf shedding strategy is more efficient than adopting a constant leaf shedding strategy, since a plant adopting an infection driven leaf shedding strategy does not shed any leaves in the absence of infection, even when leaf shedding rates are high. A plant adopting a constant leaf shedding rate sheds the same amount of leaves regardless of the presence of infection. Based on the results we develop two hypotheses that can be tested if the appropriate plant material is available.

A model for the evolution of pathogen-induced leaf shedding

A size-structured plant population model is developed to study the evolution of pathogen-induced leaf shedding under various environmental conditions. The evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the leaf shedding rate is determined for two scenarios: i) a constant leaf shedding strategy and ii) an infection load driven leaf shedding strategy. The model predicts that ESS leaf shedding rates increase with nutrient availability. No effect of plant density on the ESS leaf shedding rate is found even though disease severity increases with plant density. When auto-infection, that is increased infection due to spores produced on the plant itself, plays a key role in further disease increase on the plant, shedding leaves removes disease that would otherwise contribute to disease increase on the plant itself. Consequently leaf shedding responses to infections may evolve. When external infection, that is infection due to immigrant spores, is the key determinant, shedding a leaf does not reduce the force of infection on the leaf shedding plant. In this case leaf shedding will not evolve. Under a low external disease pressure adopting an infection driven leaf shedding strategy is more efficient than adopting a constant leaf shedding strategy, since a plant adopting an infection driven leaf shedding strategy does not shed any leaves in the absence of infection, even when leaf shedding rates are high. A plant adopting a constant leaf shedding rate sheds the same amount of leaves regardless of the presence of infection. Based on the results we develop two hypotheses that can be tested if the appropriate plant material is available.

Female–female aggression : structure of interaction and outcome in loggerhead sea turtles

Aggressive behaviour between females of the same species is not widely documented, particularly in marine vertebrates. During a 3 yr in-water survey at the temperate loggerhead sea turtle Caretta caretta breeding area of Zakynthos, Greece, female–female interactions comprised 4% of all female loggerhead sighting events (n = 60 out of 1449 events). Male–female interactions comprised an additional 4% of sighting events, while 92% were of solitary females. The structure of interactions was analysed for 58 of these sighting events, each lasting an average of 3.4 min (SD ± 1) and comprising a total of 3.1 h observation time. We found that interactions involved ritualized escalation in behaviour from passive threat displays (e.g. head–tail circling) to aggressive combat (e.g. sparring). We suggest that circling individuals evaluate opponent size, sparring individuals test opponent strength, and that the positioning of the prehensile tail signals motivational intent to either escalate or abort. The presence of intruder females triggered a passive response in 100% of events involving basking and swimming turtles (n = 19); although residents resting on the seabed only responded on 69% of occasions (n = 27), their response was almost 4 times more likely to escalate to one of aggression. Our results suggest that certain sites may be preferentially sought after and defended by sea turtles.

Using climatic suitability thresholds to identify past, present and future population viability

Often climatic niche models predict that any change in climatic conditions will impact species abundance or distribution. However, the accuracy of models that just incorporate climatic information to predict future species habitat use is widely debated. Alternatively, environmental conditions may simply need to be above some minimum threshold of climatic suitability, at which point, other factors drive population size. Using the example of nesting sites of loggerhead sea turtles (Caretta caretta) in the Mediterranean (n = 105), we developed climatic niche models to examine whether a climatic suitability threshold could be identified as a climatic indicator in order for large populations of a widespread species to exist. We then assessed the climatic suitability of sites above and below this threshold in the past (∼1900) and future (∼2100). Most large sites that are currently above the climatic threshold were above the threshold in the past and future, particularly when future nesting seasonality shifted to start 1–2 months earlier. Our analyses highlight the importance of future phenological shifts for maintaining suitability. Our results provide a positive outlook for sea turtle conservation, suggesting that climatic conditions may remain suitable in the future at sites that currently support large nesting populations. Our study also provides an alternative way of interpreting the outputs of climatic niche models, by generating a threshold as an index of a minimum climatic suitability required to sustain large populations. This type of approach offers the possibility to benefit from information provided by climate-driven models, while reducing their inherent uncertainties.

Modeling the role of competition and cooperation in the evolution of katydid acoustic synchrony

The precise timing of individual signals in response to those of signaling neighbors is seen in many animal species. Synchrony is the most striking of the resultant timing patterns. One of the best examples of acoustic synchrony is in katydid choruses where males produce chirps with a high degree of temporal overlap. Cooperative hypotheses that speculate on the evolutionary origins of acousti synchrony include the preservation of the species-specific call pattern, reduced predation risks, and increased call intensity. An alternative suggestion is that synchrony evolved as an epiphenomenon of competition between males in response to a female preference for chirps that lead other chirps. Previous models investigating the evolutionary origins of synchrony focused only on intrasexual competitive interactions. We investigated both competitive and cooperative hypotheses for the evolution of synchrony in the katydid Mecopoda ``Chirper'' using physiologically and ecologically realistic simulation models incorporating the natural variation in call features, ecology, female preferences, and spacing patterns, specifically aggregation. We found that although a female preference for leading chirps enables synchronous males to have some selective advantage, it is the female preference for the increased intensity of aggregations of synchronous males that enables synchrony to evolve as an evolutionarily stable strategy.

