The paradox of nationalism: the common denominator of radical right and radical left euroscepticism

What can explain the strong euroscepticism of radical parties of both the right and the left? This article argues that the answer lies in the paradoxical role of nationalism as a central element in both party families, motivating opposition towards European integration. Conventionally, the link between nationalism and euroscepticism is understood solely as a prerogative of radical right-wing parties, whereas radical left-wing euroscepticism is associated with opposition to the neoliberal character of the European Union.This article contests this view. It argues that nationalism cuts across party lines and constitutes the common denominator of both radical right-wing and radical left-wing euroscepticism. It adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining intensive case study analysis with quantitative analysis of party manifestos. First, it traces the link between nationalism and euroscepticism in Greece and France in order to demonstrate the internal validity of the argument. It then undertakes a cross-country statistical estimation to assess the external validity of the argument and its generalisability across Europe.

Radical left-wing Euroscepticism in the 2014 elections: a cross-European comparison

This article examines the varied performance of radical left-wing Eurosceptic parties during the 2014 EP elections. While the performance of the radical right during this 'earthquake' election has been widely discussed, little attention has been paid to the radical left. The article examines the result comparatively, and identifies that: (1) across Europe, radical left-wing euroscepticism is limited to few countries, including Greece, Cyprus, France and Portugal; (2) the countries that have experienced the worst of the economic crisis did not experience a significant rise in far right-wing party support but did experience the rise of left-wing euroscepticism; (3) from this sample only Greece experienced the rise of both the radical right and radical left.

The 2009 European Parliament Elections: A Disaster for Social Democrats. The European Parliament Elections of 2009 and the Fate of Euroscepticism.

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Euroscepticism vs. Political Pragmatism: The Finns Party tones down its criticism of the EU. EPIN Commentary No. 19, 26 June 2014

While many Eurosceptic parties in Europe achieved historical successes in this year’s EP elections, Finland’s populist Finns Party was unable to fulfil its own high expectations. With the eurozone crisis at least temporarily subsiding and Finland’s own economy struggling, the party has been unable to find a new electoral trump card. Facing a changed political climate and stiffer competition, the party is currently toning down its criticism of the EU, as indicated by its recent decision to join the British Tories in the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group.

Evolving Patterns of Euroscepticism in the Danish Political Landscape. EPIN Commentary No. 25/15 July 2015

Catharina Sørensen observes in this new EPIN Commentary that the most significant result of the Danish elections on June 18th was not the change of government from centre-left to centre-right, but rather the possibility that the anti-immigration, anti-European integration Danish People’s Party (DPP) would also enter government. While its leadership elected not to do so, but rather to exercise influence from outside, the author further notes that one positive outcome of a new pro-European government that is dependent on a largely eurosceptic supporting party could be that EU issues will finally get the prominence in Danish politics that they deserve.

Information Guide: Euroscepticism

A guide to information sources on Euroscepticism, with hyperlinks to further sources of information within European Sources Online and on external websites

An Ethos Theory of Party Positions on European Integration: Poland and Beyond

Since 1989, five parliamentary elections have been the stage for the foundation and demise of political parties aspiring to govern the new democratic Polish state. The demise of the AWS before the 2001 elections after ten years of attempts to create a centre-right core party resulted in a new splintering of the right-wing, and the centre-right became again devoid of a pivotal formation. While Eurosceptic parties in average gain 8 percent of the vote, in the 2001 Polish parliamentary elections Eurosceptic parties gained around 20 percent of the vote. In Poland right-wing parties show an unusual propensity for Euroscepticism. The persistence and increased importance of nationalism in Poland, which has prevented the development of a strong Christian democratic party, effectively explains the levels of Euroscepticism on the right. After the autumn 2005 parliamentary elections the national conservative party, Law and Justice, formed a governing coalition with the national Catholic League of Polish Families, creating one of the first Eurosceptic governments. Although this work does not intend to provide a theorisation of party systems development, it shows that the context of European integration fostered nationalists’ divisiveness of, and provoked the splitting of the right the unusual propensity of parties for Euroscepticism makes Poland a paradigmatic case of the kind of conflicts over European integration emerging in Central and Eastern European party systems.

