The personal constructs of coping with chronic low back pain: is coping a necessary evil?

The construct of coping is explored in this paper utilising repertory grid technique with a small group of non-patients with chronic pain. Nineteen volunteers with low back pain completed a repertory grid with eight given elements signifying various self and illness-related roles. Two constructs were given and the remainder elicited using the triad method. The 19 participants rated themselves as being in less pain than those they typified as ill or disabled and considered themselves to be coping with their pain. The constructs elicited emphasised authenticity, the limitations of being a coper, mastery, active stoicism, cheerfulness, acceptance and maintaining acceptable social interactions and appearances. Copers were considered to not be in constant pain. Self, ideal-self and social-self constructs were closely related, The participants rated themselves more like copers than ill, pain-suffering, invalid or hypochondriacal persons. Being a coper, however, was less desirable than being pain free, In essence, these volunteers with low back pain see coping as a necessary evil. This ambivalent and ambiguous construing of coping needs to be further explored in community and patient groups if we are to improve the collaboration between patients and therapists in achieving good pain management. (C) 1997 International Association for the Study of Pain. Published by Elsevier Science B.V.

Multilingualism in the EU: a Necessary Evil?

Aquest treball té com a objectiu analitzar el multilingüisme a la Unió europea des d’una perspectiva interdisciplinària entre traducció i dret de la Unió europea. Aquest article estudia la Unió com a un sistema multilingüe, amb especial èmfasi en les raons jurídiques i polítiques darrera l’actual règim lingüístic. També s’intentarà examinar els efectes que la diversitat lingüística té en la interpretació de la legislació europea. Hi han vint i tres llengües oficials i els textos publicats en les diferents llengües son igualment autèntics (Article 55 TFUE). Però les regles poden tenir la mateixa implicació jurídica en mes d’una llengua?

Introduction. Women as angel, women as evil: interrogating the boundaries

The chapters collected in this volume are only a small sampling of the fruitwhich carne out ofthe Evil, Women and the Feminine conference held in Prague inMay 2010, hosted by the Inter-Disciplinary.Net. Our hopes are to bring togethersorne of the chapters, in expanded form, which seemed, without previous planning,to speak to each other during the conference and which, herein, more directiyengage with one another, opening up a space for dialogue and interaction. Whilewe have divided the work into four sections, they are not discrete boundaries but, we hope, they work together to elicit an interdisciplinary approach to ourunderstandings of women who push the limits of 'the feminine.'

Introduction. Women as angel, women as evil: interrogating the boundaries

The chapters collected in this volume are only a small sampling of the fruitwhich carne out ofthe Evil, Women and the Feminine conference held in Prague inMay 2010, hosted by the Inter-Disciplinary.Net. Our hopes are to bring togethersorne of the chapters, in expanded form, which seemed, without previous planning,to speak to each other during the conference and which, herein, more directiyengage with one another, opening up a space for dialogue and interaction. Whilewe have divided the work into four sections, they are not discrete boundaries but, we hope, they work together to elicit an interdisciplinary approach to ourunderstandings of women who push the limits of 'the feminine.'

PASSIONS AND EVIL IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

In this paper, I aim at relating passions to evil in Kant's philosophy. I begin by explaining the difference between affects and passions in the textAnthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Kant claims that both affects and passions are illnesses of the mind, because both affect and passion hinder the sovereignty of reason. I show that passions are worse than affects for the purpose of pure reason. Second, I relate affects and passions to the degrees of the propensity to evil in theReligion. I analyze the idea of an ethical community as a way to overcome the evil, which goes beyond political and anthropological solutions suggested by Kant.