The Economics of "Why is it so hard to save a threatened Language?"

We study the language choice behavior of bilingual speakers in modern societies, such as the Basque Country, Ireland andWales. These countries have two o cial languages:A, spoken by all, and B, spoken by a minority. We think of the bilinguals in those societies as a population playing repeatedly a Bayesian game in which, they must choose strategically the language, A or B, that might be used in the interaction. The choice has to be made under imperfect information about the linguistic type of the interlocutors. We take the Nash equilibrium of the language use game as a model for real life language choice behavior. It is shown that the predictions made with this model t very well the data about the actual use, contained in the censuses, of Basque, Irish and Welsh languages. Then the question posed by Fishman (2001),which appears in the title, is answered as follows: it is hard, mainly, because bilingual speakers have reached an equilibrium which is evolutionary stable. This means that to solve fast and in a re ex manner their frequent language coordination problem, bilinguals have developed linguistic conventions based chie y on the strategy 'Use the same language as your interlocutor', which weakens the actual use of B.1

Institutions, Behavior and Evolution

The three articles constituting this thesis are for reasons of content or method related to the following three fields in economics: Behavioral Economics, Evolutionary Game Theory and Formal Institutional Economics. A core element of these fields is the concept of individual preferences. Preferences are of central importance for the conceptional framework to analyze human behavior. They form the foundation for the theory of rational choice which is defined by the determination of the choice set and the selection of the most preferred alternative according to some consistency requirements. The theory of rational choice is based on a very simplified description of the problem of choice (object function and constraints). However, that choices depend on many more factors is for instance propagated by psychological theories and is supported by many empirical and experimental studies. This thesis adds to a better understanding of individual behavior to the extent that the evolution of certain characteristics of preferences and their consequences on human behavior forms the overarching theme of the dissertation. The long-term effect of evolutionary forces on a particular characteristic of importance in the theoretical, empirical and experimental economic literature, the concept of inequality aversion, is subject of the article “The evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life” (Chapter 4). The contribution of the article is the overcoming of a restriction of former approaches to analyze the evolution of preferences in very simple environments. By classifying human interaction into three central economic games, the article provides a first step towards a simplified and sufficiently complete description of the interaction environment. Within such an environment the article characterizes the evolutionary stable preference distribution. One result shows, that the interaction of the aforementioned three classes can stabilize a preference of inequality aversion in the subpopulation which is favored in the problem of redistribution. The two remaining articles are concerned with social norms, which dissemination is determined by medium-run forces of cultural evolution. The article “The impact of market innovations on the evolution of social norms: the sustainability case.“ (Chapter 2) studies the interrelation between product innovations which are relevant from a sustainability perspective and an according social norm in consumption. This relation is based on a conformity bias in consumption and the attempt to avoid cognitive dissonances resulting from non-compliant consumption. Among others, it is shown that a conformity bias on the consumption side can lead to multiple equilibria on the side of norm adoption. The article “Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas: signaling internalized norms.” (Chapter 3) studies the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas based on the signaling of social norms. The article provides a potential explanation of cooperative behavior, which does not rely on the assumption of structured populations or on the unmotivated ability of social norms to restrict individual actions or strategy spaces. A comprehensive result of the single articles is the explanation of the phenomenon of partial norm adaption or dissemination of preferences. The plurality of the applied approaches with respect to the proximity to the rational choice approach and regarding the underlying evolutionary mechanics is a particular strength of the thesis. It shows the equality of these approaches in their potential to explain the phenomenon of cooperation in environments that provide material incentives for defective behavior. This also points to the need of a unified framework considering the biological and cultural coevolution of preference patterns.

Evolutionary bi-stability in pathogen transmission mode

Many pathogens transmit to new hosts by both infection (horizontal transmission) and transfer to the infected host's offspring (vertical transmission). These two transmission modes require speci®c adap- tations of the pathogen that can be mutually exclusive, resulting in a trade-off between horizontal and vertical transmission. We show that in mathematical models such trade-offs can lead to the simultaneous existence of two evolutionary stable states (evolutionary bi-stability) of allocation of resources to the two modes of transmission. We also show that jumping between evolutionary stable states can be induced by gradual environmental changes. Using quantitative PCR-based estimates of abundance in seed and vege- tative parts, we show that the pathogen of wheat, Phaeosphaeria nodorum, has jumped between two distinct states of transmission mode twice in the past 160 years, which, based on published evidence, we interpret as adaptation to environmental change. The ®nding of evolutionary bi-stability has impli- cations for human, animal and other plant diseases. An ill-judged change in a disease control programme could cause the pathogen to evolve a new, and possibly more damaging, combination of transmission modes. Similarly, environmental changes can shift the balance between transmission modes, with adverse effects on human, animal and plant health.