Análisis de la influencia de las corrientes de integración europea en las decisiones políticas irlandesas con respecto al futuro de la construcción de la UE durante el periodo 2000 a 2009.

Esta monografía es una aproximación a las definiciones de Europeísmo y Euroescepticismo irlandés, basadas en las características obtenidas del análisis del marco (discurso manejado, actores principales y repertorio) de las campañas desarrolladas durante los 4 referendos irlandeses en temas europeos (Tratados de Niza y Lisboa) entre 2000 y 2009.

Die Schuldenkrise und die Unterstützung der Europäischen Union

Die Unterstützung der EU durch ihre Bürger ist spätestens seit dem Vertrag von Maastricht Gegenstand einer Vielzahl von Beiträgen in der Einstellungsforschung. Eine zentrale Annahme der bisherigen Forschung war die große Distanz der EU zur Alltagswirklichkeit der Bürger. Nach dieser werden Einstellungen zur EU nur aufwendig oder mit Rückgriff auf Einstellungen zum Nationalstaat gebildet. Mit der Euro-Schuldenkrise, deren wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen für die Bürger und einer Vielzahl von EU-Krisengipfeln erfuhr die europäische Politik seit 2010 eine enorme Aufmerksamkeit in der Öffentlichkeit. In dieser Arbeit wird die Entwicklung der EU-Unterstützung vergleichend in Deutschland und Griechenland vor und während der Schuldenkrise untersucht: 1) Zunächst wird diskutiert, inwieweit die Schuldenkrise mit den etablierten Determinanten der Unterstützungsforschung theoretisch zusammenhängt. Im Mittelpunkt stehen wirtschaftliche und demokratische Performanz, europäische und nationale Identität sowie Heuristiken zum Nationalstaat. 2) Der Fokus auf Deutschland und Griechenland ermöglicht einen Vergleich der Determinanten vor und während der Krise, da beide Länder substanziell völlig unterschiedlich, jedoch gleichzeitig betroffen waren. Während die Bürger in Griechenland spürbare Wohlstandsverluste erleiden, stellt sich in Deutschland die Frage nach der Solidarität mit den europäischen Nachbarn. 3) Die empirische Analyse zeigt, dass die etablierten Determinanten in der Schuldenkrise ihre Relevanz behalten. Das individuelle wirtschaftliche Schicksal ist in Griechenland ein stärkerer Einflussfaktor als vor der Krise. Es bestätigt sich die Erwartung, dass die größere Präsenz der EU in der Krise mit einer geringeren Bedeutung der Einstellungen zum Nationalstaat einhergeht.

Croatia: accession negotiations with the EU overshadowed by parliamentary elections. OSW Commentary No. 48, 2011-02-29

In 2011 Croatia entered the final stage of its accession negotiations with the EU. The completion of these negotiations will probably coincide with the parliamentary elections which should be held in November or December this year. The elections are likely to bring about a change of government, as public support for Jadranka Kosor's cabinet and her party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) has been declining; the left-wing opposition is likely to take power. Therefore, the government’s main goal is to complete the accession negotiations in the first half of the year, in order to sign the accession treaty and hold the EU membership referendum before the parliamentary elections. The HDZ believes that only the successful completion of the accession negotiations could increase its chances of a good result in the upcoming elections. At the same time, fearing a further fall in support, the government will avoid any decisions and reforms that would be controversial for the public, especially in the sphere of the economy; such decisions could also increase Euroscepticism among the Croatian public, and result in the rejection of EU accession in the referendum. The government in Zagreb hopes that the currently implemented anti-corruption strategy and reform of the judiciary, as well as the advanced process of adaptation to EU conditions, will be enough to complete the negotiations. This strategy has a serious chance of success, considering that there is considerable support for Croatia's membership among the EU countries and institutions. Another reason is that further prolongation of the negotiations could aggravate hostility towards the EU among the Croatian public, and would be a bad sign for other Balkan states with membership aspirations. However, subordinating Croatian policies to the completion of negotiations in the first half of the year could prove to be adverse for Croatia itself in the longer term, as it would put off the necessary structural reforms.

