Employer evasion of worker entitlements 1986-95 : what and whose?

Employer non-compliance with workers’ entitlements is an area seldom explored in Australian industrial relations, generally considered uncommon or the province of ‘rogue’ employers. This paper provides a picture of the categories of entitlements against which complaints of evasion were made in the federal industrial relations jurisdiction in Australia, between 1986 and 1995 and the characteristics of complainants. The “top 30” awards ranked by extent of underpayment recovered by the federal enforcement agency (1987-95) are also explored to support arguments that intense competition, reduced union density, precarious employment, youth and being female are strongly associated with employer evasion. The increasing prevalence of these factors in the labour market suggests that employer compliance should be more carefully explored in the Australian context.

Gender and public attitude toward corruption and tax evasion

The topics of corruption and tax evasion have attracted significant attention in the literature in recent years. We build on that literature by investigating empirically: (1) whether attitudes toward corruption and tax evasion vary systematically with gender and (2) whether gender differences decline as men and women face similar opportunities for illicit behavior. We use data on eight Western European countries from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey. The results reveal significantly greater aversion to corruption and tax evasion among women. This holds across countries and time, and across numerous empirical specifications. (JEL H260, D730, J160, Z130)

Employer evasion of workers’ entitlements 1968 – 1995: why, what and whose?

Employer non-compliance with workers’ entitlements has been largely ignored in Australian industrial relations. The legal and regulatory literature however, identifies arguments relating to employer propensity to evade regulatory requirements, as well as highlighting environmental factors that may influence such behaviour. This article explores these issues in the Australian federal industrial relations jurisdiction, as well as providing a picture of employer evasion of minimum labour standards between 1986 and 1995: who is exploited and in respect of what entitlements. Industry contexts and common characteristics of non-compliance are outlined by exploration of 30 awards ranked by the extent of underpayments recovered by the federal inspectorate during the period. Employer evasion of workers’ entitlements is arguably a calculated business decision, prompted or facilitated by intense competition, precarious employment (particularly female and youth), non-unionized workplaces and under-resourced enforcement agencies.

On inequality tax evasion and progressive taxes

This paper proposes a simple variation of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) construct and integrates it to a dynamic general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents. We study an overlapping generations framework i n which agents must initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, they then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that in comparison with the basic approach, the ‘evade or not’ choice drastically reduced the extent of evasion in the economy. This outcome is the result of an anomaly intrinsic to the basic Allingham and Sandmo version of the model, which makes the evade-or-not extension a more suitable approach to modelling the issue. We also find that the basic model, and the model with and ‘evade-or-not’ choice have strikingly different political economy implications, , which suggest fruitful avenues of empirical research.

Tax evasion, inequality, and progressive taxes : a political economy perspective

The standard approach to tax compliance applies the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968): in its first application, due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) it models the behaviour of agents as a decision involving a choice of the extent of their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional environment, represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties in the event the agent is caught. While this basic framework yields important insights on tax compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations. Specifically, it indicates a level of compliance that is significantly below what is observed in the data. This thesis revisits the original framework with a view towards addressing this issue, and examining the political economy implications of tax evasion for progressivity in the tax structure. The approach followed involves building a macroeconomic, dynamic equilibrium model for the purpose of examining these issues, by using a step-wise model building procedure starting with some very simple variations of the basic Allingham and Sandmo construct, which are eventually integrated to a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations framework with heterogeneous agents. One of the variations involves incorporating the Allingham and Sandmo construct into a two-period model of a small open economy of the type originally attributed to Fisher (1930). A further variation of this simple construct involves allowing agents to initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, the agents then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that the ‘evade or not’ assumption has strikingly different and more realistic implications for the extent of evasion, and demonstrate that it is a more appropriate modeling strategy in the context of macroeconomic models, which are essentially dynamic in nature, and involve consumption smoothing across time and across various states of nature. Specifically, since deciding to undertake tax evasion impacts on the consumption smoothing ability of the agent by creating two states of nature in which the agent is ‘caught’ or ‘not caught’, there is a possibility that their utility under certainty, when they choose not to evade, is higher than the expected utility obtained when they choose to evade. Furthermore, the simple two-period model incorporating an ‘evade or not’ choice can be used to demonstrate some strikingly different political economy implications relative to its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart. In variations of the two models that allow for voting on the tax parameter, we find that agents typically choose to vote for a high degree of progressivity by choosing the highest available tax rate from the menu of choices available to them. There is, however, a small range of inequality levels for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a relatively low value of the tax rate. The final steps in the model building procedure involve grafting the two-period models with a political economy choice into a dynamic overlapping generations setting with more general, non-linear tax schedules and a ‘cost-of evasion’ function that is increasing in the extent of evasion. Results based on numerical simulations of these models show further improvement in the model’s ability to match empirically plausible levels of tax evasion. In addition, the differences between the political economy implications of the ‘evade or not’ version of the model and its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart are now very striking; there is now a large range of values of the inequality parameter for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a low degree of progressivity. This is because, in the ‘evade or not’ version of the model, low values of the tax rate encourages a large number of agents to choose the ‘not-evade’ option, so that the redistributive mechanism is more ‘efficient’ relative to the situations in which tax rates are high. Some further implications of the models of this thesis relate to whether variations in the level of inequality, and parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties for tax evasion matter for the political economy results. We find that (i) the political economy outcomes for the tax rate are quite insensitive to changes in inequality, and (ii) the voting outcomes change in non-monotonic ways in response to changes in the probability of detection and penalty rates. Specifically, the model suggests that changes in inequality should not matter, although the political outcome for the tax rate for a given level of inequality is conditional on whether there is a large or small or large extent of evasion in the economy. We conclude that further theoretical research into macroeconomic models of tax evasion is required to identify the structural relationships underpinning the link between inequality and redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. The models of this thesis provide a necessary first step in that direction.