Nietzsche's will-to-power ontology : an interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil

Abstract: Nietzsche's Will-to-Power Ontology: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil § 36 By: Mark Minuk Will-to-power is the central component of Nietzsche's philosophy, and passage 36 of Beyond Good and Evil is essential to coming to an understanding of it. 1 argue for and defend the thesis that will-to-power constitutes Nietzsche's ontology, and offer a new understanding of what that means. Nietzsche's ontology can be talked about as though it were a traditional substance ontology (i.e., a world made up of forces; a duality of conflicting forces described as 'towards which' and 'away from which'). However, 1 argue that what defines this ontology is an understanding of valuation as ontologically fundamental—^the basis of interpretation, and from which a substance ontology emerges. In the second chapter, I explain Nietzsche's ontology, as reflected in this passage, through a discussion of Heidegger's two ontological categories in Being and Time (readiness-to-hand, and present-at-hand). In a nutshell, it means that the world of our desires and passions (the most basic of which is for power) is ontologically more fundamental than the material world, or any other interpretation, which is to say, the material world emerges out of a world of our desires and passions. In the first chapter, I address the problematic form of the passage reflected in the first sentence. The passage is in a hypothetical style makes no claim to positive knowledge or truth, and, superficially, looks like Schopenhaurian position for the metaphysics of the will, which Nietzsche rejects. 1 argue that the hypothetical form of the passage is a matter of style, namely, the style of a free-spirit for whom the question of truth is reframed as a question of values. In the third and final chapter, 1 address the charge that Nietzsche's interpretation is a conscious anthropomorphic projection. 1 suggest that the charge rests on a distinction (between nature and man) that Nietzsche rejects. I also address the problem of the causality of the will for Nietzsche, by suggesting that an alternative, perspectival form of causality is possible.

Praxiology of evil: Thinking about threats and their effectiveness

Comment rationnellement peut-on imaginer les stratégies de menace, si l’on veut influencer les actions d’autrui? Dans cette conférence l’auteur essaie de montrer que les menaces de coercition ne fonctionnent pas dans des situations duelles sans contexte social. Il montre qu’elles fonctionnent seulement si on ajoute des éléments sociaux comme les institutions. En d’autres termes, les menaces efficientes entre sujets rationnels fonctionnent seulement si elles sont confortées par les institutions. C’est une sorte d’argument Hobbésien qui montre que dans l’état de nature le pouvoir social n’existe pas. Le pouvoir social est une construction sociale

Imagining Evil

It is in a way easier to imagine evil actions than we often suppose, but what it is thus relatively easy to do is not what we want to understand about evil. To argue for this conclusion I distinguish between imagining why someone did something and imagining how they could have done it, and I try to grasp partial understanding, in part by distinguishing different imaginative perspectives we can have on an act. When we do this we see an often unnoticed asymmetry: we do not put the same demands on our understanding of wrongdoing as on that of most everyday, morally acceptable, actions. Il est relativement facile d’imaginer des actes maléfiques, plus facile que ce que nous sommes prêts à supposer. Mais ce qui est ainsi facile à imaginer n’est pas ce que nous souhaitons comprendre à propos des actes maléfiques. Pour étayer cette conclusion, je distingue entre comprendre pourquoi quelqu'un fait ce qu'il fait et imaginer comment cette personne aurait fait une telle chose; j'essaie aussi de saisir ce qu'est la compréhension partielle, du moins en partie, en distinguant entre elles les différentes perspectives imaginaires d’un même acte. C’est ainsi qu’apparaît une asymétrie qui passe souvent inaperçue: nous n'imposons pas les mêmes exigences à l'égard de notre compréhension d’actes répréhensibles qu'à l’égard d’actions quotidiennes moralement acceptables.

Is maternal deprivation the root of all evil?

In this paper we seriously entertain the question, “Is maternal deprivation the root of all evil?” Our consideration of this question is broken down into three parts. In the fi rst part, we discuss the nature of evil, focusing in particular on the legal concept of depravity. In the second part, we discuss the nurture of evil, focusing in particular on the common developmental trajectory seen in those who are depraved. In the third part, we discuss the roots of evil, focusing in particular on the animal and human research regarding maternal deprivation. Our conclusion is that maternal deprivation may actually be the root of all evil, but only because depraved individuals have been deprived of normative maternal care, which is the cradle of our humanity.