Proportionality needed in the subsidiarity debate in the EU – Appraisal of the British and Dutch initiatives. CEPS Essay No. 11, 8 April 2014

In a new CEPS Essay, Michael Emerson assesses the initiatives taken by the UK and Dutch governments to cut out excessive EU regulatory intrusion, namely in the form of the ongoing British Balance of Competences Review and the Dutch list of 54 items of EU regulation that they would like to see repealed or reformed. He concludes that while one can approve of a campaign for better EU regulation and for cutting out unnecessary micro-regulation, it would require impressive commitment by all member states and the EU institutions to follow the best features of the British and Dutch leads for this to have a real effect in the fight against populist euroscepticism. In his view, that battle will have to be won primarily with bigger weapons – some combination of better macroeconomic results, bigger foreign policy achievements and the emergence of a European-level political leadership to which the people can relate. In short, there has to be due proportionality in the diagnosis of the responsibility of inadequate subsidiarity for the EU’s ills.

The New European Commission Presidency and the Advent of European Democracy. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 17, August 2014

On June 15, 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, the lead candidate of the European People’s Party, was elected President of the European Commission, with the support of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and some of the European Socialists and Greens. Amid unprecedented Euroscepticism, the media and many pundits predicted a record-low voter turnout and record-high results for Europhobic parties. The aforementioned parties then decided that the political outcome of these 2014 European elections would also be unprecedented. For the first time in EU history, the European political parties agreed to nominate candidates to chair the institution, which they justified by putting forward Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament has often characteristically used political discourse - the logos, to influence the EU’s institutional framework, even though it entails grappling with Member States. It took the form of reports and resolutions, like the official use of the phrase “European Parliament” in 1962, direct universal suffrage elections in 1975 and a European Union in 1984. Nominating contenders to chair the European Commission is no exception. It requires a specific political discourse whose origins can be traced back to the early years of the European Parliament, when it was still the “Common Assembly”. This political discourse is one of the elements thanks to which the European Parliament acquired visibility and new prerogatives, in pursuit of its legitimacy. However, the executive branch in all member states is not intent on yielding such prerogatives to the European Parliament. As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has often ended up strengthening the heads of state and governments, since MEPs are forced to resort to self-discipline. The symbolic significance of its logos and, consequently, its own politicisation as a source of legitimacy, is thus undermined. For instance, in 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker’s election actually strengthened German Chancellor Angela Merkel. First she questioned the fact that the candidate whose party holds the parliamentary majority after the election should be appointed President of the Commission. Then she seemed strongly intent on democratising the Union, when she confronted David Cameron, who openly opposed Juncker, believed to be too federalist and old-fashioned a candidate. By doing so, she eventually reduced the symbolic dimension of the European Parliament’s initiative, and Juncker’s election. She also unquestionably embodied EU leadership. This paper aims at analysing Juncker’s election to the Presidency of the European Commission, as well as other questions it raises. In the first part, I lay out some thoughts about the sociohistorical context of voting in European elections in order to make the readers understand why the European Parliament should be bolder. Secondly, I try to explain how the European Parliament has used the logos as a weapon to grapple with member states for more power, as was the case during the 2014 European elections. Last but not least, I seek to show how Angela Merkel got hold of that weapon and took advantage of it, thus proving that despite MEPs’ best efforts, Juncker’s task will be all the more complicated as he was not the consensual candidate of all the governments.

Great hatred, little room Northern Ireland and the European Union: Attitudes, perspectives and the role of religion. Bruges Political Research Papers 48/2015.

Little academic attention has been given to the study of Northern Irish Euroscepticism despite the fact that it is a unique and interesting example of citizens’ relationships with the EU. Northern Irish Euroscepticism is defined by the divergence in attitudes towards European integration between Catholics and Protestants. This is a divide that is rooted in historical and religious interpretations of the project, as well as the widespread belief that membership of the EU will somehow lead to a united Ireland. Membership in the EU has not had a significant political impact on Northern Ireland, with citizens’ attitudes being largely characterised by a clear lack of interest in the project. Participation at the European level provided limited opportunity for cooperation by both sides while it may be argued that European elections contributed to the sectarian divide.