From fare evasion to illegal downloads : the cost of defiance

Australian households currently pay the second highest “honesty tax” in the world at $290 per household per year, levied by retailers to offset the $AU1.86 billion in losses they incur from customer theft. Theft is only one type of consumer deviance, which can include behaviours that are against the law, an organisation’s policy, or behaviours that violate normally accepted conduct. An individual’s “deviant behaviour” can vary from one person to the next. My research exploring consumer definitions of right and wrong has found a number of things can inform what an individual thinks is “deviant behaviour”, beyond what the law or organisational policy states as right or wrong. Consumers then use their own justifications to excuse their actions...

Aircraft pursuit-evasion problems with variable speeds

Aircraft pursuit-evasion encounters in a plane with variable speeds are analysed as a differential game. An engagement-dependent coordinate system confers open-loop optimality on the game. Each aircraft's optimal motion can be represented by extremel trajectory maps which are independent of role, adversary and capture radius. These maps are used in two different ways to construct the feedback solution. Some examples are given to illustrate these features. The paper draws on earlier results and surveys several existing papers on the subject.

Planar pursuit-evasion with variable speeds, part 1, extremal trajectory maps

Pursuit evasion in a plane is formulated with both players allowed to vary their speeds between fixed limits. A suitable choice of real-space coordinates confers open-loop optimality on the game. The solution in the small is described in terms of the individual players'' extremal trajectory maps (ETM). Each map is independent of role, adversary, and capture radius. An ETM depicts the actual real-space trajectories. A template method of generating constant control arcs is described. Examples of ETM for an aircraft flying at a constant altitude with fixed and varying speeds are presented.

Planar pursuit-evasion with variable speeds, part 2, barrier sections

An iterative method of constructing sections of the game surfaces from the players'' extremal trajectory maps is discussed. Barrier sections are presented for aircraft pursuit-evasion at constant altitude, with one aircraft flying at sustained speed and the other varying its speed.

The pursuit-evasion problem of two aircraft in a horizontal plane

The pursuit-evasion problem of two aircraft in a horizontal plane is modelled as a zerosum differential game with capture time as payoff. The aircraft are modelled as point masses with thrust and bank angle controls. The games of kind and degree for this differential game are solved.

Fas ligand expression and tumour immune evasion; the role of prostaglandin E2 and the EP1 receptor