Conditional male dimorphism and alternative reproductive tactics in a Neotropical arachnid (Opiliones)

In arthropods, most cases of morphological dimorphism within males are the result of a conditional evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) with status-dependent tactics. In conditionally male-dimorphic species, the status` distributions of male morphs often overlap, and the environmentally cued threshold model (ET) states that the degree of overlap depends on the genetic variation in the distribution of the switchpoints that determine which morph is expressed in each value of status. Here we describe male dimorphism and alternative mating behaviors in the harvestman Serracutisoma proximum. Majors express elongated second legs and use them in territorial fights; minors possess short second legs and do not fight, but rather sneak into majors` territories and copulate with egg-guarding females. The static allometry of second legs reveals that major phenotype expression depends on body size (status), and that the switchpoint underlying the dimorphism presents a large amount of genetic variation in the population, which probably results from weak selective pressure on this trait. With a mark-recapture study, we show that major phenotype expression does not result in survival costs, which is consistent with our hypothesis that there is weak selection on the switchpoint. Finally, we demonstrate that switchpoint is independent of status distribution. In conclusion, our data support the ET model prediction that the genetic correlation between status and switchpoint is low, allowing the status distribution to evolve or to fluctuate seasonally, without any effect on the position of the mean switchpoint.

Efficient Placement of Fault Indicators in an Actual Distribution System Using Evolutionary Computing

This paper proposes an evolutionary computing strategy to solve the problem of fault indicator (FI) placement in primary distribution feeders. More specifically, a genetic algorithm (GA) is employed to search for an efficient configuration of FIs, located at the best positions on the main feeder of a real-life distribution system. Thus, the problem is modeled as one of optimization, aimed at improving the distribution reliability indices, while, at the same time, finding the least expensive solution. Based on actual data, the results confirm the efficiency of the GA approach to the FI placement problem.

Multiresistance in Pasteurella multocida is mediated by coexistence of small plasmids

In most gram-negative bacteria, acquired multiresistance is conferred by large plasmids compiling numerous antimicrobial resistance genes. Here, we show an evolutionary alternative strategy used by Pasteurella multocida to become resistant to multiple clinically relevant antibiotics. Thirteen beta-lactam-resistant clinical isolates, concomitantly resistant to tetracyclines and/or streptomycin as well as to sulfonamides, were studied. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis revealed different profiles among the isolates, showing that clonal dissemination was not the sole event responsible for the spread of multiresistance. Each P. multocida strain carried two or three small plasmids between 4 and 6 kb in size. A direct association between resistance profile and plasmid content was found. Complete nucleotide sequencing of all plasmids revealed seven different replicons, six of them belonging to the ColE1 superfamily. All plasmids carried one, or a maximum of two, antimicrobial resistance determinants. Plasmids pB1000 and pB1002 bore bla(ROB-1), pB1001 carried tet(B), pB1003 and pB1005 carried sul2 and strA, pB1006 harbored tet(O), and p9956 bore the tet(H) gene. All plasmids except pB1002 and pB1006 were successfully transformed into Escherichia coli. pB1000, also involved in beta-lactam resistance in Haemophilus parasuis (A. San Millan et al., Antimicrob. Agents Chemother. 51:2260-2264, 2007), was mobilized in E. coli using the conjugation machinery of an IncP plasmid. Stability experiments proved that pB1000 was stable in P. multocida but highly unstable in E. coli. In conclusion, bla(ROB-1) is responsible for beta-lactam resistance in P. multocida in Spain. Coexistence and the spread of small plasmids are used by P. multocida to become multiresistant.

Evolution of sex ratios in social hymenoptera: consequences of finite brood size

Evolutionarily stable sex ratios are determined for social hymenoptera under local mate competition (LMC) and when the brood size is finite. LMC is modelled by the parameter d. Of the reproductive progeny from a single foundress nest, a fraction d disperses (outbreeding), while (1-d) mate amongst themselves (sibmating). When the brood size is finite, d is taken to be the probability of an offspring dispersing, and similarly, r, the proportion of male offspring, the probability of a haploid egg being laid. Under the joint influence of these two stochastic processes, there is a nonzero probability that some females remain unmated in the nest. As a result, the optimal proportion of males (corresponding to the evolutionarily stable strategy, ESS) is higher than that obtained when the brood size is infinite. When the queen controls the sex ration, the ESS becomes more female biased under increased inbreeding (lower d), However, the ESS under worker control shows an unexpected pattern, including an increase in the proportion of males with increased inbreeding. This effect is traced to the complex interaction between inbreeding and local mate competition.