Background and Aim: During carcinogenesis, tumours develop multiple mechanisms to evade the immune system and suppress the anti-tumour immune response. Upregulation of Fas Ligand (FasL/CD95L) expression may represent one such mechanism. FasL is a member of the tumour necrosis factor superfamily that triggers apoptotic cell death following ligation to its receptor Fas. Numerous studies have demonstrated upregulated FasL expression in tumor cells, with FasL expression associated with numerous pro-tumorigenic effects. However, little is known about the mechanisms that regulate FasL expression in tumours. The cyclooxgenase (COX) signalling pathway may play an important role in colon carcinogenesis, via the production of prostaglandins, in particular PGE2. PGE2 signals through four different receptor subtypes, EP1 – EP4. Thus, the aim of this study was to investigate the effect of targeting the PGE2-FasL signaling pathway. Results: (i) PGE2 induces FasL expression via the EP1 receptor in colon cancer cells. (ii) Suppression of FasL expression in colon tumour cells in vivo significantly delays and reduces tumour growth. (iii) Blocking EP1 receptor signaling, or suppression of the EP1 receptor in colon tumour cells, reduces tumour growth in vivo. Suppression of tumour growth correlates in part with suppression of FasL expression. (iv) The reduction in tumour growth is associated with an improved anti-tumour immune response. Tumour infiltration by Treg cells and macrophages was reduced, and the cytotoxic activity of CTL generated from splenocytes isolated from these mice increased. Conclusion: 1) Targeting FasL expression by blocking PGE2-EP1 receptor signalling reduces tumour development in vivo. 2) The mechanism is indirect but is associated with an increased anti-tumour immune response. Thus, unraveling the mechanisms regulating FasL expression and the pro-tumorigenic effects of the EP1 receptor may aid in the search for new therapeutic targets against colon cancer.

Chemotherapy-Induced CXC-Chemokine/CXC-Chemokine Receptor Signaling in Metastatic Prostate Cancer Cells Confers Resistance to Oxaliplatin through Potentiation of Nuclear Factor-κB Transcription and Evasion of Apoptosis

Constitutive activation of nuclear factor (NF)-kappa B is linked with the intrinsic resistance of androgen-independent prostate cancer (AIPC) to cytotoxic chemotherapy. Interleukin-8 (CXCL8) is a transcriptional target of NF-kappa B whose expression is elevated in AIPC. This study sought to determine the significance of CXCL8 signaling in regulating the response of AIPC cells to oxaliplatin, a drug whose activity is reportedly sensitive to NF-kappa B activity. Administration of oxaliplatin to PC3 and DU145 cells increased NF-kappa B activity, promoting antiapoptotic gene transcription. In addition, oxaliplatin increased the transcription and secretion of CXCL8 and the related CXC-chemokine CXCL1 and increased the transcription and expression of CXC-chemokine receptors, especially CXC-chemokine receptor (CXCR) 2, which transduces the biological effects of CXCL8 and CXCL1. Stimulation of AIPC cells with CXCL8 potentiated NF-kappa B activation in AIPC cells, increasing the transcription and expression of NF-kappa B-regulated antiapoptotic genes of the Bcl-2 and IAP families. Coadministration of a CXCR2-selective antagonist, AZ10397767 (Bioorg Med Chem Lett 18:798-803, 2008), attenuated oxaliplatin-induced NF-kappa B activation, increased oxaliplatin cytotoxicity, and potentiated oxaliplatin-induced apoptosis in AIPC cells. Pharmacological inhibition of NF-kappa B or RNA interference-mediated suppression of Bcl-2 and survivin was also shown to sensitize AIPC cells to oxaliplatin. Our results further support NF-kappa B activity as an important determinant of cancer cell sensitivity to oxaliplatin and identify the induction of autocrine CXCR2 signaling as a novel mode of resistance to this drug.

Identification of the Flagellin Glycosylation System in Burkholderia cenocepacia and the Contribution of Glycosylated Flagellin to Evasion of Human Innate Immune Responses

Burkholderia cenocepacia is an opportunistic pathogen threatening patients with cystic fibrosis. Flagella are required for biofilm formation, as well as adhesion to and invasion of epithelial cells. Recognition of flagellin via the Toll-like receptor 5 (TLR5) contributes to exacerbate B. cenocepacia-induced lung epithelial inflammatory responses. In this study, we report that B. cenocepacia flagellin is glycosylated on at least 10 different sites with a single sugar, 4,6-dideoxy-4-(3-hydroxybutanoylamino)-d-glucose. We have identified key genes that are required for flagellin glycosylation, including a predicted glycosyltransferase gene that is linked to the flagellin biosynthesis cluster and a putative acetyltransferase gene located within the O-antigen lipopolysaccharide cluster. Another O-antigen cluster gene, rmlB, which is required for flagellin glycan and O-antigen biosynthesis, was essential for bacterial viability, uncovering a novel target against Burkholderia infections. Using glycosylated and nonglycosylated purified flagellin and a cell reporter system to assess TLR5-mediated responses, we also show that the presence of glycan in flagellin significantly impairs the inflammatory response of epithelial cells. We therefore suggest that flagellin glycosylation reduces recognition of flagellin by host TLR5, providing an evasive strategy to infecting bacteria.